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KEYWORDS / PHRASES 
 
In this thesis the following definitions have been adopted. 
 
Family Law Act (Cth) 1975 - Section 4AB:  Definition of Domestic Violence, etc.  
(1) For the purposes of this Act, domestic violence means violent, threatening or 
other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family 
(the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.  
(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute domestic violence include (but are not 
limited to):  
(a) an assault; or  
(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or  
(c) stalking; or  
(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or  
(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or  
(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or  
(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she 
would otherwise have had; or  
(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living 
expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family 
member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; 
or  
(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or 
her family, friends or culture; or  
(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's 
family, of his or her liberty.  
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to domestic violence if the child 
sees or hears domestic violence or otherwise experiences the effects of domestic 
violence.  
(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to domestic 
violence include (but are not limited to) the child:  
(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family 
towards another member of the child's family; or  
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(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member 
of the child's family; or  
(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has 
been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or  
(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged 
property of another member of the child's family; or  
(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the 
assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.  
 
Family Law Act (Cth) 1975, Section 4AB(3) 
“… a child is exposed to domestic violence if the child sees or hears domestic 
violence or otherwise experiences the effects of domestic violence.” 
 
Family Law Act 1975, Section 4(1) 
"abuse", in relation to a child, means:  
(a) an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child; or  
(b) a person (the first person ) involving the child in a sexual activity with the first 
person or another person in which the child is used, directly or indirectly, as a sexual 
object by the first person or the other person, and where there is unequal power in the 
relationship between the child and the first person; or  
(c) causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited 
to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family 
violence; or  
(d) serious neglect of the child.  
 
“Return Order” in this thesis means an order under Part 3 for the return, under the 
Convention, of a child who has been removed to, or retained in, Australia.1 
“Requested State” in this thesis means the country to which the child has been 
abducted.2 
                                                        
1 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 2. 
2 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention, A Critical Analysis, 
Volume 13 in the series Studies in Private International Law, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), Introduction, 4. 
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“Requesting State” in this thesis means the place where the child was habitually 
resident before the abduction.3 
The terms “Article 13(1)(b)”, “Regulation 16(3)(b)” and “Grave Risk of Harm  
Exception” are all used in this thesis to describe the Exception outlined in Article  
13(1)(b) of the Abduction Convention which essentially provides that an abducted  
child can avoid return “if there is a grave risk that the return of the child under the  
Convention would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise  
place the child in an intolerable situation”.   
  
                                                        
3 Ibid. 
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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis will examine how the strict enforcement of Regulation 16(3)(b) in the 
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), also known as 
the “Grave Risk of Harm” Exception (the “Exception”)4 by Australia’s family courts 
over the past decade has been detrimental to women and children fleeing domestic 
violence, and will argue reform is urgently required.   
First, the history and purpose of the Abduction Convention will be discussed and 
how the Convention has been implemented by Australia.   
The thesis will then examine how Australia’s family courts have been interpreting 
the Grave Risk Exception in domestic violence related abduction cases, as it is 
regularly raised by primary carer taking mothers seeking to prevent their children 
being returned from Australia.  This examination will be done by critically 
examining a selection of such cases where the Grave Risk of Harm Exception was 
raised by the taking mother.  All cases examined were decided by the High Court of 
Australia, the Full Court of the Family Court or the Australian Family Court5 
from the past ten years, as my research indicates that primary carer abductions to 
Australia escalated during that time period.   
Essentially, the thesis will focus on demonstrating how Australia’s family courts 
have greatly narrowed the scope of the Grave Risk Exception in domestic violence 
related abduction cases even where there is evidence of abuse/domestic violence 
perpetrated by the applicant father against the child and/or the taking mother, and/or 
evidence that the child has been exposed to serious parental violence.   
The case analysis will begin by discussing how fourteen years ago judicial officers of 
the Australian High Court held that they favoured a broader interpretation of the 
Exception.6  It will then be shown that since that decision the family courts have 
                                                        
4 Regulation 16(3)(b) is the equivalent of Article 13(1)(b) of the Abduction 
Convention and provides that an abducted child can avoid return if “there is a grave 
risk that the return of the child under the Convention would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation”.   
5 I did not find any relevant cases decided by the Federal Circuit Court between 2005 
and 2015. 
6 DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director General NSW Department 
of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
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continued to interpret the Exception narrowly.  That is, generally if there is 
insufficient evidence of direct physical abuse to the child, the family courts will not 
consider that the Exception has been made out.  This seems to be because the family 
courts are reluctant to accept that evidence of emotional/psychological abuse or 
physical violence perpetrated by the applicant father against a taking mother (not 
against the child) can pose a grave risk of harm to the child.  Furthermore, even 
evidence of a child’s exposure to serious parental violence is not readily accepted by 
the family courts as qualifying as “abuse” and consequently does not constitute a 
grave risk of harm to the child or intolerable situation.  This approach by the family 
courts is confusing especially as the definition of “abuse” in relation to a child in the 
Family Law Act7 includes “… causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, 
including (but not limited to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected 
to, or exposed to, family violence.”    
Finally, this thesis will explore literature from other jurisdictions on the inadequacies 
of protection mechanisms which the courts put in place when making return orders. 
These include undertakings given by the applicant and conditional orders and mirror 
orders imposed by the courts.  It will also discuss how the narrow interpretation of 
the Exception can adversely impact on abused women and children.   
To better protect abused women and children who have fled violence it will be 
suggested that reform is required and can be achieved if the family courts adopt a 
broader interpretation of the Exception.  It will be suggested that the courts start 
accepting that evidence of past abuse or violence suffered by a taking mother, or 
evidence that the abducted child was exposed to serious domestic violence  between 
the parents8 equates to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, or otherwise 
places the child in an intolerable situation.  Consequently, no return order should 
therefore be made.  If a return order must be made in a domestic violence case, it will 
                                                        
7 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4(1)(c). 
8 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(1) “… domestic violence means violent, 
threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the 
person's family (the family member ), or causes the family member to be fearful”;  
s 4AB(3) “child is exposed to domestic violence if the child sees or hears domestic 
violence or otherwise experiences the effects of domestic violence.” 
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be submitted that strict pre-conditions9 be attached to the order by the court and fully 
complied with by the applicant father, before the child is removed from Australia.10   
Regarding desired outcomes from this project, this thesis will be submitted for 
publication in appropriate legal journals and also to The Office for Women, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, for review and consideration as part 
of the Commonwealth Government’s current inquiries into domestic violence in 
Australia.  It will also be sent to the Hague for review and consideration by those 
working on the Convention to further highlight this serious issue with a view to 
opening a dialogue about how the international legal community can better address 
this issue.  
  
                                                        
9 Made in accordance with Regulation 15(1)(c). 
10 As was the case in State Central Authority & Fouadi [2010] FamCA 12 (22 
January, 2010). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter will give an introduction to and overview of the Abduction Convention.  
Knowing the background to the Abduction Convention allows a discussion of the 
problems which the Convention has caused domestic violence victims and puts them 
into some perspective. 
The Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction (the 
“Abduction Convention”) was adopted on 24 October, 1980 by the Fourteenth 
Session of the Hague Conference on private international law in Plenary Session, and 
by unanimous vote of the States which were present (including Australia) and 
concluded on 25 October, 1980.18  It was ratified by Australia on 25 October, 1986 
and came into force in Australia on 1 January, 1987.  As at February 2015 there were 
93 contracting states.19  It is a multilateral treaty developed by the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law20 and it protects children from the harmful effects of 
their wrongful removal or retention and establishes procedures to ensure their prompt 
return to the State of their habitual residence.  It also protects parental rights of 
access.21  It governs all civil cases relating to international child abduction when both 
countries are parties to the Abduction Convention.22     
Basically, the primary objectives of the Abduction Convention are deterrence and 
protection of custody rights which are achieved by “the prompt return of children 
                                                        
18 Elisa Perez-Vera, ‘Explanatory Report on the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 
1980’, (Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Vol. III, April 1981), 426. 
19 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of Part I and Part II of the 6th Meeting of the Special Commission 
on the Practical Operation of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention and the 1996 
Child Protection Convention (25-31 January, 2012) and a Report of Part II of the 
Meeting (April 2012) drawn up by the Permanent Bureau. 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 
20 Also referred to as the “HCCH”. 
21 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (signed on 25 
October 1980 and entered into force between the signatories on 1 December, 1983), 
Preamble. 
22 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for 
Feminists Concerned about Domestic Violence Here and Abroad,’ (2003) 11(2) 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 749-800, 761. 
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wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting state’ … with a final decision 
on custody to be taken by the authorities of the child’s habitual residence prior to its 
removal.”23  Comity is seen as vital for the Abduction Convention to work properly.  
“International comity encompasses the idea that countries should interpret an 
international Convention that applies to both of them so as not to undermine the 
other country’s law and structure.”24 
The Abduction Convention assumes that the best interests of children collectively are 
best served by an early return to their home country to permit the resolution of a 
custody dispute in that country’s domestic forum.  Although the Abduction 
Convention contains Exceptions to the general rule of immediate return of the child, 
the drafters felt they should be “interpreted in a restrictive fashion” or the Abduction 
Convention would “become a dead letter”.25  However, the Explanatory Report to 
the Abduction Convention offers no specific guidance on what is meant by a 
“restrictive” or narrow interpretation of the Exceptions.26   
The Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Family Law Regulations 1986 (Cth) 
virtually mirror the Abduction Convention, including the Exceptions to the principle 
rule of immediate return of the child to their habitual residence.  The main 
Exceptions raised are: 
• the child was not habitually resident in a Convention country before 
removal/retention;  
                                                        
23 Article 1; Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention’ (Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Vol. III, April 1981), 429 [Paragraph 16]. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
24 Sharon C Nelson, ‘Turning Our Backs On The Children: Implications Of Recent 
Decisions Regarding The Hague Convention On International Child Abduction’ 
(2001) U.Ill. L. Rev. 669, 689. 
25 Elisa Pérez-Vera, ‘Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Acts And Documents Of The Fourteenth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Vol. III, April 1981) 429. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
26 HCCH, ‘Domestic Violence And The Article 13 “Grave Risk” Exception In The 
Operation Of The Hague Convention Of 25 October 1980 On The Civil Aspects Of 
International Child Abduction: A Reflection Paper’ (May 2011) Prel. Doc. No 9, 12 
[34]. http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=6224 
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• the applicant did not have rights of custody to the child before 
removal/retention;  
• the applicant had not been exercising his/her rights of custody to the child;  
• the applicant consented to removal/retention;  
• removal was more than 12 months before the application was lodged and the 
child is settled in their new home;  
• the child objects to being returned;  
• there is a grave risk that the return of the child would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation; or 
• return is not permitted by the fundamental rules of Australia relating to the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
When the Abduction Convention was being drafted, it was believed that the typical 
abductor was a non-custodial father27 (or father or father unlikely to win custody), 
leaving the mother with little recourse to bring her child back home.28  However, the 
drafters’ vision of the typical abductor has proven incorrect as now around seventy 
percent of the abductors are mothers.29  For cases where a non-primary carer father 
has abducted the child the Abduction Convention works well because the child can 
be quickly located and returned to their habitual residence and their primary carer 
                                                        
27 Dr Danielle Bozin, ‘Re-Examining Habitual Residence As The Sole Connecting 
Factor In Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases’ (2012) 3(1) Family Law 
Review 4-17. 
http://www.thomsonreuters.com.au/family-law-review-
online/productdetail/105697?id=857 
28 Justice Kay in the unreported Decision Of SCA V [M] [2003] Famca 1128 
(17/9/2003); See Also Carol Bruch, ‘Protecting Children Who Are Abducted By A 
Parent’, Symposium (A Publication Of Shimer College, Chicago IL), Summer 2012; 
Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential And Challenges Of Transnational Litigation For 
Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here And Abroad,’ (2003) 11(2) 
American University Journal Of Gender, Social Policy & The Law, 749-800. 
29 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for 
Feminists Concerned about Domestic Violence Here and Abroad’ (2003) 11, Issue 2, 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 749-800, 765; M 
Salter, ‘The Impact Of International Law On Child Abduction By Protective 
Mothers’ (2014) 39:I ALTLJ 20; Carol Bruch, ‘Protecting Children Who Are 
Abducted By A Parent’ (Summer 2012) Symposium (A Publication Of Shimer 
College, Chicago IL). 
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mother.  Furthermore, many of these women are fleeing to the safety of Australian 
relatives to escape abusive and violent spouses.30  The Australian courts prefer to 
apply the Convention strictly to all cases in order to encourage comity with other 
signatory states.  What is not widely known, but is discussed in Chapter Five, is how 
the strict application of the Abduction Convention’s principles, in particular, the 
courts’ narrow interpretation of Regulation 16(3)(b), can cause serious hardships for 
abused women and their children.   
Interestingly, the modus operandi of the Abduction Convention and its impact on 
individuals in the middle of these disputes, particularly children, was raised shortly 
after Australia adopted the Abduction Convention.  Brian Davis stated in 1990 that: 
The principles of the Convention and the [Australian] Family Law 
Regulations are the principles of comity and forum convenience.  The welfare 
of the child is not the paramount consideration, or, indeed, a consideration at 
all, saves to the very limited extent provided for by Art. 13 of the Convention 
…31   
Further, in 2005 Carol Bruch (Professor Emerita, University of California, Davis) 
stated that: 
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, as currently applied, imposes unnecessary hardships on domestic 
violence victims and their children.  These difficult cases require better 
solutions …32 
                                                        
30 Mirela Iverac, ‘Protecting Kids: Rethinking The Hague Convention’ (10 
December, 2010) Time Magazine; Carol Bruch, ‘Protecting Children Who Are 
Abducted By A Parent’ (2012), Symposium (A Publication Of Shimer College, 
Chicago IL); International Social Service Australian Branch, ‘Living In Limbo, The 
Experience Of International Parental Child Abduction – The Call For A National 
Support Service’ February 2005. 
31 Brian Davis, ‘The New Rules On International Child Abduction’ (March 1990) 4 
Australian Journal Of Family Law, 34. 
32 Carol S Bruch, ‘The Unmet Needs Of Domestic Violence Victims And Their 
Children In Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases’, GP Solo Magazine, 
September 2005. 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_so
lo_magazine_index/unmetneeds.html 
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Geographically speaking, Australia is quite removed from the rest of the world.  
However, it is not insulated from this issue.  According to the Australian Parliament,  
Child abduction is a growing problem in the world. Modern technology and 
transport systems have dramatically increased people's mobility.  As a result, 
there are an increasing number of international marriages, marriage 
breakdowns and child custody disputes. … Australia is not insulated from the 
growing problem of international child abduction.  International child 
abduction is a complicated issue, despite international conventions aimed at 
dealing with cross-border abductions. Differences in legal systems and lack 
of enforcement have resulted in lengthy and costly legal battles for parents 
and sometimes years of separation from their children.33   
Although a taking mother who is an Australian citizen may flee to Australia with her 
child believing the courts will willingly grant her full legal and physical custody of 
that child.  Generally, however, if the Abduction Convention is involved the opposite 
is true.34 
The case law over the past decade illustrates that taking mothers almost always raise 
Regulation16(3)(b) as a defence.  It provides that: 
“… the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound 
to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which 
opposes its return establishes that … there is a grave risk that his or her return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.”35 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
33http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affair
s_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/1996-99/consular/report/c09 
34 Parliament of Australia, ‘Helping Australians Abroad – A Review of the 
Australian Government’s Consular Services, Chapter 9, ‘Custody Issues Involving 
Australian Children’, paragraph 9.9. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs
_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/1996-99/consular/report/c09 
35 Regulation 16(3)(b) of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 
1986 (Cth), mirrors Article 13(b). 
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The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) section 4AB(1) defines “domestic violence” as 
meaning “violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls 
a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member 
to be fearful.”  Subsection(2) gives examples of behaviour that may constitute 
domestic violence which includes (but is not limited to):  
(a) an assault; or  
(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or  
(c) stalking; or  
(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or  
(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or  
(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or  
(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she  
would otherwise have had; or  
(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living  
expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family  
member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support;  
or  
(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or  
her family, friends or culture; or  
(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's  
family, of his or her liberty.  
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to domestic violence if the child 
sees or hears domestic violence or otherwise experiences the effects of domestic 
violence.  
(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to domestic 
violence include (but are not limited to) the child:  
(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family 
towards another member of the child's family; or  
(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member 
of the child's family; or  
(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has 
been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or  
(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged 
property of another member of the child's family; or  
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(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the 
assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.  
 
Fourteen years ago the Australian High Court rejected a narrow interpretation of the 
Grave Risk of Harm Exception.36  However, the case law analysed in this thesis 
reveals that Australia’s family courts have steadfastly remained reluctant to embrace 
a broader approach to the Exception.  Instead the courts have generally continued to 
interpret the Exception narrowly, even in domestic violence related abduction cases.  
That is, Australia’s family courts generally refuse to accept that abuse/violence 
perpetrated against a taking mother by an applicant, or abuse witnessed by a child, 
can satisfy Regulation 16(3)(b).  This attitude prevails despite recent research 
published by the HCCH37 itself that “children who are part of a family where adult 
domestic violence is found are at greater risk of being exposed to physical harm 
themselves.”38  It will be argued that in domestic violence related abduction cases 
Australia’s courts should be expanding the scope of Regulation 16(3)(b) based on the 
definitions of “domestic violence”, “exposure of a child” to domestic violence and 
the definition of “abuse” in relation to a child in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) so 
that evidence of abuse/violence perpetrated against a mother and/or witnessed by her 
child satisfies Regulation 16(3)(b).   
To support the argument in this thesis I used the doctrinal methodology and 
examined a selection of published cases decided by the High Court of Australia, the 
Full Court of the Family Court and the Family Court between 2005 and 2015.  The 
case law shows it was during this time period that primary carer abductions to 
Australia from other countries started escalating.   
Between September 2014 (when I commenced this project) and September 2015 I 
conducted extensive searches of the Australian Family Court website, Austlii, and 
LexisNexis.  I also researched the HCCH’s website to find cases where the Grave 
                                                        
36 See DP v Commonwealth Central Authority: JLM v Director General NSW 
Department of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
37 The Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php 
38 HCCH, ‘Domestic Violence And The Article 13 “Grave Risk” Exception In The 
Operation Of The Hague Convention Of 25 October 1980 On The Civil Aspects Of 
International Child Abduction: A Reflection Paper’ (May 2011) Prel. Doc. No 9. 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=6224 
 http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=6224 
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Risk Exception was raised by the taking mother and supported by 
allegations/evidence of abuse perpetrated by the applicant father against the child 
and/or the mother, or witnessed by the child.  I used various search terms which 
included “Hague Convention and domestic violence”, “International Parental Child 
Abduction”, “Parental Kidnapping”, “Australia and the Hague Convention.”  I 
examined sixteen cases in total.  In only four of those cases did the court decline to 
make a return order.  In twelve of those cases the courts did not find that the Grave 
Risk of Harm Exception was made out, so a return order was made.   
In Chapter Two, I explore the history, content and implementation of the Hague 
Abduction Convention in Australia, including how the key principles of deterrence, 
protection of custody rights and comity have been embedded in Australian domestic 
law. 
Chapter Three examines how Australian family courts interpret Regulation 16(3)(b) 
when raised by a taking mother in a Hague case where the child was not directly 
abused by a parent, but was exposed to parental violence.  I will discuss a selection 
of cases decided by the Australian High Court, the Full Court of the Family Court 
and the Family Court where the Grave Risk Exception was raised by the taking 
mother.  The cases span the past 10 years as primary carer abductions escalated 
during this time period.  Also, I wanted to explore how the courts were handling the 
most recent cases involving domestic/family violence.  I will also examine recent 
social science research and the section 4 definition of “abuse” in the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth) (a child’s exposure to parental violence can constitute “serious 
psychological harm” to the child) and submit that such exposure should be accepted 
by Australian family courts as satisfying Regulation 16(3)(b). 
Chapter Four examines cases from the past decade where the taking mother and/or 
abducted child have been directly abused by the applicant father, and in most of these 
cases the child has also witnessed parental violence.  The focus is on how the courts 
interpreted Regulation 16(3)(b).   
My analysis of the selected cases illustrates how the Grave Risk Exception is 
regularly raised by primary carer taking mothers and supported by evidence of 
abuse/violence perpetrated against the taking mother, and/or her child, or witnessed 
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by the child.  In these cases I examine the allegations/evidence provided by the 
taking mother to support the Exception against different styles of judicial 
interpretation.  In most cases a narrow interpretation of the Exception is favoured 
whereby the courts strictly apply the return mechanism, despite solid evidence of 
abuse/violence.  In only a few cases is a broader interpretation adopted where the 
judicial officers fully examine the evidence offered and discuss how life might be for 
the mother and child upon their return. 
In most of the cases I examined the Family Court or the Full Court of the Family 
Court tried to minimize the risk of harm to the mother and/or child by putting into 
place what they consider to be protective measures such as undertakings given by the 
applicant or conditions imposed by the court.  They are supposed to eliminate or 
substantially reduce any grave risk of harm or avoid an intolerable situation.  I will 
examine how these types of measures are often unenforceable and result in abused 
women and children having to face serious hardships upon their return to the child’s 
habitual residence (e.g. isolation from friends/family, financial and housing 
hardships and/or further abuse/violence).   
I will argue for minimizing such hardships by encouraging the judiciary to adopt a 
broader interpretation of the Grave Risk of Harm Exception, which was advocated by 
the High Court, and to accept that evidence of abuse/domestic violence suffered by 
the taking mother, or a child’s exposure to parental violence satisfies Regulation 
16(3)(b) based on the definitions of “domestic violence” and “abuse” in the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth).  The courts should start to recognize social science research that 
a child’s exposure to violence between their parents has a long lasting and traumatic 
impact on that child’s life and even on their adult life.39  I will submit that if a return 
order must be made in a domestic violence case that strict pre-conditions40 are 
attached to protect the mother and child from any further abuse/violence from the 
applicant father and that those conditions must be complied with by the applicant 
father before the child is removed from Australia. 
                                                        
39 John W Fantuzzo and Wanda K Mohr, ‘Prevalence and Effects of Child Exposure 
to Domestic Violence’ The Future of Children, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
CHILDREN, Vol. 9 • No. 3 – Winter 1999; See also: 
http://www.nctsn.org/content/children-and-domestic-violence 
 
40 Regulation 15(1)(c). 
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Chapter Five is an analysis of international literature from the past few years which 
discusses how generally when a return order is made in a domestic violence matter it 
is the practice of most judges to add protective measures such as undertakings, 
conditional orders or mirror orders to the return order.  However, history shows that 
these types of safeguards are ineffective in protecting abused women and children.  I 
will examine some case examples which illustrate this and discuss the consequences 
of this procedure.  There has been some limited discussion in Australia on this point, 
for example, by the Australian Law Reform Commission which made 
recommendations that have not yet been adopted by the Australian 
government/judiciary.  I then compare Australia’s approach to domestic violence 
related abduction cases to that of the United States and Switzerland.  These 
jurisdictions utilise the Paramountcy Principle when deciding domestic violence 
related abduction cases.  I then list some local services, including current community 
and legal services, available in Queensland for Australian taking mothers who find 
themselves as respondents in a Hague case. 
Chapter Six briefly discusses some possible solutions which have been raised in 
relation to this issue, ranging from a Protocol being added to the Abduction 
Convention to deal with domestic violence cases, which is virtually impossible to 
achieve, to something more attainable like having judges who have been educated 
about domestic violence related abduction cases from the jurisdictions involved in 
the case communicate and work together to achieve a result that supports the child’s 
best interests.   
The Conclusion in Chapter Seven sums up the main arguments made in this thesis.  
Generally, judicial officers of the Australian family courts continue to interpret 
Regulation 16(3)(b) narrowly in all Hague cases which can cause harm to abused 
women and children.  It will be submitted that in domestic violence related abduction 
cases Australia’s family courts should be expanding the scope of Regulation 16(3)(b) 
based on the definitions of “domestic violence”, “exposure of a child” to domestic 
violence and the definition of “abuse” in relation to a child in the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth) so that evidence of abuse/violence perpetrated against a mother and/or 
witnessed by her child satisfies Regulation 16(3)(b) and no return order is made.   
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I will argue that the way the Australian judiciary is currently handling such cases is 
not only failing to protect abused mothers and their children, it is exposing them to 
hardships and harm upon their return.  The history of how Australian courts have 
narrowly interpreted the Grave Risk of Harm Exception, even in serious domestic 
violence related abduction cases, must be acknowledged and redressed by the 
judiciary by interpreting the Exception more broadly and in line with the High Court 
ruling in DP v. Central Authority; JLM v Director-General, NSW Department of 
Community Services,41 and by adopting the Paramountcy Principle as the test for 
domestic violence related abduction cases where there is strong evidence of 
abuse/violence perpetrated against the mother and/or the child, or the child’s 
exposure to violence. 
  
                                                        
41 (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE HISTORY, CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION IN AUSTRALIA. 
In this chapter I explore the history, content and implementation of the Hague 
Abduction Convention in Australia, including how the key principles of deterrence, 
protection of custody rights and comity have been embedded in Australian domestic 
law. 
History of the Abduction Convention: 
The Abduction Convention provides a mechanism for the prompt return of 
wrongfully removed or retained children between contracting states; the aim being to 
serve the interests of all children by deterring their wrongful abduction or retention 
and restoring them to their place of habitual residence, but also to serve the interests 
of the individual child by making certain assumptions about what will be in that 
child’s best interest.  These assumptions can be rebutted by the establishment of one 
or other of the defences contained in the Family Law Regulations (see In Re E 
(Children) (Abduction Custody Appeal) [2011] 4 ER 517 at 525).42 
 
This chapter will discuss how the Abduction Convention was drafted and enacted to 
deal with straightforward cases of international parental child abduction, i.e., where a 
non-custodial parent takes or retains their child in another jurisdiction without the 
consent of the other parent.  The Abduction Convention seeks to have the abducted 
child swiftly found and returned to the child’s habitual residence so that issues of 
parental custody and access can be decided and enforced in the correct jurisdiction.  
To be effective, the Abduction Convention strongly encourages deterrence and 
comity, i.e., for signatory state to recognise each other’s laws in this area.43   
The Abduction Convention was drafted and adopted before the 1989 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.  This has meant that the language concerning the best 
                                                        
42 Wolford & Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) [2014] FamCAFC 197. 
43 Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981), 429; Article 7. 
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interests of the child, which is enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,44 is not the legal standard under the Abduction Convention.  The preamble to 
the Abduction Convention does state that “the interests of children are of paramount 
importance in matters relating to their custody” and the Abduction Convention seeks 
to do that by protecting them against the “harmful effects of their wrongful removal 
or retention.”45  Article 3 of the Abduction Convention defines the removal or 
retention as “wrongful” when it occurred “in breach of rights of custody,” and when 
“those rights were actually exercised.”46  The Abduction Convention represents a 
policy decision made by the drafters of what they thought was in the best interests of 
children, generally.  It serves children’s collective best interests by balancing the 
interests of an individual child against other factors such as deterring international 
child abduction and promoting comity while causing the least amount of overall 
harm to children by promptly returning them to familiar surroundings.47 
 
Under the Abduction Convention the removal or retention of a child from a 
convention country would be considered child abduction and therefore breaking the 
law if it breaches the rights of custody attributed to another person, institution or 
body under the law of the state where the child lived before the removal.48  Because 
of the heavy focus on the principle of comity, the Abduction Convention gives 
                                                        
44 United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child (Entered Into Force 20 
November 1989) Art 3. 
45 Elisa Pérez-Vera,‘Explanatory Report on the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 
1980’, (Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Vol. III, April 1981), 429. 
Http://Www.Hcch.Net/Upload/Exp128/Pdf 
46 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential And Challenges Of Transnational Litigation For 
Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here And Abroad,’ (2003) 11(2) 
American University Journal Of Gender, Social Policy & The Law, 749-800, 764. 
47 De L V Director-General Department Of Community Services (NSW) (1996) 187 
CLR 640; Jodi Anne Gray, ‘Respecting Human Rights In The Drafting And 
Interpretive Stages Of The Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International 
Child Abduction’ (2002) 17 AJFL 270, 3.  
48 Hague Convention On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction 
(entered into force 1 December 1983), Art 3; Jennifer Hollyer, ‘An Update On Child 
Abduction And The Hague Convention’ (March 23, 2012), Stowe Family Law LLP 
http://www.marilynstowe.co.uk/2012/03/23/an-update-on-child-abduction-and-the-
hague-convention-by-guest-blogger-jennifer-hollyer/ 
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precedence to collaboration between Contracting States over the rights of individual 
children.49   
The Abduction Convention was drafted to primarily deal with parents kidnapping 
their children across jurisdictions and forum shopping to get custody orders in their 
favour.50  When the Abduction Convention was first drafted, the paradigm abductor 
was not the children’s primary carer, but the other parent who ‘snatched’ them away 
from her.51  Even the Explanatory Report prepared for the Abduction Convention 
refers to “the father” as being the “abductor”.52  The drafters of the Abduction 
Convention did not address the issue of domestic violence related parental 
abductions by abused women53 or invoke the Paramountcy Principle.54  At the time 
of drafting “women abductors were invisible to reformers.”55 
 
Legal scholars who regularly research and write on this area have noted that 
“domestic violence now plays an increasingly important role in Convention 
litigation.”56  Professor Carol Bruch has stated that “It is, with hindsight, truly 
remarkable that violence against caregivers was neither discussed nor dealt with by 
                                                        
49 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. Iii, April 1981), 436. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
50 Merle H Weiner, ‘International Child Abduction And The Escape From Domestic 
Violence’ (2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 593, 599. 
51 Per Hale LJ In TB v JB [2001] 2 FLR 515, para 43. 
52 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981) 429. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
53 This situation relates to an abused mother and wife who leaves her home and goes 
to another jurisdiction together with her children, to escape abuse/violence 
perpetrated upon her and/or the children by the children’s father, without first 
obtaining consent from the father of the children. 
54 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CA - Child's Best Interests Paramount 
Consideration In Making A Parenting Order: In deciding whether to make a 
particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests 
of the child as the paramount consideration.  
55 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for 
Feminists Concerned about Domestic Violence Here and Abroad,’ (2003) 11(2) 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 749-800, 799. 
56 Carol Bruch, ‘The Promise And Perils Of A Protocol To The 1980 Convention On 
The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction’ (2011) 237, 244.   
https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bruch/files/Bruch_aus_FS_Schwenzer.pdf 
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the drafters, but the days in which the law failed to acknowledge these harsh realities 
are fortunately in the past.  It is now essential that specific provisions to protect 
caregivers be articulated and that the new drafters understand that these protections 
are also necessary to protect the children’s welfare.57  Professor Bruch has also 
stated: 
 
Return orders that would endanger caregivers or place children in foster care, 
battered women’s centers, or poverty should be prohibited by express 
language. … A return that would expose the children’s caregivers to renewed 
violence should raise a valid defence under current Convention language, 
because it would expose the children to a grave risk of psychological harm, 
an express defence under Article 13(1)(b).  Independently, a return into these 
circumstances, or into foster care (because their caregiver cannot accompany 
them or does not dare to do so), surely falls into another of the Article’s 
express defences to return: a grave risk that the child will be returned into an 
intolerable situation.  The theory that an abductor will not be heard to 
complain about the danger of returning with a child, because it permits the 
abductor to profit from his or her own wrong, not only misunderstands the 
drafter’s intention to allow a custodial parent to relocate with the children, it 
also ignores the central purpose of the Convention – to protect children, not 
to harm them in order to punish their caretaker.58  
 
Professor Merle Weiner has also written that “… the remedy of return is 
inappropriate when the abductor is the primary caretaker and is seeking to protect 
herself and her children from the other parent’s violence.  The Convention has no 
“domestic violence defence” for these abductors, and courts are often inhospitable to 
domestic violence victims’ efforts to employ the existing defences. … Much 
substantive work needs to be done in Hague cases to make the Hague Convention 
                                                        
57 Ibid. 
58 Carol Bruch, ‘The Promise And Perils Of A Protocol To The 1980 Convention On 
The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction’ (2011) 237, 245 - 246. 
https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bruch/files/Bruch_aus_FS_Schwenzer.pdf 
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less devastating for domestic violence victims who flee with their children to escape 
domestic violence.”59 
 
The Full Court of the Australian Family Court has also weighed in:60 
 
“As discussed by Kay J in the unreported decision of SCA v [M] [2003] 
FamCA 1128 (17/9/2003), the particular problem created by allegations of 
domestic violence has been the subject of significant debate in cases 
throughout the world.  There has been much academic writing about it.  It 
seems to be generally accepted that the Convention was basically designed to 
discourage abducting non-primary caregivers, usually fathers, but that in its 
operation it has most significantly affected a group who can be loosely 
termed to be “escaping mothers”.  These persons are often primary caregivers 
who want to relocate with their children back to their own country of origin, 
or into a new relationship somewhere else, or to a place they see as a safe 
refuge from an unsatisfactory relationship.” 
Although a court cannot order the taking mother to return, because the order is in 
relation to the child, inevitably in most cases the mother wants to go with her child to 
protect her child.61  As will be discussed later, this can be harrowing for several 
reasons, for example if she is worried about her physical safety, lacks the financial 
means to relocate to a safe environment or to retain lawyers to represent her in the 
other jurisdiction.  
The Hague Conference on Private International Law stated in 199662 that the 
operation of the Abduction Convention had been further strengthened by 
complementing provisions in the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.  This is known as the 
Hague Convention on Child Protection.  It is supposed to “add to the efficacy of any 
                                                        
59 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential And Challenges Of Transnational Litigation For 
Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here And Abroad,’ (2003) 11(2) 
American University Journal Of Gender, Social Policy & The Law, 749-800, 766. 
60 H.Z. and State Central Authority [2006] FamCA 466 [Full Court, Family Court], 
[47]. 
61 http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2009-7/ 
62 Outline - Hague Child Abduction Convention:  The Convention Of 25 October 
1980 On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction - www.hcch.net. 
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temporary protective measures ordered by a judge when returning a child to the 
country from which the child was taken, by making such orders enforceable in that 
country until such time as the authorities there are able to put in place necessary 
protections.”63  However, it will be shown that complications arise in relation to 
efforts to ensure that protection orders accompany children (and their primary carers) 
who have to return to the jurisdiction from which they fled. 
The Content of the Abduction Convention: 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was 
concluded on 25 October, 1980 and entered into force between the signatories on 1 
December, 1983.  It has 45 Articles and applies to children under the age of 16.64   
The main objectives of the Abduction Convention are65 to secure the prompt return 
of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State;66 to ensure 
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively respected in the other Contracting States;67 and to provide a fast method 
of returning a child from one member country (the contracting state) back to their 
country of “habitual residence” (the requesting state)68 so that issues of parental 
responsibility can be dealt with in the other jurisdiction.  This expedited process is 
supposed to minimize any harm to the child.69  
                                                        
63 Outline – Hague Convention on Child Protection, HCCH (Hague Conference on 
Private International Law), September 2008, p 2. 
64 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), art 4. 
65 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983); Jodi Anne Gray, ‘Respecting human rights in the 
drafting and interpretive stages of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction’, (2003) 17 AJFL 270, p 5. 
66 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), art 1. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), art 12. 
69 Emma Nash, Solicitor, ‘Social Media and the Voice of the Child in Hague 
Convention Cases’, www.familylawweek.co.uk 
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The Explanatory Report to the Abduction Convention also states that important 
objectives are to (a) restore the status quo that existed before the abduction;70 (b) 
protect children from the harmful effects of abduction by promptly returning the 
child to the requesting state;71 (c) deter forum-shopping for a more sympathetic 
court;72 and (d) encourage international comity by respecting the laws of other 
Contracting States. 
The Explanatory Report to the Abduction Convention73 states that an implicit aim on 
which the Convention rests is that any debate on the merits of custody rights should 
take place before the competent authorities in the State where the child had his 
habitual residence prior to its removal.  The aim of return and the manner in which it 
should best be achieved is reinforced in the Articles, notably in the duties required of 
Central Authorities74 and in the requirement for judicial authorities to act 
expeditiously.75 
The Abduction Convention provides that all Contracting States, as well as any 
judicial and administrative bodies of those Contracting States, shall act expeditiously 
in all proceedings seeking the return of a children and that those institutions shall use 
the most expeditious procedures available to the end that final decision be made 
within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings.  The 
Abduction Convention requires that a court in which a Hague Convention action is 
                                                        
70 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981) 429 [B16]. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
71 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), Preamble. 
72 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981) 429 [B16]. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
73 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981) 429 [19]. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
74 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983). 
75 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), art 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
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filed should not consider the merits of any underlying child custody dispute, but 
should determine only that country in which those issues should be heard.   
Implementation by Australia: 
 
Australia ratified the Abduction Convention on 29 October, 1986 and implemented 
the Abduction Convention via the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Family 
Law Regulations 1986 (Cth) (the “Family Law Regulations”), which commenced on 
1 January, 1987.  The Family Law Regulations give effect to Australia’s legal 
obligations under the Abduction Convention.  Although the Abduction Convention 
by itself is not part of Australian domestic law, it is set out in Schedule 1 of the 
Family Law Regulations, and to this extent, it is part of domestic law.76  The federal 
Family Court deals with Hague cases and interprets the Australian law.77  Australia 
deals with many applications under the Abduction Convention each year.  During the 
2013 – 2014 financial year out of the 60 incoming cases to Australia, 45% came 
from New Zealand, 8% were from the U.K. and USA, and 47% were from all other 
countries.78  The Hague Convention by itself has no force and effect in Australia.  
Our courts are bound only by the provisions of the Family Law Regulations and the 
case authorities determined by the Family Court of Australia and the High Court 
which I will discuss below.79 
 
Australian Federal Legislation Implementing The Convention:  
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): 
 
In parenting cases, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) embraces and enforces what has 
become known as the “Paramountcy Principle.”  This means that when Australian 
courts are making a decision concerning a child, the child’s “best interests” will be 
the paramount consideration (this approach reflects the influence of the United 
                                                        
76 De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (1996) FLC 
92-706. 
77 The Law Library of Congress (Australia), Hague Convention on International 
Child Abduction (2004-92), Australian Treaty Series 1987, No. 2. 
78 Statistics from The Commonwealth Central Authority, Attorney-General’s 
Department, Canberra, May 2015. 
79 Alicia Furman, ‘Four Girls v The Hague Convention’ (12 November, 2012). 
www.lawsocietysa.asn.au. 
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Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).80  Section 4.1 of the Family Law Act 
1975 (Cth) has a wide definition of “Interests.”  They include matters related to “the 
care, welfare or development of the child and thus is intended to be a concept of 
broad application encompassing all matters relevant to a child’s upbringing.”81  
Unfortunately, this test does not apply to Hague cases. 
 
The Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Family Law Regulations 1986 (Cth): 
 
Clause 61 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 1983 
(Cth) (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia) states only that it “inserts new 
section 111B which will permit Family Law Regulations to be made to enable 
Australia to accede to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction signed at the Hague on 25 October 1980.”  
Section 111B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) was inserted into the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth) in 1983 enabling the enactment of the Family Law (Child Abduction 
Convention) Family Law Regulations 1986 (Cth) (the “Child Abduction Family Law 
Regulations”) which came into force on 1 January, 1987 and which give effect to 
Australia’s obligations under the Abduction Convention.82  Section 111B provides 
that the Child Abduction Family Law Regulations may make provisions, as is 
necessary or convenient, to enable the performance of the obligations of Australia 
under the Convention.   
 
The Child Abduction Family Law Regulations are made pursuant to the external 
affairs power in the Australian Constitution and are part of Australia’s domestic law.  
They have been amended on various occasions are currently 81 pages long.  The 
Abduction Convention is used in interpreting the Child Abduction Family Law 
Regulations under the rules of statutory interpretation.83 [CITE]  
 
                                                        
80 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CA.   
81 Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth); Young, Monahan, Sifris & Carroll, Family 
Law in Australia, 8th ed., p 418, paragraph 8.55 and p 426, Paragraph 8.64. 
82 Clause 61 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commonwealth Parliament 
House of Representatives Family Law Amendment Bill 1983 inserted new Section 
111B.  
83 Alexandra Harland, Donna Cooper, Zoe Rathus, Renata Alexander, Family Law 
Principles (Lawbook Co., 1st ed. (2011). 
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“The Family Law Regulations reflect the objects of the Convention to 
settle issues of jurisdiction between Contracting States by favouring that 
forum which has been the habitual residence of the child. The underlying 
premise is that, once the forum is located in this way, each Contracting 
State has faith in the domestic law of the other Contracting State to deal 
in a proper fashion with matters relating to the custody of children under 
the age of 16 …”.84 
 
“The Family Law Regulations are to be construed: 
 
a) as having regard to the principles and objects mentioned in the preamble to, 
and Article 1, of the Hague Convention; and 
b) as recognising, in accordance with the Hague Convention, that the 
appropriate forum for resolving disputes relating to a child’s care, welfare 
and development is ordinarily that child’s country of habitual residence; and 
c) as recognising that the effective implementation of the Convention depends 
on the reciprocity and mutual respect between judicial or administrative 
authorities (as the case may be) of Convention countries.”85 
 
This thesis focuses on Regulation 16(1) which states that once wrongful  
removal/retention is established a judge is compelled to make a return order – unless  
one of the circumstances outlined in Regulation 16(3) applies.  If so, a return order is  
not compulsory and would instead be at the judge’s discretion even though the  
Convention does not speak to “discretion.”  “Whilst Reg. 16 and the specific  
subregulation has been amended since the High Court’s consideration of it in  
its previous form it would seem that for all relevant purposes the provisions are  
identical in effect.”86   
The Central Authority: 
                                                        
84 De L v Director-General, NSW Dept. of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640, 
657-658. 
85 Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services and Berman 
[2013] FamCA 613. 
86 Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability 
Services & Rovo [2015] FamCA 1 (5 January 2015) [57]. 
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Article 6 of the Hague Convention requires Contracting States to establish a Central 
Authority to discharge the duties that are imposed under the Convention.  Article 7 of 
the Hague Convention requires the Central Authority to take appropriate measures 
including but not limited to: 
1) discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed or 
retained; 
2) secure the voluntary return of the child or bring about an amicable resolution of 
the issues; 
3) provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in 
connection with an application under the Convention; 
4) initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with 
a view to obtaining the return of the Child; and 
5) where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of 
legal advice, including participation of legal counsel and advisers.   
 
Regulation 2 provides that “Central Authority has the meaning it has in the 
Convention.”  State Central Authorities can exercise all the powers and functions of 
the Commonwealth Central Authority (Regulation 9). 
Regulation 5 outlines the extensive duties, powers and functions of the Australian 
Central Authorities. 
The main Australian Federal Central Authority is located in Canberra.  It is a unit 
within the Federal Attorney-General’s Department and it is responsible for 
administering the Abduction Convention.  The Canberra Central Authority is the 
recipient of the original application from the overseas Central Authorities and 
reviews them to see if the required criteria are met by applicants.  If so, it sends the 
application to the relevant State Central Authority in Australia to initiate legal 
proceedings.  The state Central Authority is the “applicant” on behalf of the left-
behind parent. 
   
The State Central Authority will locate the taking mother and build a case against 
her.  She then becomes a “taking mother” in the case.  They will retain and instruct 
an experienced family law barrister to argue their case in court.  Because the 
Abduction Convention has been routinely applied in a strict manner by Australian 
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courts over the past three decades, the general prosecution of most Hague cases does 
not require complex legal analysis or lengthy preparation by the Central Authorities’ 
lawyers. The Central Authorities’ processes and procedures are unique in that they 
rely completely on the information received from the Central Authority in the other 
jurisdiction, which is in effect, from the applicant himself.87   
When the Central Authority begins the intensive and expensive process of locating 
and serving the taking mother (or obtaining ex parte orders from the court against the 
taking mother)88 all the Central Authority lawyers know for sure is that the applicant 
has satisfied the minimum criteria required under the Convention and the Australian 
Family Law Regulations.  They are not required to have to consider why the taking 
mother fled with the child.  For example, they do not have to consider whether the 
taking mother fled domestic violence or whether she or her children were in danger 
of being harmed by the applicant.   
The Australian Central Authorities have virtually unlimited power to prosecute 
Hague cases under the Family Law Regulations.  They are very successful in quickly 
locating the taking parent and child and this is mostly due to the agreements for 
exchange of information between governmental departments such as the Police, 
Centrelink, Immigration and other Federal Government Departments.   
Under the Family Law Regulations, the Central Authorities also have the authority to 
apply for court orders to seize a child from their mother’s custody and place them 
into foster care with complete strangers until return orders are made by the court.89  
The Central Authority can also request, amongst other things, the following orders 
from the court under Family Law Regulations 13 and 14: 
1. An order directing that the child not be removed from Australia; 
                                                        
87 See State Central Authority & Papastavrou [2008] FamCA 1120 (22 December 
2008): Bennett J's assertion [at 55] that the State Central Authority's role can be 
distinguished from that of other model litigants, as their ability to prepare the case is 
limited by their reliance on the resources of the Greek Central Authority. 
88 Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability 
Services & Rovo [2015] FamCA 1 (5 January 2015]. 
89 In the case of Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) and Garning 
[2011] FamCA 485 (23 June 2011) the Department of Children’s Services applied 
for an order from the Court under Reg 31 to take possession of the children and 
deliver them to a person nominated by DOCS.  They were found on 12/5/12 and 
placed in foster care. 
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2. An order for the surrender of the child’s passport(s); 
3. An order placing a child’s name on the Airport Watch List (which is a system 
designed to prevent children from being removed from Australia without the 
consent of the Court.) 
4. An order requiring the taking mother to pay any expenses incurred by the 
applicant father (e.g., travelling expenses and costs to return the child).  
 
My search of Australian case law found that these types of orders are standard, 
routinely sought ex parte by the Central Authorities and are almost always granted 
by the courts.90  The Family Law Regulations also allow that the arrangements 
regarding a child’s return are to be made by the State and Commonwealth Central 
Authorities in consultation with the Central Authority of the overseas country and the 
applicant – with no consultation with the taking mother.   
 
Family Law Regulations 5, 8(3) and 9 give the Central Authorities the power to 
advise the Attorney-General on “all matters that concern, or arise out of performing 
their obligations, including any need for additional legislation required for 
performing their obligations.”  The Central Authorities now regularly deal with 
domestic violence related child abductions.  
Recent statistics from the Australian Central Authority show that during the 2013 – 
2014 financial year 94 children were brought into Australia and 64 children were 
returned.  This is approximately a seventy percent return rate.91 
 
The Australian Federal Police support the Central Authorities in each Australian state 
and can enforce any orders obtained by the Central Authorities, including forcing 
children onto an aeroplane to return to their habitual residence against their will).92 
The Australian Federal Courts have the role of interpreting and applying the Family 
Law Regulations.  The Australian Federal Courts (including the Federal Magistrates 
Court sometimes93) hear and decide Hague cases. 
                                                        
90 Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability 
Services & Gallego [2013] FamCA 603. 
91 Australian Central Authority statistics, www.ag.gov.au/childabduction. 
92 Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) and Garning [2011] FamCA 
485; Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 14. 
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The Process for Return: 
The left-behind parent can obtain custody orders for the abducted child before 
submitting an application for return of the child to the Central Authority in their 
country.94  That Central Authority then sends the application to the Australian 
Federal Central Authority in Canberra.  If the application meets the requirements 
under the Convention, it is sent to the appropriate Australian State Central Authority 
which then commences legal proceedings with the Federal Circuit Court or the 
Family Court seeking a return order for the child.  Legal proceedings are conducted 
in accordance with Family Law Regulations discussed above.  At the time the 
initiating application is filed with the Family Court by the Central Authority a date is 
fixed in about seven days for an ex parte hearing seeking orders restraining the 
mother from removing the child, surrendering their passports and putting the child on 
the Airport Watch List so that any attempt to leave Australia will signal an alert to 
the AFP.95   
In Australia, the courts can make an interim order providing for the custody of the 
child until a Hague Convention application is determined.96  However, once a return 
order is made, the taking mother is usually given one to two weeks by the court to 
return her child.97   
 
Requirements For A Valid Application For Return:98 
1. The Child is under 16 years of age (even if the proceedings have commenced, 
they would be terminated if the child turned 16); 
2. The child was habitually resident in a Convention country before the 
abduction/removal; 
3. The applicant had “rights of custody” to the child (by law, court order or legal 
agreement) before the removal/retention; 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 In April 2013 the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia became known as the 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia. 
94 Garcia v Garcia, Case No. BD578213, Los Angeles Family Court (Filing Date 
02/22/2013). 
95 http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2009-7/  
96 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 19. 
97 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 16(5). 
98 Australian Central Authority, Attorney General’s Department (Canberra), Hague 
Child Abduction Convention - Information for Abducting Parents, November 2001. 
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4. The applicant had been exercising his/her “rights of custody” to the child (or 
would have been exercising those rights, but for the removal/retention of the 
child); 
5. The applicant did not consent to the removal or retention of the child. 
Rights of Custody: 
Article 3 of the Abduction Convention states that: 
“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where: 
(a) It is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any 
other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child 
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and 
(b) At the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either 
jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention. 
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular 
by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason 
of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.” 
Habitual Residence: 
Article 4 provides that “The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually 
resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access 
rights.  The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 
years.”  The Abduction Convention does not define “habitual residence” which has 
been developed by case law. 
According to Dr Danielle Bozin99 the Australian High Court case of    
LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services100 is the most recent 
                                                        
99 Dr Danielle Bozin, ‘Re-Examining Habitual Residence As The Sole Connecting 
Factor In Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases’ (2012), 3(1) Family Law 
Review, 4-17. 
http://www.thomsonreuters.com.au/family-law-review-
online/productdetail/105697?id=857 
100 (2009) 237 CLR 582. 
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Hague Convention decision of the High Court of Australia to consider the test for 
determining a child’s habitual residence.   The High Court considered whether the 
subject children were “habitually resident” in Israel and thus liable to be returned 
there at the request of the non-abducting father.   
 
In the very recent case of SCA & Castillo [2015] FamCA 792 (10 September 2015) 
Justice Bennett cited the decision in LK as espousing the test for “habitual 
residence”: 
 
“In the case of LK and Director-General, Department of Community Services 
… the High Court considered the principles that go to a determination of 
habitual residence.  The Court made two preliminary observations regarding 
the criteria for determining a child’s place of habitual residence.  First, there 
are a wide variety of circumstances that bear upon where a child resides and 
whether that residence is habitual. Second, the past and present intentions of a 
child’s parents will affect the significance to be attached to particular 
circumstances, such as the duration of a person’s connections with a place of 
residence.”101  
 
“Regarding intention, the High Court noted that a parent’s intentions will 
usually be relevant, but not necessarily determinative of habitual residence. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that a person’s intentions may be ambiguous.  
In LK and Director-General, the mother had left Israel with the children on 
the understanding that if she and the father reconciled they would return to 
Israel, but if they did not reconcile she and the children would remain in 
Australia. The High Court found that it was appropriate to have regard to the 
steps the mother took before and after her arrival in Australia as supporting 
the mother’s argument that it was her intention to move to Australia unless 
the marriage reconciled. The High Court drew several points from the 
ambiguities of the parents’ intentions (emphasis original): 
[32] ... because the notion of habitual residence does not require that it 
be possible to say of a person at any and every time that he or she has a 
                                                        
101 [98]. 
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place of habitual residence, it is important to recognise that a person 
may cease to reside habitually in one place without acquiring a new 
place of habitual residence. 
[33] Secondly, because a person's intentions may be ambiguous, in 
asking whether a person has abandoned residence in a place it is 
necessary to recognise the possibility that the person may not have 
formed a singular and irrevocable intention not to return, yet properly 
be described as no longer habitually resident in that place. Absence of a 
final decision positively rejecting the possibility of returning to Israel in 
the foreseeable future is not necessarily inconsistent with ceasing to 
reside there habitually. 
[34] Thirdly, when considering where a child is habitually resident, 
attention cannot be confined to the intentions of the parent who in fact 
has the day-to-day care of the child. It will usually be necessary to 
consider what each parent intends for the child. When parents are living 
together, young children will have the same habitual residence as their 
parents. No less importantly, it may be accepted that the general rule is 
that neither parent can unilaterally change that place of habitual 
residence. The assent of the other parent (or a court order) would be 
necessary. But again, if it becomes necessary to examine the intentions 
of the parents, the possibility of ambiguity or uncertainty on the part of 
one or both of them must be acknowledged. 
Following the above discussion, the High Court unanimously concluded that 
a closed set, or a hierarchical set, of criteria would not assist in making a 
decision which could potentially fall into a very wide range of circumstances. 
The principles expressed by the High Court are binding on this Court.  
The father argues that the children became habitually resident in Australia 
when they came here in April 2013 in accordance with what he asserts to 
have been the mutual intention of the parents that they reside here 
permanently.  Counsel for the father relied upon the High Court’s 
endorsement of the statements of the plurality in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal case of P v Secretary for Justice, as follows:[34] 
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“Such an inquiry should take into account all relevant factors, including 
settled purpose, the actual and intended length of stay in a state, the purpose 
of the stay, the strength of ties to the state and to any other state (both in the 
past and currently), the degree of assimilation into the state, including living 
and schooling arrangements, and cultural, social and economic integration. In 
this catalogue, SK v KP held that settled purpose (and with young children the 
settled purpose of the parents) is important but not necessarily decisive. It 
should not in itself override what McGrath J called at [22], the underlying 
reality of the connection between the child and the particular state.” 
In terms of defining “settled purpose”, our High Court referred to the United 
Kingdom jurisprudence and, in particular, quoted the decision of Waite J (as 
his Honour then was) in Re B (Minor’s Abduction) [No 2] [1993] 1 FLR 993:   
“All that the law requires for a “settled purpose” is that the parents’ 
shared intentions in living where they do should have a suffıcient 
degree of continuity about them to be properly described as 
settled.”102 
This test could be described as being very broad.  However, this is likely agreeable to 
the drafters as the Explanatory Report103 commenting on the Abduction Convention 
stated that “the notion of habitual residence is a well-established concept in the 
Hague Conference, which regards it as a question of pure fact, differing in that 
respect from domicile. 
Grounds For Opposing The Application For Return Of A Child: 
The circumstances in which an Australian court may not or will not order the return 
of a child are set out in Regulation 16 of the Family Law (Child Abduction 
Convention) Family Law Regulations 1986 (Cth).  These are commonly known as 
the “Exceptions”: 
 
1. The child is over 16 years of age; 
                                                        
102 [99] - [102]. 
103 Elisa Perez-Vera, ‘Explanatory Report on the Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, 1980’, (Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Vol III (1982) 426 at 445 [66]   ). 
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2. The child was not taken from a Convention country; 
3. The child was not “habitually resident” in the Convention country;104 
4. There are no rights of custody:  The taking mother has to show that the law in 
the child’s country of habitual residence gave the taking mother sole parental 
responsibility, or that the taking mother has a court order which extinguishes 
the rights of the other parent. 
5. The applicant was not exercising his/her rights of custody:  The taking mother 
must show that at the time of removal/retention the left-behind parent had not 
had any contact with the child for a long time and had not attempted to have 
contact or had surrendered their rights in some way.  The applicant’s inability 
to exercise “rights of custody” because of the wrongful removal/retention is not 
sufficient to prove a failure to exercise rights of custody.105   
6. The applicant consented to the removal/retention of the child before it occurred 
or afterwards:  If the applicant consented to the child relocating to Australia 
permanently, they cannot later withdraw that consent.  Evidence of this ground 
can be found by looking at signed passport applications, written agreements, 
letters, emails or other documents.  If the left-behind parent did not agree to the 
child leaving permanently but later agrees, that is called “subsequent 
acquiescence” to the removal or retention of the child.  This can be proved by 
written evidence or by inactivity of the other parent in seeking the child’s 
return.106   
7. Removal more than 12 months ago:  The taking mother has to show that the 
child has been in Australia for over 12 months and is settled in their new 
environment.  The court looks at factors such as attachments with their new 
home, school, friends/relations, sports and other activities compared with the 
child’s previous routine.  It’s not enough to show the taking mother is the 
primary carer and the child prefers that parent, and the court still has discretion 
whether or not to return the child even if they are clearly settled in Australia.107   
                                                        
104 HBH v Director-General of Child Safety (2006) FamCA 1053. 
105 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 16(3)(a). 
106 Director-General, Dept of Child Safety v Milson [2008] FamCA 872. 
107 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 16(2); 
Director-General Department of Community Service v M and C (1998) 24 Fam LR 
178; Townsend v Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community 
Care [1999] FamCA 285. 
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8. Child objects to being returned:  However, the child must be of sufficient age 
and maturity for his/her views to be taken into account by the court.  The 
objection must display a strength of feeling that is more than just a preference 
or wish to live with the taking mother and the court will usually require a 
report from an independent counsellor who has interviewed the child to 
establish the reliability of the child’s objections.108 
9. There is a grave risk that the return of the child would expose the child to 
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation: The courts require very clear and compelling evidence109 of grave 
risk of exposure to future harm before deciding not to return the child.  The 
grave risk must be to the child (not the mother) and the grave risk must be 
substantial and comparable to an intolerable situation. There must be evidence 
that the child would risk exposure to physical or psychological harm.  More 
than allegations of domestic violence is required.110   
10. Return may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental rules 
of Australia relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.111 
 
Of all the Exceptions available which can prevent the return of a child, the Grave 
Risk of Harm Exception is the primary Exception raised by taking mothers to prevent 
a child being returned.  The issue explored in the next chapter is how the Australian 
family courts prefer to interpret the Grave Risk of Harm Exception narrowly when 
the evidence of harm to the child is their exposure to parental violence.  The family 
courts have not really appreciated how a child’s exposure to serious domestic 
violence could equate to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child, 
or place them in an intolerable situation if returned to their habitual residence. 
  
                                                        
108 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 16(3)(c), 
Re F (Hague Convention – Child’s Objections) (2006) 36 Fam LR 183. 
109 Article 13(b); DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
110 Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), reg 16(3)(b); 
DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401 [43]. 
111 Article 20; Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth); 
Regulation 16(3)(d); In the Marriage of McCall (1995) FLC 92-551; Director-
General, Department of Families, Youth and Community Care v Bennett (2000) FLC 
93-011. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HOW DO AUSTRALIAN COURTS INTERPRET THE “GRAVE RISK” 
EXCEPTION WHEN THE ABDUCTED CHILD HAS BEEN EXPOSED 
TO PARENTAL VIOLENCE?        
This chapter examines how Australian family courts interpret the Grave Risk of 
Harm Exception in Regulation 16(3)(b) when the abducted child has not been 
directly abused by a parent, but has been exposed to parental domestic violence.  I 
will examine some case examples through the lense of social science research and 
the section 4 definition of “abuse” in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (that a child’s 
exposure to parental violence can constitute “serious psychological harm” to the 
child) and submit that evidence of exposure to parental violence should be accepted 
by Australia’s family courts as satisfying Regulation 16(3)(b) so that no return order 
is made. 
Exposure to Parental Violence: 
The Family Law Act 1975, Section 4(1) defines "abuse", in relation to a child, as:  
(a) an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child; or  
(b) a person (the first person ) involving the child in a sexual activity with the first 
person or another person in which the child is used, directly or indirectly, as a sexual 
object by the first person or the other person, and where there is unequal power in the 
relationship between the child and the first person; or  
(c) causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited 
to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family 
violence; or  
(d) serious neglect of the child.  
 
Interestingly, no discussion of subsection (c) was found in any of the decisions I 
analyse in this thesis.  Defence lawyers do not seem to raise it in Hague cases to 
support the taking mother. 
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The Hague Conference on Private International Law (“HCCH”) in its 2011 
Reflection Paper112 discussed the effects of domestic violence on children.  It 
states113 that:   
… children who are part of a family where adult domestic violence is found 
are at greater risk of being exposed to physical harm themselves.”  It also 
states114 that a recent World Health Organization study on domestic violence 
in 10 countries notes that ‘[v]iolence against women has a far deeper impact 
than the immediate harm caused[…] [i]t has devastating consequences for the 
women who experience it, and a traumatic effect on those who witness it, 
particularly children.’ 
It further states: 
A body of social science research supports such observations, and it is 
reported in this literature that there are correlations between a child’s 
exposure to domestic violence, whether direct or indirect, and 
contemporaneous childhood and later problems in adult life.  Such problems 
may include higher rates of ‘aggressive’ and ‘antisocial’ and ‘fearful and 
inhibited’ behaviours among children, ‘lower social competence’ and higher 
than average rates of ‘anxiety, depression, trauma symptoms and 
temperament problems.’  The degree of harm to the child in particular 
situations of domestic violence has also been found to vary depending on the 
presence or absence of a variety of other influential, including substance 
abuse of one of the parents, the presence of a protective care-giver or the 
presence of other protective factors.115 
                                                        
112 ‘Domestic And Family Violence And The Article 13 “Grave Risk” Exception In 
The Operation Of The Hague Convention Of 25 October 1980 On The Civil Aspects 
Of International Child Abduction: A Reflection Paper’ (Preliminary Document No 9 
of May 2011) drawn up by the Permanent Bureau for the attention of the Special 
Commission of June 2011 on the practical operation of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.  See also  
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=6224 
113 Ibid 9 [20]. 
114 Ibid 9 [21]. 
115 Ibid 9 [22]; J L Edleson, ‘Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence’ 
(1999) 14 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 839-870.   
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In the recent case of Wolford & Attorney-General’s Department116 the court stated 
that:  
 
… Every child has to put up with a certain amount of rough and tumble, 
discomfort and distress.  It is part of growing up.  But there are some things 
which it is not reasonable to expect a child to tolerate.  Among these, of 
course, are physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the child herself.  
Among these also, we now understand, can be exposure to the harmful effects 
of seeing and hearing the physical or psychological abuse of her own parent. 
[emphasis added]  
Even the Australian government (via the Australian Institute of Criminology)117 has 
recognised children’s exposure to domestic violence is harmful.  In a paper published 
in 2011 author Kelly Richards118 discussed the impacts of childhood exposure to 
domestic violence.119  She states that there is a range of impacts on children which 
they can experience including psychological and behavioural impacts like 
depression, anxiety, increased aggression, antisocial behaviour, low self-esteem, the 
presence of pervasive fear, mood problems, loneliness, school difficulties, peer 
conflict, impaired cognitive functions and increased likelihood of substances abuse.   
 
Other researchers list eating disorders, teenage pregnancy, leaving school early, 
suicide attempts, delinquency and violence as potential consequences of exposure to 
domestic violence.120  Ms Richards also discussed health and socioeconomic impacts 
                                                        
116 [2014] FamCAFC 197. 
117 The Australian Institute of Criminology is Australia's national research and 
knowledge centre on crime and justice.  The AIC was established in 1973 under the 
Criminology Research Act 1971.  As the AIC is a Commonwealth statutory authority 
it is regulated under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA 
Act).  The Institute seeks to promote justice and reduce crime by undertaking and 
communicating evidence-based research to inform policy and practice.  
118 Acting Senior Research Analyst at the Australian Institute of Criminology. 
119 Kelly Richards, ‘Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence in Australia’ (June 
2011) No 419 Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends & Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice.  
120 See T Herrenkohl, C Sousa, E Tajima, R Herrenkohl & C Moylan, ‘Intersection 
Of Child Abuse And Children’s Exposure To Domestic Violence, ‘Trauma, Violence 
& Abuse’ (2008) 9(2): 84–99 (PubMed.gov – US National Library of Medicine, 
National Institutes of Health).http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18296571 
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such as alcohol and drug abuse and even early death.121  She also mentions inter-
generational transmission of violence stating that ‘studies have indicated that 
children from violent homes may be likely to exhibit attitudes and behaviours that 
reflect their childhood experiences of witnessing domestic violence … children’s 
exposure to domestic violence may result in attitudes that justify their own use of 
violence and that boys who witness domestic violence are more likely to approve of 
violence,122 and there is support for the hypothesis that … children from violent 
families of origin carry violent and violence-tolerant roles to their adult intimate 
relationships.’123   
 
This kind of research should be argued to the court by defence lawyers representing 
taking mothers and their children in domestic violence related abduction cases.  
When the courts do not accept that evidence the child has been exposed to serious 
domestic violence perpetrated against the mother by the applicant father as being a 
grave risk of harm to the child and instead order the child’s return, the courts are in 
effect sending the child back to live in an abusive situation, either with or without 
their primary carer.   
 
It was recently stated by Dr Kelly Richards124 that ‘… children who live in homes 
characterised by violence between parents, or directed at one parent by another, have 
been called the ‘silent’, ‘forgotten’, ‘unintended’, ‘invisible’, and/or ‘secondary’ 
                                                        
121 See P Pinheiro, ‘World Report On Violence Against Children’ (2006) New York: 
UNICEF. 
http://www.crin.org/docs/UNVAC_World_Report_on_Violence_against_Children.p
df 
122 See J Edleson, ‘Children’s Witnessing Of Adult Domestic Violence’ (1999) 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence 14(8): 839–870. 
123 Kelly Richards, ‘Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence in Australia’ (June 
2011) Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice No 419  p 3; J Edleson, ‘Children’s Witnessing Of Adult Domestic Violence’ 
(1999) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 14(8): 839–870; K Kovacs & A Tomison, 
‘An Analysis Of Current Australian Program Initiatives For Children Exposed To 
Domestic Violence’ (2003) Australian Journal of Social Issues 38(4): 513–539.   
124 Senior Lecturer, QUT Faculty of Law and School of Justice. 
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victims of domestic violence.’125  However, children’s exposure to domestic violence 
and the effects that this exposure can have is starting to be recognised in Australia.126   
Furthermore, only a few years ago UNICEF reported that it was estimated that 
between 133 million and 275 million children around the world frequently witness 
domestic violence every year.127   
 
Professor Merle Weiner has stated128 that:  
… The Hague Convention is premised on a belief that child abduction is per 
se harmful to children.  Therefore, women who abduct their children are seen 
as exposing their children to the harms of child abduction; they are 
presumptively bad mothers because exit inherently is believed to cause harm.  
Missing from this simplistic description is the fact that mothers who flee from 
domestic violence with their children often view flight as the best alternative 
for their children.  In fact, concern for their children’s physical and 
psychological well-being often motivates abductions.  These women’s 
perceptions are not misguided, but rather are corroborated by social science 
evidence that indicates the potential harm to children from remaining in 
battering households’.  Also, legal scholar Professor Carol Bruch has stated 
that ‘… repetitive stress in childhood is now understood to cause serious, 
irreversible alterations in a person’s response to stressful events later in life.  
                                                        
125 Kelly Richards, ‘Children’s Exposure To Domestic Violence In Australia’ (June 
2011) Trends & Issues In Crime And Criminal Justice No. 419, 1, Australian 
Government, Institute of Criminology. 
126 Ibid; C Humphreys, ‘Problems In The System Of Mandatory Reporting Of 
Children Living With Domestic Violence, (2008) Journal of Family Studies 14(2/3): 
228-239. 
127 Kelly Richards, ‘Children’s Exposure To Domestic Violence In Australia’ (June 
2011) Trends & Issues In Crime And Criminal Justice No. 419, 2, Australian 
Government, Institute of Criminology; P Pinheiro, ‘Word Report On Violence 
Against Children, (2006) New York: UNICEF 
http://www.crin.org/docs/UNVAC_World_Report_on_Violence_against_Children.p
df 
128 Merle H Weiner, ‘The Potential And Challenges Of Transnational Litigation For 
Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here And Abroad,’ (2003) American 
University Journal Of Gender, Social Policy & The Law 11(2) 749-800, 783-784.   
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Returning children into abusive settings therefore entails a grave risk of both 
physical and psychological harm over the lifespan.129   
There is some concern that by expanding the grave risk of harm defence, while it 
may benefit individual children, may also undermine some of the important policy 
considerations underlying the Hague Convention.  For example, expanding the grave 
risk of harm defence will ultimately mean that a child’s physical and psychological 
well-being will be raised in Hague Convention proceedings, and that by analysing a 
child’s physical and psychological welfare the courts will in effect be making a 
custody determination, rather than a decision about the best jurisdiction to decide 
custody and other issue.  It is the approach of the Australian Government Attorney-
General’s Department that the Convention ‘is designed to ensure that decisions about 
the welfare of the child should be made in the jurisdiction in which the child 
habitually resides’.130 
It is the approach of the family courts that the main purpose of a Hague Convention 
proceeding is to determine the correct jurisdiction to make a custody determination 
for the child.  However, under the grave risk of harm defence courts should look to 
the wellbeing of the child within the context of that defence, which would not 
constitute a custody determination.131 
The impacts of childhood exposure to domestic violence cannot be overstated and 
range from psychological and behavioural impacts  to health and socioeconomic 
problems and even inter-generational transmissions of violence so the children can 
grow up to be the perpetrators or victims of violence.132 
                                                        
129 Carol Bruch, ‘The Promise And Perils Of A Protocol To The 1980 Convention 
On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction’ (2011), 245 – 246. 
130 Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Submission FV 166, 25 
June 2010, ‘National Violence’, A National Legal Response, ALRC Report 114. 
131 Jennifer S Tier, ‘Domestic Violence Harms The Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts 
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How Do Australian Courts Deal With Cases Involving Exposure To Parental 
Violence? 
The case of State Central Authority & Daker133 involved abuse and violence to the 
mother and the child’s exposure to parental violence yet Justice Bennett of the 
Melbourne Family Court returned a 4 ½ year old child to Israel.  The unmarried 
parents were both 27 and Israeli citizens, as was the child.  The mother had consent 
to bring the child to Melbourne to visit her family but unlawfully retained the child in 
Australia.  The mother raised the Regulation 16(3) Exception.  The mother alleged 
that the father was ‘cruel, heartless, nasty, and ruthless’, called her ‘slut and bitch’ 
and told her she was ‘worthless’.  He monitored what she ate, where she went and 
who she associated with.  He had physically abused her many times by dragging her 
around their home by the hair, slapping her face, choking her and striking her with a 
hair brush until it broke.  He would abuse her when he was sober or drunk.  He 
regularly drank very heavily and smoked marijuana.  He had also admitted to an 
army psychiatrist that he was mentally unstable.  There was no evidence of direct 
physical abuse to the child, however all the abuse to the mother was witnessed by the 
child.  The mother alleged that the father’s new partner was a prostitute and that one 
of his female relatives owned and operated an illegal brothel in Tel Aviv.  She stated 
that was afraid for her safety if she had to return to Israel with her child, but could 
not let him go alone, as he depended upon her for everything.  She had not made any 
police reports or tried to get any social service help.  The father denied all 
allegations.  The judge found that there was a direct conflict in the evidence and 
there was no oral evidence or cross examination.   
The judge held that it was open to the mother to seek orders from courts in the 
relevant country for personal protection and interim and final custody immediately 
upon her arrival.  She could also seek permission of the courts to relocate the child to 
Australia (a long, arduous and expensive process).  The only comment that the judge 
made about the child’s exposure to parental violence was that ‘The very harmful 
effects of domestic violence, including when experienced by children as observers, is 
accepted in this country’.  A return order was made conditional upon the applicant 
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father booking and paying for the airfares and making available $6,000 to the mother 
in her bank account in Israel so she could get her own place to live with the child.  
The mother requested that an interim personal protection order be entered for her 
benefit against the father prior to return to Israel.  The judge liaised with a judge in 
Israel to make that enquiry and the enquiry and reply were circulated to the parties’ 
lawyers prior to the final hearing.  The reply stated that ‘[t]he order of protection 
may be problematic since one of the prerequisites is that a threatening act occurred 
shortly before filing.  I do not know if such an act could have occurred outside the 
country but if it is a mirror order of an Australian order, I believe it would be 
ratified.’  However, in the end the judge found that because there was doubt as to 
whether there would be sufficient grounds for an order to be made, he did not make 
the entry of such an order a pre-condition to the mother’s return.  
This case illustrates how even when judges find that the children have been exposed 
to serious parental violence, they are still unwilling to equate that to there being a 
grave risk of harm to the child or the child being placed in an intolerable situation. 
The case of State Central Authority & Morton134 involved intimidation, serious 
violence and sexual assault to the mother and the children’s exposure to parental 
violence.  In 2009 the 19 year old primary carer mother abducted her 2 children 
(aged 2 and 1) from New Zealand to her father’s home in Sydney.  The father made a 
return application and in December 2010 Justice Austin of the Sydney Family Court 
made a return order with undertakings/conditions attached.  Both parents were New 
Zealand citizens, although the mother had lived in Australia from age 8 to 12.  The 
mother returned to New Zealand to live when she was 13 and met the father who was 
20 years old.  Shortly thereafter, they commenced a sexual relationship.   
The mother argued that if she returned to New Zealand with the children then she 
would be forced to live with the father, the domestic violence would continue and the 
children would witness it as they had in the past.  She stated that her psychological 
health would deteriorate in that situation causing her parenting capacity to be 
impaired and those circumstances would give rise to a grave risk of harm to the 
children, being exposed to a physical or psychological harm or otherwise being 
placed in an intolerable situation.  The psychologist she saw in Australia when she 
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returned in 2009 opined that the mother had contemplated suicide and her symptoms 
were consistent with a diagnosis of major depression.  He opined that there was a 
high likelihood of the mother resuming her relationship with the father should she 
return to New Zealand as the mother had very limited resources/support in New 
Zealand and that the past problems with the relationship would recur so the mother’s 
depressive symptoms would escalate.   
The judge accepted that the mother had been the victim of serious violence 
perpetrated by the father.  The father had conceded his physical abuse of the mother.  
There was also corroborative evidence in the form of a report prepared by the New 
Zealand Department of Child, Youth and Family Services which had investigated the 
assault which was admitted into evidence.  There was also evidence given that the 
children had witnessed the violence and the father even admitted to Department 
officers that he had hit the mother in front of the children.  Despite all the evidence 
and the mother’s psychologist opining that she had major depression, the judge still 
felt a return order was justified.  The judge did not feel the mother would feel 
isolated or dependent on the father or have to live with the father, as she had some 
acquaintances in the town she had been living in and she had access to public 
housing, social welfare income, and legal aid for engagement in parenting 
proceedings with the father.  The judge did not give a lot of weight to the fact that the 
father participated in a domestic violence rehabilitation course, but did state ‘I am 
persuaded by the evidence that he has acquired some level of insight into the 
destructive nature of his past violent conduct towards the mother and the deleterious 
effect of that upon the children’.  As is the general practice, the judge cited the Full 
Court case of Murray135 stating ‘it would be presumptuous and offensive’ in the 
extreme to think that New Zealand does not have a litigious and social support 
system similar to that found in Australia  
 
The judge made a return order with a condition attached that the children return in 
the care of the mother and made it a condition precedent to the return of the children 
with the taking mother to New Zealand that the father actually commence parenting 
proceedings in New Zealand, and that in the context of those proceedings he obtains 
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an injunctive order or proffers an enforceable undertaking for the personal protection 
of the taking mother.  The father was not obligated to comply with the conditions 
precedent but judge stated that if he did, then by the time the mother and children 
arrived in New Zealand, she would be a party to existent parenting proceedings 
concerning the children, and would have the comfort of an enforceable restraint upon 
the father protecting her from domestic violence.  The mother would then be free to 
conduct the pending parenting proceedings as she sees fit, which could conceivably 
include her making an application for interim orders that the children live 
predominantly with her, and her proposing that she be able to ultimately re-locate to 
Australia with the children.  Any such parenting proposals would be evaluated by the 
New Zealand Court.  This sounded good in theory but we cannot know if this is what 
actually transpired. 
 
Should The Best Interests Of The Individual Child Be Considered By The Courts 
When They Have Been Exposed To Parental Violence? 
 
Unlike the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth),136 the best interests of an individual child137 
are not the paramount concern under the Abduction Convention.  The Abduction 
Convention operates on the basis that it is in the best interests of all children for their 
welfare issues to be determined by the courts of the country in which they are 
habitually resident.138  The action of prompt return is seen as encouraging deterrence, 
maintaining comity and re-establishing the status quo regarding a child’s habitual 
residence and custody.139  It is also the case that the Paramountcy Principle is not the 
test used by Australian courts when hearing Hague cases.  In De L v Director 
General, NSW Department of Community Services & Anor, the High Court of 
Australia stated 140 that: 
                                                        
136 Section 60CA. 
137 Also referred to as the Paramountcy Principle. 
138 M Kaye, ‘The Hague Convention And The Flight From Domestic Violence: How 
Women And Children Are Being Returned By Coach And Four’ (1999) 13 
International Journal Of Law, Policy And The Family 191, 195. 
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The underlying premise is that, once the forum is located … each Contracting 
State has faith in the domestic law of the other Contracting States to deal in a 
proper fashion with matters relating to the custody of children under the age 
of 16 … it follows that they are not subject to the Paramountcy Principle. 
Unfortunately, an unforeseen result of ordering the immediate return of children 
without considering their best interests has been that (predominantly) male batterers 
are able to continue to perpetuate their control and abuse of the taking mother and/or 
child.141  Several years ago the Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia at that 
time observed that the immediate return of children may result in ‘custodial parents 
and children being returned to the original country in circumstances where … it may 
not be in the best interests of the particular child or children that this should 
occur.’142   
Recently, Australian legal academic Dr Danielle Bozin observed that the defences to 
a child’s return provide for minimal consideration of the welfare of the individual 
child.143  Dr Bozin stated that:  
Protecting the individual child’s best interests during Convention return 
proceedings and promoting comity between contracting states are perceived 
to be largely incompatible aspirations.  This incompatibility is most often 
resolved in favour of facilitating comity.  This choice has been rationalized 
with the erroneous assumption that the child’s best interests can be reserved 
for consideration post-return in the child’s habitual residence … However, 
the proposition that the Convention achieves comity, acts as a deterrent, and 
                                                        
141 Merle H Weiner, et al., Law Reform Policy Paper: ‘Federal Law Implementing 
Abduction Convention Puts Children In Harm’s Way’ (2014); see also Department 
of Community Services & Hadzic [2007] FamCA 1703 (30 November 2007) where 
an abusive husband killed his wife in front of their children. 
142 ZP v PS (unreported, Full Court of the Family Court at Melbourne, 16 February 
1994) per Nicholson C.J.  See also J Reddaway and H Keating, ‘Child Abduction: 
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Principles of The Hague Convention?’ (1997) 5 The International Journal of 
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143 Dr Danielle Bozin, ‘Re-Examining Habitual Residence As The Sole Connecting 
Factor In Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases’ (2012) 3(1) Family Law 
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is thus in the best interests of children generally, does not in itself provide an 
answer to questions surrounding the Convention’s efficacy.144 
In order to feel more at ease with making return orders Australian courts have 
conceptualized the child’s return as being to a place, and not to the left behind 
parent.145  In reality though, after the abducted child is returned they have to live 
with the abusive left behind parent, or at the very least, ordered to have contact with 
that parent.  Because Australian legislators chose not to have the Paramountcy 
Principle included in the Family Law Regulations as the primary test for Hague cases 
as other jurisdictions have done,146 Australian courts are not obligated under the law 
to consider the best interests of the abducted child before making a return order.  The 
courts would have been obligated to consider where an abused child will live, with 
whom they will live and whether the child will be protected from abuse or danger 
upon their return - if the Paramountcy Principle was the primary test under 
Australian law.  Instead, the courts’ focus is primarily on determining the correct 
jurisdiction to handle the custody issues.147     
Basically, the Regulations flow directly from the Abduction Convention which was 
drafted with a focus on children’s collective interests.148  However, this is at odds 
with the Children’s Rights Convention,149 where the best interests of the child are 
considered paramount.  Article 9 of the CRC provides that ‘Children should not be 
separated from their parents unless it is for their own good.  For example, if a parent 
                                                        
144 Dr Danielle Bozin, ‘Re-Examining Habitual Residence As The Sole Connecting 
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148 E Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report On The 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention’ (Hague Conference On Private International Law, Acts And Documents 
Of The Fourteenth Session, Vol. III, April 1981) 429 [19]. 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/exp128/pdf 
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 Page 55 
 
is mistreating or neglecting a child.  Children whose parents have separated have the 
right to stay in contact with both parents, unless this might harm the child’.  
Consequently, if a child’s psychological wellbeing or physical safety is at risk, it 
would not be in their best interests to be made to leave their primary carer and return 
to the left behind parent simply to uphold that parent’s custody rights.  An extreme 
example of tragedy resulting from a court not considering a child’s best interests is 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region case of S. v. S.150  After an immediate 
return order was made for a six year old boy to be sent back to Britain from Hong 
Kong his mother killed him by lethal injection just one day before he was to leave 
her and then committed suicide herself, because she was unable to return with him.  . 
Although the Abduction Convention drafters and the Australian law-makers chose 
not to use the Paramountcy Principle as the test in Hague cases, the Australian courts 
could have ensured that the law evolved over the past decade when domestic 
violence related abductions to Australia started increasing.  In not considering the 
abducted child’s best interests in domestic violence related abduction cases Australia 
could appear to other signatory countries to be out of touch with the issue of 
domestic violence, or unconcerned about abused mothers and their children.   
Our judiciary must start to recognise and accept that the current process and 
procedure for Hague cases involving abused mothers and children is having adverse 
effects.  For example, the strict enforcement of the Abduction Convention has 
already resulted in the tragic murder of a young mother of two young children.151  
Unfortunately, the Convention’s primarily concern is not the best interests of 
individual children or their abused mothers, but to preserve the custody rights of left-
behind parent.152   
To begin to change the current system the courts need to embrace the concept that 
even where there has been no direct physical abuse to the child, parental stress and 
abuse has an impact on children.  In Wolford,153 the court stated:  
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… the words 'physical or psychological harm' are not qualified.  However, 
they do gain colour from the alternative 'or otherwise' placed 'in an 
intolerable situation' (our emphasis).  As was said in Re D [2006] UKHL 
51; [2007] 1 All ER 783 at [52], '"Intolerable" is a strong word, but when 
applied to a child must mean "a situation which this particular child in these 
particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate" '.  Those words 
were carefully considered and can be applied just as sensibly to physical or 
psychological harm as to any other situation.  Every child has to put up with a 
certain amount of rough and tumble, discomfort and distress.  It is part of 
growing up.  But there are some things which it is not reasonable to expect a 
child to tolerate.  Among these, of course, are physical or psychological abuse 
or neglect of the child herself.  Among these also, we now understand, can be 
exposure to the harmful effects of seeing and hearing the physical or 
psychological abuse of her own parent. 
Research of Australian case law indicates that male judges were conservative in their 
approach to the Grave Risk Exception, whereas female judges may interpret the 
Exception more broadly.154  However, overall, the family courts are still very 
conservative in their decisions despite the High Court providing a judgment that 
permits a broader interpretation of the Grave Risk Exception.   
How Do Other Signatories Handle The Issue Of Grave Risk Of Harm Being Raised 
In Domestic Violence Related Abductions? 
 
Switzerland has embraced the Paramountcy Principle for Hague cases.  In July 2010 
the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland,155 decided by the European Court 
of Human Rights, was a turning point for Hague cases among jurisdictions which are 
subject to the European Court of Human Rights.  It had been stated that this decision 
may influence the application of Article 13(1)(b) and future development of the law 
                                                        
154 See the decision in Harris v Harris [2010] FamCAFC 221 (5/11/10) of Justice 
Judith Ryan (Sydney Family Court); and decisions in State Central Authority & 
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in this area in these jurisdictions and beyond.156  However, this case was not raised in 
any of the Australian decisions I analysed for this thesis.  The reason may be that it 
seems it has not been given very much exposure in Australia.  In that case an 
application for return was brought by a father in relation to a child born in Israel in 
2003 to a Swiss mother and an Israeli father, who had married in Israel in 2001.  
After the child’s birth the mother alleged that the father had joined a radical, ultra-
orthodox Jewish sect.  The mother raised the Grave Risk Exception alleging that the 
father had made death threats against her.  There was no evidence of abuse 
perpetrated directly against the child by the applicant father.  In that case the 
European Court of Human Rights held that the Hague Convention is now subject to 
its obligation to consider general principles of international law and other human 
rights instruments.157  The Court also held that the Abduction Convention ‘cannot be 
interpreted in a vacuum’ and that the ‘best interests of the child must always be 
paramount.’  There was a view that this case could have been very persuasive in 
Australian courts as it was handed down by a full court of 17 judges and was a 
majority decision of 16 to 1.158  However, to date, it does not seem to have been 
raised in any reported decision over the past 10 years.  
Interestingly, British academic Kirsten Fleming159 voiced some concern about this 
decision stating that due to the Neulinger case ‘subsequent decisions from the 
European Court of Human Rights appear to endorse the “best interests” approach, 
which diverges from the original purpose and aims of the Convention.’  She stated 
that contradictory interpretations of the Hague Convention will create legal 
uncertainly, which is potentially detrimental to victims of domestic violence and 
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their children.  However, she does not state in her article why it could be 
“detrimental” to abuse victims or their children. 
The United States’ federal courts seriously consider a child’s exposure to parental 
violence.  The United States Congress implemented the Abduction Convention when 
it passed the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA").  Congress 
ratified and implemented the Abduction Convention on July 1, 1988.  As with 
Australia’s Regulations, the ICARA sets forth the procedures applicable to handling 
Abduction Convention cases in the United States.  In the U.S. both State and Federal 
courts have original concurrent jurisdiction to hear Abduction Convention cases.160  
The law favours prompt return of the abducted child.161  Under the ICARA a person 
may petition a court authorised to exercise jurisdiction in the place where a child is 
located for the return of the child to his or her habitual residence in another signatory 
country.162  The court's inquiry is limited to the merits of the abduction claim, and 
not the merits of the underlying custody battle.163  The ICARA does not protect 
abused taking mothers when they raise “grave risk.”  However, over the past fifteen 
years there has been a substantial change in how U.S. courts decide Abduction 
Convention cases, even allowing domestic violence to be the basis of a defence 
under Article 13(1)(b).   
For example, in the 2000 case of Walsh v Walsh164 the court in that instance gave 
express recognition to the fact that a child’s exposure to domestic violence is a 
sufficient risk to preclude a child’s return under the Convention.  The children had 
witnessed serious assaults on their mother perpetrated by their father and the court 
found that credible social science literature established that serial spouse abusers are 
also likely to be child abusers.165     
                                                        
160 42 U.S.C. 11603(a).   
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Similarly, in the 2001 case of Tsarbopoulos v Tsarbopoulos166 a Federal District 
Court in Washington State held that ‘spousal abuse is a factor to consider in 
determining whether the Grave Risk Exception applies because of the potential that 
the abuser will also abuse the child.’167   
During the past fifteen years there has also been an important shift in the opinion of 
American scholars.168  Since 2000, well-respected academic and imminent expert in 
this area, Professor Merle Weiner, has written and published influential scholarly 
articles to establish that the Abduction Convention ‘was drafted based upon the 
prediction that a non-custodial father, or a father who was unlikely to win custody, 
would typically be the abductor so the Abduction Convention’s “remedy of return” 
was supposed to quickly return abducted children to their habitual residences, and 
usually their primary caretakers.’169  While the remedy of return works well if the 
abductor is a non-custodial father, it is inappropriate when the abductor is a primary 
caretaker who is seeking to protect herself and her children from the other parent’s 
violence.170  Professor Weiner writes that ‘In such a case, the remedy of return puts 
the victim’s most precious possession, her child, in close proximity to her batterer, 
either without her protection (if she does not return), or with her protection, thereby 
exposing her to further violence.’171   
In 2004 Professor Bruch published an article which was well received by the legal 
fraternity.172  In it she argues that “courts have been far too grudging in their 
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application of the Article 13(1)(b) defence” and “she called on courts to exercise 
more common sense in refusing to send mothers and children back to circumstances 
of domestic abuse.”173   
In further support of reform of this issue Professors Shetty and Edelson published an 
article in 2005174 which forcefully presented the argument that as the weight of the 
emerging social science evidence and U.S. public policy change brings about 
expanded definitions of a child’s best interest, so too must there be an interpretation 
of the Abduction Convention that prevents a battered mother from being compelled 
to return her children to an abusive father in a country which did not protect her or 
her children.175 
In January 2005 two court decisions were recorded in the Federal District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York and both concerned mothers fled with their children 
to avoid domestic violence.  In each case the return petition was denied by reason of 
the grave risk of harm that return would entail.176   
The 2005 case of Van de Sande v Van de Sande177 also dealt with domestic violence 
and “grave risk.”  The court made the grave risk of harm defence possible in cases of 
spousal abuse by recognizing that spousal abuse can harm a child psychologically 
and potentially physically because of the greater likelihood that a spousal abuser will 
also abuse a child.  In Van de Sande the Seventh Circuit did not place the policy 
considerations of narrowly interpreting the Hague Convention over the well-being of 
individual children by overly limiting the grave risk of harm defence through such 
barriers as evaluating the laws of the country of habitual residence and issuing 
                                                        
173 Jeremy D Morley, ‘The Future of the Grave Risk Of Harm Defence in Hague 
Cases’, International Family Law, http://www.international-divorce.com 
174 S Shetty & J L Edelson, ‘Adult Domestic Violence In Cases Of International 
Parental Child Abduction, (2005) Violence Against Women 11, 115-138. 
175 Jeremy D Morley, ‘The Future of the Grave Risk Of Harm Defence in Hague 
Cases’, International Family Law, http://www.international-divorce.com 
176 Elyashiv v Elyashiv, 353 F.Supp.2d 394 (E.D.N.Y 2005); Olhin v Del Carmen 
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undertakings.  The court properly placed children first by restoring the grave risk of 
harm defence to its proper scope under the Hague Convention.178     
The Seventh Circuit issued a well-reasoned analysis of the problem of spousal abuse 
and its impact on Hague return applications and the court overturned the return order 
made by the trial judge.  In that case, two children habitually resident in Belgium 
were retained by their mother in the U.S.A.  The father was awarded custody by the 
Belgium court and issued return proceedings.  The American mother raised the 
Grave Risk Exception and produced evidence of domestic violence which included 
death threats from the father against her and their children.  The American court 
found that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim of grave risk 
of harm to the children under the ICARA.   
The Court of Appeals judge, Justice Posner, accepted the evidence presented in 
affidavits submitted for the mother.  Justice Posner ruled that the father’s propensity 
for violence and his disregard for the children’s welfare (which he displayed by 
choking and beating their mother in their presence), meant the children would face a 
grave risk of harm if returned to Belgium.  The Court considered the existing case 
law to be that it should focus exclusively on whether the children could and would be 
protected in Belgium.  It ruled, however, that this was not the correct approach to 
take, being at odds with the language of the Convention and the U.S. implementing 
legislation.   
The court cited an article by Professor Weiner179 with approval, along with a 2003 
article written by Berkeley academic Roxanne Hoeggers,180 which discusses the 
insufficiency of undertakings made by an applicant father.  Importantly, the court 
held that to give custody of the children to the father when they were at great risk of 
harm from him on the grounds that they would be protected by the police in the other 
jurisdiction would be to act on an unrealistic premise.  The court ruled that the 
                                                        
178 Jennifer S Tier, ‘Domestic Violence Harms The Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts 
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rendering country (i.e., the USA) must satisfy itself that the children will, in fact, and 
not just in legal theory, be protected if returned to their abuser’s custody.  In 
discussing whether a return order could be made with conditions attached, the court 
suggested that in cases of child abuse, the presumption should be against such an 
outcome. 
In September 2005 the Hague Convention Chapter Advisory Committee of the 
Washington Courts issued a report181 setting forth strong arguments in support of the 
recent trend in U.S. courts against returning children whose mother fled with them 
from domestic violence.182  Not long after that in February 2006, the Third U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important ruling in Re Application of Adan,183 
where it specifically endorsed the determination in Walsh,184 that abuse against a 
mother may well create grave risk of harm to her child. 
In 2012 emiment American jurist Professor Carol Bruch stated that neurobiological 
research on the developing brain of a child shows that return orders that disrupt the 
primary attachment bond between a child and their protective primary attachment 
figure, or return children to other dangers, can cause immediate detachment and 
cause health problems in children ranging from eating and sleeping disorders to heart 
disease and depression and suicide attempts.  She states that this was not what the 
drafters of the Convention envisioned.185   
Just last year, in 2014, Professor Merle Weiner186 and two of her academic 
colleagues drafted a law reform policy paper entitled “Federal Law Implementing 
Abduction Convention Puts Children in Harm’s Way”187 which outlines amendments 
they argue could be made by the United States Congress to the ICARA.  The policy 
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paper was submitted on their behalf by lawyer Raymond S. Calamaro.188  The 
background of the policy paper states that the United States government has made 
progress over the past 20 years to address the urgent social problems of domestic 
violence and child abuse.  However, the academics opined that as part of this 
ongoing effort, the American government must ensure that it does not promote 
policies that can cause or facilitate domestic violence and/or child abuse.  It has been 
argued that this can happen with the Abduction Convention if legislators, 
government officials, policy makers and/or judges do not distinguish between an 
“abduction,” and a flight to safety by an abused primary carer mother.   
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that by witnessing domestic violence between 
parents, a child can be forever damaged psychologically and/or physically. 
Therefore, the courts should seriously consider this kind of evidence when deciding 
whether to make a return order and whether or not it is in the child’s best interests to 
return to this kind of environment. 
  
                                                        
188 A Partner with Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington D.C. Office. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
HOW DO AUSTRALIAN COURTS INTERPRET THE “GRAVE RISK” 
EXCEPTION WHEN A TAKING MOTHER AND/OR ABDUCTED CHILD 
HAVE BEEN DIRECTLY ABUSED BY THE APPLICANT FATHER? 
In this chapter I examine a selection of cases decided by the High Court of Australia, 
the Full Court of the Family Court and the Family Court over the past 10 years where 
the Regulation 16(3)(b) Grave Risk Exception was raised by the taking mother.  In 
these cases the mother alleges she and/or the children have been abused by the father, 
or the children have witnessed the parental violence.     
The majority of Australian cases I read and analysed for this thesis illustrated that 
when a taking mother alleges she has fled domestic violence with her children, the 
Exception raised in most cases to fight a return order for the child, is the Regulation 
16(3)(b) Exception.  Therefore, this thesis will focus on how that Exception is 
interpreted by the courts.   
Essentially, when a taking mother raises the Regulation 16(3)(b) Exception they are 
arguing that the return of their child would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.  
However, this defence has limited scope.  Even if the facts of a case fall squarely 
within this defence, the family courts generally progress to the next step which is 
using their discretion to decide whether return should be ordered or not.189 
The case analysis was undertaken to ascertain how Australian family courts have 
been interpreting the Exception, particularly in domestic violence related parental 
abduction cases.  It illustrates that over the past decade primary carer abductions to 
Australia have risen in number, however, the family courts have been extremely 
reluctant to adopt a broader approach to this Exception.  This is despite the fact that 
the majority judges of the High Court in the 2001 case of DP v. Central Authority; 
JLM v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services190 rejected a 
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narrow interpretation of the Exception holding191 that the Grave Risk Exception 
should be “… given the meaning its words require.”   
The narrow interpretation of the Grave Risk of Harm Exception should not have 
continued after the Australian High Court laid down important tests in its landmark 
decision in this area.  In DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director 
General NSW Department of Community Services192 the majority held that: 
 
‘… These considerations, however, do not warrant a conclusion that reg 
16(3)(b) is to be given a ‘narrow’ rather than a ‘broad’ construction.  There 
is, in these circumstances, no evident choice to be made between a ‘narrow’ 
and ‘broad’ construction of the regulation.  If that is what is meant by saying 
that it is to be given a ‘narrow construction’ it must be rejected.  The 
Exception is to be given the meaning its words require.’193 
 
Although the High Court gave the lower courts permission to ‘mould conditions’ 
upon which return may occur, the Court also stated that ‘If that is to be done, 
however, care must be taken to ensure that the conditions are such as will be met 
voluntarily or, if not met voluntarily, can be readily enforced’.194  The problem is 
that in this is not being done in most cases. 
 
In the cases discussed below the taking mothers all allege they or their children have 
been abused by the applicant father, and/or the children were exposed to the parental 
violence. 
In the case of HZ (Appellant/Mother) and State Central Authority195 the application 
related to three children who were born and raised in Greece, aged 2 ½, and 7 at the 
date of the alleged wrongful retention.  The Greek father and Australian/Greek 
mother had been married for ten years when in 2005 the mother took the children to 
Australia for a ten week vacation, but then illegally retained them in Australia.  In 
September 2005 the father filed a return petition with the Greek Central Authority.  
                                                        
191 [44]. 
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Proceedings were initiated in the Family Court of Australia in January 2006 and in 
April 2006 the Family Court of Australia ordered the return of the children.     
The mother raised the grave risk of harm defence and presented evidence that the 
father was very aggressive and emotionally abusive to her throughout their marriage, 
that he had assaulted her in the past in front of the children (who were 6, 3 and 2 at 
the time), that he was addicted to marijuana and other drugs, was a gambler, that he 
regularly locked himself in a room and engaged in sexual activity over the internet, 
that he had received psychiatric treatment and been in hospital during his compulsory 
military training, he had engaged in heated/physical arguments with his own parents 
(with whom they lived) and that he had pinched his own daughter’s breasts.  She also 
produced abusive and threatening text messages that the father had sent to her which 
threatened her, the children and her family.  The father denied all allegations.     
The trial judge, Bennett J, stated that in order for her to predict what could happen 
after the children’s return the taking mother needed to have adduced expert evidence 
of how past events or other matters were likely to impact on her and the children in 
the immediate future as a consequence of the children being returned forthwith.  The 
judge required the mother to offer ‘persuasive and cogent evidence’ about the likely 
effect of the father’s behaviour on the children or herself.  Further, Her Honour 
Justice Bennett noted that the mother had not adduced any evidence as to her ability 
to access the legal system in Greece in order to act protectively of the children on 
their return to Greece.196  Justice Bennett did find that the mother and children had 
been subjected to violent and inappropriate behaviour by the father, including within 
the paternal grandparents' home.  However, Justice Bennett stated that ‘whilst the 
past could be a good indicator of the future, it was not determinative’.   
Somewhat unfairly, and some could argue illogically, Her Honour stated197 that it 
was not sufficient for the taking mother to point to historical events involving 
violence or unacceptable behaviour on the part of the requesting parent or his family 
members, and then expect the court to extrapolate from those events that there is a 
grave risk of the children being exposed to such harm or placed in an intolerable 
situation.  For the taking mother to make out the Regulation 16(3)(b) Exception it 
was necessary to establish that the risk of exposure to physical or psychological harm 
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or the children being placed in an intolerable situation in the event of their return to 
Greece forthwith is not only very real, but ‘grave.’   
Her Honour stated that she did not envisage that upon returning to Greece the mother 
and children would return to live in the paternal grandparents' home, where the father 
lived, thus she was not satisfied that an immediate return to Greece would result in a 
grave risk that the children would be exposed to harm or placed in an intolerable 
situation.  Basically, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the trial judge 
assumed that the mother would be able to avail herself (and the children) of lawful 
protection against any threats by the father. 
The mother’s appeal was dismissed for the same reasons given by the trial judge. 
This does not make sense as the Full Court (of the Court of Appeal) even discussed 
how “domestic violence has been the subject of significant debate in cases 
throughout the world”198 and stated that “… It seems to be generally accepted that 
the Convention was basically designed to discourage abducting non-primary 
caregivers, usually fathers, but that in its operation it has most significantly affected a 
group who can be loosely termed to be “escaping mothers”.199   
It appears that the courts are generally aware of the hardships facing abused taking 
mothers, but nevertheless impose a heavy evidentiary burden on these women which 
most cannot meet due to a variety of reasons such as financial hardship and fear, 
which apply to abused women. 
In defence of the Abduction Convention the Full court stated200 that “the purpose and 
underlying philosophy of the Hague Convention would be at risk of frustration if a 
return order were to be refused, because the trial judge identified the retention as 
‘blatant’, given that these children were born in Greece and had spent effectively the 
entirety of their life in Greece until the mother ‘unilaterally determined to retain them 
in Australia’.  On that basis, the appeal court held that Greece was clearly the 
appropriate forum to decide issues relating to the welfare of these children.     
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The tragic case of Department of Community Services & Hadzic201 involved serious 
violence to the mother and abuse of the eldest child, plus the children’s exposure to 
parental violence.  Cassandra Hasanovic (“Cassandra”) was killed by her estranged 
husband (“Hasanovic”) when she was just 24 years old.  Cassandra was an 
Australian citizen who had travelled to the U.K. when she was 18 years old to live 
and work.  It was there she met her future husband, a Serbian national ten years her 
senior.  Hasanovic had served in the Serbian Army during the ethnic war with 
Bosnia.202  They married in 2003 and had two little boys.  He was not a British 
citizen so he was relying on the mother’s sponsorship of him to achieve U.K. 
residency.  In 2007 Cassandra finally decided to end the relationship, after Hasanovic 
sexually assaulted her.  She reported that incident to British police who arrested and 
charged him with assault.  In 2008, afraid for her life, she fled her abuser with her 
sons to Sydney where her family lived.  Hasanovic then filed a return application.   
   
Cassandra raised the Grave Risk of Harm Exception alleging that abuse and violence 
to her and the eldest child started immediately after the birth of the second child and 
continued for five years.  Hasanovic threatened to kill her on several occasions, even 
during phone conversations while she was in Sydney.  She alleged that he threatened 
her that when she returned to Britain he would “chop her up into little pieces and 
mail them back to her family in Australia”.  Cassandra’s sister gave affidavit 
evidence that she had witnessed Hasanovic’s violence towards Cassandra and that he 
made the eldest boy watch porn on the internet with him.  A family report was 
prepared in Australia and provided to the family court stating that if the mother and 
children were returned to the U.K. it would expose them to a risk of physical and/or 
psychological harm.     
 
Despite being able to produce a substantial amount of documented evidence detailing 
years of abuse at the hands of her violent husband, including police reports and 
restraining orders from U.K. courts, Justice Le Poer Trench (of the Sydney Family 
Court), ordered Cassandra to return her children to the U.K. on the basis that as she 
was a U.K. citizen she was entitled to social security and other benefits from the 
government there.  Justice Le Poer Trench attached undertakings to the return order 
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which included Hasanovic agreeing not to contact or approach Cassandra upon her 
return to the U.K. without first obtaining an order in which Cassandra had the 
opportunity to participate.     
 
Justice Le Poer Trench cited with approval Murray & Director of Family Services 
ACT,203 a case which is cited regularly in Hague cases.204  Murray involved a mother 
opposing return of her three young children to N.Z. because of the potential of the 
father, a member of bikie group the “Mongrel Mob”, to harm her and/or the children.  
She alleged that she was that she was the victim of several violent attacks and had 
received death threats.  The violence either took place in the presence of, or in close 
proximity to the children.  She alleged that the husband had an arsenal of weapons 
which included firearms, knives, chains and meat cleavers and that he was likely to 
use the weapons against her.  The husband admitted to a turbulent relationship with 
the wife and to some incidents of violence.  The trial judge rejected a Regulation 
16(3)(b) defence in that case, commenting that it was not possible to determine the 
veracity of the allegations and that the evidence relating to them would be available 
only in New Zealand. 
The mother appealed and the Full Court rejected her appeal holding: 
Whilst there is nothing that requires the wife to return to New Zealand, it is 
obviously desirable and from the point of view of the children that she does 
so.  However, there is no requirement imposed by this court that she or they 
must return to Dunedin.  It is open for her to return to another part of New 
Zealand where the danger to her may be less and it is of course open to her to 
seek orders from the New Zealand courts both for personal protection and 
interim and final custody immediately upon her arrival in New Zealand.  She 
can also, if she wishes, seek leave from the New Zealand court to take the 
children to Australia.  As His Honour pointed out, New Zealand has a system 
of family law and provides legal protection to persons in fear of violence 
which is similar to the system in Australia.  It would be presumptuous and 
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offensive in the extreme for a court in this country to conclude that the wife 
and the children are not capable of being protected by the New Zealand 
courts or that relevant New Zealand authorities would not enforce protection 
orders which are made by the courts.  In our view, and in accordance with the 
views expressed by this Court in Gsponer's case,205 the circumstances in 
which Regulation 16(3) comes into operation should be largely confined to 
situations where such protections are not available … . For us to do otherwise 
would be to act on untested evidence to thwart the principal purposes of the 
Hague Convention which are to discourage child abduction and where such 
abduction has occurred to return such children to the country of habitual 
residence so the courts of that country can determine where or with whom 
their best interests lie.  These children are New Zealand citizens who have 
lived all their lives in New Zealand and it is for a New Zealand court to 
determine their future. 
In Hadzic Justice Le Poer Trench cited the Murray court with approval stating that 
the court should not and would not, on the facts of the case, presume the authorities 
in the United Kingdom would not protect the mother and children if the children 
returned with the mother to the United Kingdom.  Justice Le Poer Trench also stated 
that he could not see that the mother’s evidence would satisfy the conditions or terms 
of regulation 16(3)(b) and that the mother should make applications to the courts and 
authorities in the U.K. to assist in protecting her and her children.   
 
As the boys were only 3 and 5 and she was their primary carer Cassandra returned 
with them.  Tragically, within just a few months of returning to the U.K. she was 
murdered.  On 29 July, 2008 she was stabbed to death in front of her sons and her 
mother on a footpath, while she was trying to escape to a women’s shelter with her 
children.  Despite several requests to the local police they had refused to escort her to 
the shelter, even though they had classed her as being ‘at high risk of serious harm’ 
at the hands of her estranged husband because he continuously breached the court’s 
protection orders, which the authorities also did nothing about.  It is submitted that 
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Justice Le Poer Trench’s confidence that the U.K. authorities could or would protect 
Cassandra and her children was misplaced, to say the least.   
 
Cassandra’s murder was the fatal consequence of an Australian family court issuing 
a return order with undertakings which could not be enforced in the U.K.  The 
authorities both in Australian and the U.K. failed to protect Cassandra.  This may 
seem like an extreme case, but it certainly illustrates the tension courts face when 
interpreting what constitutes a grave risk of harm to abused women and children and 
also the problems abused women have with obtaining enforceable protection orders 
under the Abduction Convention and the Australian law. 
Director-General, Department of Community Services & Timms (aka Black)206 
involved violence to the mother and the child’s exposure to parental violence.  The 
judge at first instance dismissed the application.  The Australian born Mother 
brought her 7 year old child from New Zealand (“N.Z.”) to Australia with the N.Z. 
born father’s consent in 2007 for a holiday, but then illegally retained child in 
Australia.  The father made a return application and the mother opposed the 
application on three bases, one being that return to N.Z. would expose the child to a 
grave risk of physical or psychological harm and/or place her in an intolerable 
situation.  The mother alleged that the father abused alcohol, used marijuana 
regularly and had been violent during their relationship.  She produced corroborating 
evidence in the form of documentation from the N.Z. Ministry of Social 
Development (Child Youth and Family).  N.Z. police records also showed that the 
father had a history of driving offences and violence dating back to 1998.  There was 
also evidence from the N.Z. Department of Work and Income (who was paying the 
father) that the child would be in the sole custody of the father if she went to live in 
N.Z. again.   
The trial judge held that based on the evidence, the child would be at grave risk of 
being exposed to physical and emotional harm if she returned to her father in N.Z.   
and noted that it was unlikely that the mother would be able to return to N.Z. to live, 
visit or pursue residence orders for the child as she had four other children living 
with her in Australia.  His Honour stated that to send the child back to live in the sole 
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care of her father “would further imperil” her because despite concerns raised about 
her safety, the evidence suggested that the N.Z. authorities had no real concern about 
her parenting at the hands of her father and this was in a situation where the mother 
could not live close by to monitor her living arrangements.  His Honour considered 
whether, notwithstanding the findings of grave risk to the child, he should 
nevertheless in his discretion order her return upon conditions.   
His Honour stated that he was concerned that the father had an anti-social 
personality, he appeared to demonstrate a lack of respect for authority, he continued 
to drive motor vehicles while unlicensed, was abusing alcohol and drugs and would 
have to subject himself to 24 hours per day supervision in order to satisfy any 
meaningful conditions and that any proposed conditions would have to ensure that 
the mother could prosecute a case for custody of the child in New Zealand.  This 
meant the mother would have to be assisted financially to travel to New Zealand, be 
able to accommodate herself during a hearing or hearings and have legal aid made 
available for her, or alternatively have the father fund her legal expenses.  His 
Honour noted that all of these conditions seemed quite unlikely to be able to be met 
by the New Zealand authorities.  The judge then held that it would not be possible to 
impose conditions that would safeguard the child, or alternatively that the conditions 
he would impose would be too onerous to the N.Z. community, even if they were to 
agree to them.  His Honour dismissed the application of the Central Authority for the 
child’s return. 
The Central Authority appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court who referred to 
the High Court cases of DP v. Central Authority; JLM v Director-General, NSW 
Department of Community Services207 wherein the High Court stated that ‘reg 
16(3)(b) requires consideration of what are said to be the consequences of that 
return’ which is essentially a question of fact.  The Full Court held that although the 
father’s “shortcomings” identified by the trial judge would be very relevant in a 
hearing about residence based on best interest principles, “it could not be said that 
the evidence supported a finding on the balance of probabilities that there was a 
grave risk of exposure to future harm to the child should she be returned to New 
Zealand”.  The court stated that no prediction of what may happen if the child were 
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returned was made and that evidence that the mother had agreed to the child living 
with the father without objection for over twelve months undermined her grave risk 
defence.  It is difficult to understand how the appeal court could consider the 
extensive evidence offered in the trial against the father as nothing more than that he 
had some “shortcomings”. 
State Central Authority & Fouadi208 involved serious violence to the mother and 
children and the children’s exposure to parental violence.  The mother was an 
Australian citizen mother of Lebanese background who brought her two sons 8 and 
13 from the U.S.A. to Australia without the father’s consent.  The mother alleged 
that she was fleeing domestic violence and to get medical treatment in Australia for 
her 8 year old son for his delayed bone development disorder.  The parents were first 
cousins and the mother had been sent by her family to the U.S.A. in 1992 when she 
was 15 to marry the father.  She alleged that he raped and beat her on their ‘wedding’ 
night.  In 2009 the father, who travelled to Lebanon regularly to see his family, 
commenced a relationship with another women in Lebanon, who he eventually 
married.  The mother stated that the father wanted her and their sons to move to 
Lebanon to live with him and his family close to the Israeli border, which would 
likely expose the children to war and fighting at that time.  She also alleged that the 
children would be exposed to further domestic violence between the father and the 
new wife, not have proper financial security and not have their medical needs taken 
care of, so that constituted a grave risk of harm to them.   
The judge accepted all of the mother’s evidence over the father’s evidence, i.e., that 
the father had been physically and verbally abusive during the course of their 
relationship, that the children were exposed to that violence, and the father was 
physically violent to the children.209  The judge also accepted the mother’s evidence 
that the father failed to properly financially care for the mother and the children 
following the separation and that there was a risk he would fail to do so in the 
future.210  The judge accepted the mother’s evidence that if she and the children 
moved to the Lebanese village where the father wanted them to live, that it would 
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“put them in harms [sic] way and probably expose them to war”.211  The judge stated 
that the mother took no steps to obtain help from the authorities in the USA to shelter 
the children from the father’s violence and domineering behaviour and that there 
must be a concern that if she returned she would likely “feel powerless to do so”.  
The Judge also accepted that if the children were returned to the USA they would 
immediately go into the care of their father, as he had an order in his favour from the 
American courts requiring that the children live with him, and that such an 
arrangement would be a substantial change in the children’s circumstances as the 
mother has been the primary caregiver for the children all their lives.   
The judge stated212 that “… In determining whether … there is ‘a grave risk of 
exposure to future harm” the following risks do fall into that category.”  That is, the 
father will take the children to Lebanon and leave them there permanently, that the 
children would be removed from the mother’s care, that the children’s medical needs 
will not be properly attended to or attended to at all, or that the mother and the 
children will not be provided with adequate financial support. 
The judge considered that there was clear and compelling evidence to enable him to 
reach this conclusion213 stating “I am satisfied that there is a grave risk that an order 
for return would expose the children to physical or psychological harm or place them 
in an intolerable situation should they be returned, however, the regulation still 
contains a discretion to nonetheless require the return of the children”214 citing D.P. v 
Central Authority; JLM v Director General Department of Community Services215: 
There may be many matters that bear upon the exercise of … discretion.  In 
particular there will be cases where, by moulding the conditions on which 
return may occur, the discretion will properly be exercised by making an 
order for return on those conditions, notwithstanding that a case of grave risk 
may otherwise have been established.  Ensuring that not only that there will 
be judicial proceedings in the country of return but also there will be suitable 
interim arrangements for the child may loom large at this point in the enquiry. 
                                                        
211 [95]. 
212 [101]. 
213 [102]. 
214 [103]. 
215 (2001) 206 CLR 401 [40]. 
 Page 75 
 
In the Fouadi case the Judge held that there was a grave risk of harm to the children, 
yet still made a return order, albeit, one attaching several strict pre-conditions for the 
applicant father to satisfy before the children would be returned.  Mr. Fouadi was 
ordered to obtain orders from the Los Angeles Superior Court pending further orders 
from that court.  
The judge finished by stating that “… I would not be prepared to order the return of 
the children to the USA if there still remained charges which the mother could expect 
to be met with upon her return arising from the removal of the children from the USA 
[emphasis added].  In my view the possibility of the incarceration of the mother and 
the children being deprived of their mother’s care and exposed to the care of their 
father would place the children at grave risk of being physically and psychologically 
harmed”.216  
This is another example of a judge accepting all of the mother’s evidence and finding 
there is a grave risk of harm to the children, but still exercising discretion to make a 
return order.   
Department of Communities (Child Safety Services) & Garning217 involved 
allegations of violence to the mother and the children and exposure to parental 
violence.  The Australian mother of four daughters aged 8 to 14 years old, all born in 
Italy to an Italian father, illegally retained the girls in Australia after a holiday.  The 
father filed an application for their return.  The mother argued Regulation 16(3)(b) 
applied and gave evidence that the father had suffered from mental illness for several 
years which he had been hospitalised and treated for, that there was a history of 
serious physical, verbal and emotional abuse by the husband towards the mother and 
children before and after they had separated in 2007, and even death threats to the 
mother.  She also gave evidence that he was not paying child support and that he had 
crashed his motorcycle while driving under the influence of medication while one of 
the children was a passenger and that she suffered injuries.  The mother submitted a 
report from a psychologist who she had seen in Australia which the judge found did 
not ‘go so far as providing any evidentiary basis for the view that the mother’s own 
state of health is at such risk as creating in itself a grave risk to the psychological or 
physical wellbeing of the four children if they are ordered to return to Italy.’  The 
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mother also submitted a report from an Italian speaking psychologist who saw the 
children in Brisbane in 2010/2011.  This was also dismissed by the trial judge for not 
containing enough information regarding the matters raised by the mother, 
specifically physical violence.   
 
Forrest J stated that if the mother had been concerned about the children’s welfare 
she would have taken steps in Italy to restrict the time they spent with their father by 
applying to have the consensual agreement that was in place sanctioned by the Italian 
Court in November 2008 amended by the court.  The judge made a return order for 
all four children while holding that “… although I am concerned that the father’s 
authoritarian style of parenting might not create the ideal environment for a 
completely healthy development of these four young girls, I cannot find on the 
evidence that is before me that returning the girls to Italy, where their ongoing 
parenting arrangements can clearly be the subject of further consideration in the 
courts of Italy, places them at a risk of physical or psychological harm that can be 
described as reaching the level of ‘grave’’.  
 
Once again, the judge downplays the seriousness of a father’s behaviour and sends 
the children back to his country and care.  It is submitted that the goal of the court is 
not only to uphold the Convention, but also to punish the taking mother. 
 
In the case of Department of Family and Community Services & Reiner218 the mother 
alleged abuse and violence to her and the eldest child and exposure to parental 
violence.  The 37 year old mother was born in Asia but was an Australian citizen.  
The 60 year old father was a citizen of the United Kingdom (“U.K.”).  They married 
in 2005 in the U.K. and their two children 7 and 4 were born in the U.K.  In January 
2013 the mother abducted the children to Sydney and the father filed a return 
application in March 2013.  The mother raised the Grave Risk Exception and offered 
evidence of verbal, emotional, psychological and physical violence perpetrated by 
the father.  She also alleged he controlled their money, had kicked down a bedroom 
door while she was inside with the eldest child, had physically abused the eldest 
child leaving the child with red marks and bruises, had thrown a plate of food against 
the wall during dinner, had hit the mother when she tried to stop him from force 
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feeding the eldest child, and that generally when he got drunk he would abuse her.  
The mother did not report any of the abuse to the authorities, but did tell a friend.  
The father gave evidence identifying him as a ‘supportive.  The father also gave what 
turned out to be important evidence that while the mother had worked full time, he 
had stayed home to care for the eldest child and that both the children were in his 
care during the day time hours and that the mother did not object to this.   
The judge ruled in the father’s favour.  It appears from this decision that the alleged 
abuse/violence was not extreme enough, as the judge stated that even if he had 
accepted the mother’s assertions about domestic violence at their highest, her 
allegations would not lead him to conclude that the making of a return order would 
create a grave risk that the return of the children would expose them to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.   
In the case of Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services and 
Berman219 the mother raised allegations of abuse and violence to her and three of her 
children aged 9, 12 and 13, but had little evidence to substantiate the allegations.  
The mother moved to Australia from New Zealand (“N.Z.”) in April 2011 leaving 
the three children and a 5 year old child with their father in N.Z.  In January 2012 the 
eldest child visited the mother in Australia for four days then returned to her father.  
In June 2012 the other two younger children travelled to Australia to their mother’s 
care.  In November 2012 the eldest child returned to her mother.  All three children 
then stayed with their mother in Australia leaving the youngest with the father in 
N.Z.  On 25 January, 2013 the father made a return application.   
The mother raised grave risk of harm giving evidence that the father had a history of 
violence directed to her and the children, animals and others, including her father 
who he had physically assaulted.  However, there were some important factors that 
caused the mother’s defence to fail.  First, there had been a joint parental agreement 
made in April 2011 when the mother left N.Z. that provided that the children remain 
in the father’s primary care.  This was unchallenged by the mother.  Second, when 
the three eldest girls were in her care, the mother did complain to the relevant 
authorities in N.Z. about the father’s care of the youngest child.  However, their 
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investigation at the 5 year old girl’s child care centre revealed no concerns about the 
child’s presentation.  The father submitted a medical report for the 5 year old which 
showed there were no clinical grounds to suspect any form of abuse of the child.  
Third, in an email dated 8 January, 2012 to her solicitors, the mother said that the 
father had “never hurt the kids”.  Fourth, the Family Consultant who interviewed the 
children conceded that the children’s statements about being physically assaulted by 
the father may have come not from experience, but from an outside influence.  
Justice Hogan220 accepted the submissions of the father’s counsel that it was ‘beyond 
all reasonable belief that the taking mother, as a caring parent of four children, would 
leave them in the care of their father if she held genuine concerns about the 
unpredictability of his parenting, potential of violence towards them and excessive 
alcohol consumption’.  The father submitted that it was unbelievable that the mother 
would leave the children simply upon the father’s promise to her, prior to her move 
to Australia in April 2011, that he would ensure the children were cared for and he 
would improve his alleged bad behaviours.  The taking mother stated that on the 
basis of the father’s promise, she considered the children were safe in their father’s 
care.   
The court felt that such evidence established that the mother believed the father had 
the capacity to act in a manner which did not place the children at risk.  Basically, the 
judge found that if the mother considered the children truly to be at risk in their 
father’s care, she would have returned to N.Z. to protect them.  A return order was 
made in August 2013 for the three children to return to New Zealand. 
The case of Department of Family and Community Services & Luzzatto221 involved 
abuse/violence to the mother and suspected sexual abuse of the male child.  The 
taking mother had dual citizenship – Italian and Australian.  The applicant father was 
Italian and the children were habitually resident in Italy.  The parents were married in 
2006 and in September 2012 the father agreed that the mother could bring their two 
children aged 2 and 4 to Australia.  The mother then illegally retained them in 
                                                        
220 Brisbane Family Court. 
221 [2013] FamCA 1016. 
 Page 79 
 
Australia.  The father filed an application and the hearing was in November 2013.  
He also commenced criminal proceedings against the mother.   
 
The mother raised Regulation 16(3)(b) and offered evidence of controlling and 
aggressive behaviour from the father from the time of their honeymoon, starting with 
verbal abuse and escalating to physical abuse (pinching, slapping, shoving, punching 
and rape) and even death threats.  She stated that he would also force her to show 
him when she was menstruating.   
 
Upon physical separation they continued to sleep in the same home but in different 
rooms.  The mother then told her parents about the abuse and the mother-in-law tried 
to get the father to go to counselling.  The taking mother gave evidence that she had 
tried to contact shelters in Italy for help, having got their information from the 
Australian Embassy, but it was difficult to contact them as the husband would stalk 
her.  She also stated that she suspected sexual abuse of the male child by the father.  
Her parents and sister also gave evidence about the abuse they had witnessed.   
 
The taking mother stated that she was advised by two lawyers and her own 
psychologist not to report the abuse because the police would call the father and he 
may kill her.  She made a report at the Australian Consulate in Rome and asked for 
advice about women’s shelters.  She and the children were treated by psychologists 
in Australia and the psychologist’s report confirmed that the male child’s behaviours 
were consistent with the mother’s report of him witnessing ongoing emotional abuse 
and domestic violence and the doctor recommended that any contact with the father 
be supervised.  The mother argued that she would have to return to a place where she 
was subjected to intimidation, control and violence perpetrated by the father and 
from which she was not protected.  Furthermore, a consequence of that abuse would 
be that the children would be exposed to violent behaviour and directly, or through 
their mother, they could suffer psychological harm.  She also argued there was a risk 
that the children would be taken from her and being separated from their primary 
carer would place them in an intolerable situation.   
Not surprisingly, the court held that weighing all the evidence, grave risk of 
psychological harm to the children was not established because (i) the conduct was 
denied by the father, (ii) there were no medical records or contemporaneous police 
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records or court records, so there was no independent corroboration, (iii) the mother 
continued to live in the same home with the father, (iv) she went on a short trip and 
left the children with him, and (v) the father had a priest and his doctor give evidence 
in his favour, which the Court gave a lot of weight to.  The court found that ‘while 
disturbing and potentially harmful the allegations made by the mother about the 
father’s conduct, which the children are said to have witnessed or have been directly 
subject to – it is not of the most serious type.’   
The court cited the test for Grave Risk from In DP v Commonwealth Central 
Authority222 that what is required is persuasion that there is a risk which warrants the 
qualitative description “grave” and found that ‘… the risk that is relevant is not 
limited to harm that will actually occur, it extends to a risk that the return would 
expose the child to harm.’  The court also stated that ‘reg 16(3)(b) is not to be given a 
narrow construction’, however, ‘a court will not be persuaded of that without some 
clear and compelling evidence’.  
A return order was made with the judge stating that ‘… The High Court has rejected 
… the unquestioning assertion of the adequacy of the legal system in the jurisdiction 
of habitual residence.  However, it cannot be required that the courts of every 
signatory jurisdiction must guarantee in each instance that there could be no interim 
or final outcome that would be inimical223 to the abducting parent’s case.’ 
Wolford & Attorney-General’s Department (Cth)224 concerned an appeal against a 
return order and involved allegations of long-term abuse to the mother.  Both parents 
were born in Australia and had been living in the U.K. since 2007 (apart from living 
in Australia from January 2008 to March 2009).  Both were dual citizens.  They 
married in late 2012 and separated in November 2013.  England remained their home 
until the mother “surreptitiously” (the court’s word) removed the two children, a 2 
week old girl and a 2 year old boy, in December 2013.   
The mother raised grave risk and allegations of ‘… a long history of verbal, 
emotional and psychological abuse’ by the father.”  She had been treated by 
psychologists in the U.K. while living there and also in Australia upon her return.  
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She stated that she was suffering from anxiety, stress and depression and had a 
psychologist’s report stating that returning to the U.K. with the children would be 
detrimental to her well-being and would place her in an intolerable situation as she 
did not want to reunite with the husband and could not even live in the same home.  
She was concerned he would use the children to continue to control her.  She claimed 
not to have family support in the U.K., but admitted that it was not an option for her 
to be separated from the children, as they were so young.  Regarding the children, 
her doctor said that ‘parental stress has an impact on children and everything possible 
should be done to create a stable, consistent and emotionally supportive environment 
and lifestyle.’  The mother appealed on the basis that the primary judge made an 
error by finding there was no grave risk of harm and for failing to give sufficient 
weight to the treatment of the psychologist’s evidence.  She also stated that the 
primary judge did not impose conditions on the return order, only unenforceable 
undertakings.   
The mother lost the appeal primarily because the psychologist’s report was 
predicated upon an interplay of facts, some of which were pivotal to her report, but 
which were not able to be established.  For example, that the mother and children 
would live in the matrimonial home with the father, and that neither the mother nor 
the father has immediate family support in the U.K.  However, it came out that the 
mother did have some family in the U.K. (a grandmother, a sister and some cousins), 
but there was no reference to these relatives in the psychologist’s report, or to the 
fact that the mother had lived in England for seven years prior to her removing the 
children and thus had some friends living there.   
Whereas the mother’s psychologist proceeded on the assumption that the mother and 
children would live with the father, as a consequence of undertakings from him, the 
primary judge was satisfied the mother and children would live independently from 
the father.  Also, the psychologist did not say that in the mother’s care in England 
there was a risk the children would be exposed to psychological harm.  In this regard, 
the only clear prediction from the psychologist of them being harmed in this fashion 
was if they were to be separated from the mother, which it was common ground 
would not happen.   
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Nonetheless, and primarily on the basis of the psychologist’s evidence, His Honour 
was satisfied that even in these circumstances the children would be in the primary 
care of a ‘stressed and anxious’ mother suffering from post-natal issues and that this 
‘would be likely to have some negative effect on the children’.   
It is submitted that the judge delivered a very simplistic, if not presumptuous and 
unorthodox solution, i.e., that the mother could avail herself of counselling and 
medication for anxiety and depression without considering whether if might not be 
medically safe for the mother of a 2 week old baby to take anti-depressant 
medication while she was likely to still be breastfeeding her baby.  
Cases Where The Court Found Regulation 16(3)(b) Was Satisfied: 
McDonald v Director-General, Department of Community Services, NSW225 
concerned abuse/violence to the mother.  An Australian mother brought her six-
month old child to Australia from Belgium without the father’s consent.  The child’s 
father made a return application and the taking mother raised the Grave Risk 
Exception asserting that a return to Belgium would expose her to continuing abuse 
from the husband including verbal and physical abuse, threatening to have her 
deported to Australia, threatening to kill himself.  She alleged that the child’s father 
abused drugs and alcohol which adversely impacted on his personality and 
consequently, their child would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm if placed 
unsupervised in the father’s care.  The father admitted admitting himself into a 
psychiatric hospital in April 2005.  The mother relied on evidence from a psychiatrist 
and a psychologist who concluded that she suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder whilst she was in Belgium (up until after she returned to Australia), that she 
suffered from traumatic anxiety as a result of exposure to domestic violence and that 
she would suffer an exacerbation if she returned to Belgium.  Her doctors also found 
that the mother’s evidence suggested that the father was mentally unstable and that 
he had been threatening and violent towards her, the child and towards himself.  In 
the last paragraph of his report one of the doctors stated that there was “a real and 
significant risk” that if the mother returned to Belgium she would develop anxiety 
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again.  The doctor also stated that “it would be in the best interests of the child that 
she remains in her mother’s care in Australia”.   
At first instance Justice Le Poer Trench found that the return of the child to Belgium 
would put her at grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise place her in an 
intolerable situation, but outlined conditions which, if imposed, would mean the 
return to Belgium would no longer pose a grave risk of harm or an intolerable 
situation.  These included a protection order for the mother and provision of airfares 
and financial support for the mother and child.  The orders were subsequently varied 
by Justice Le Poer Trench so that it was sufficient for the father to provide a written 
undertaking to the mother in place of a court-ordered protection order.   
The mother appealed on the grounds that it was inappropriate for Justice Le Poer 
Trench to exercise his discretion to return the child after he had found that the return 
of the child would create a grave risk to the child or place her in an intolerable 
situation.  She argued that if it was appropriate to exercise the discretion for return, it 
could only be exercised upon the court being satisfied that certain conditions 
precedent to the return had been met, with those conditions needing to be stated with 
sufficient particularity so they could be objectively measured to determine whether 
the conditions had been met or not.  She argued that in this case, the orders were 
made after the proceedings were completed, and thus were beyond the trial judge’s 
power.  Further, if the orders were within power of the trial judge, they so radically 
changed the basis upon which the return was to be ordered as to negate the exercise 
of discretion.  The mother’s appeal was allowed.   
 
The Appeal Court stated that if conditions were to be imposed to alleviate what 
would otherwise be a grave risk of harm to the child of return, those conditions must 
be clearly defined and capable of being objectively measured to determine whether 
or not they have been fulfilled.  The Appeal Court stated that the orders, as 
formulated by the trial judge, did not meet those requirements, nor did they succeed 
in neutralising the risk to the child of return.  The Appeal Court found that there were 
so many difficulties in establishing satisfactory pre-conditions to enable the return of 
the child that the only proper exercise of discretion open to the trial judge, once the 
 Page 84 
 
Grave Risk Exception had been established, was to refuse to make an order for 
return. 
State Central Authority & Papastavrou226 involved violence perpetrated against the 
mother and eldest child and the children’s exposure to parental violence.  It heralded 
a significant new development as it was the first time that an Australian court had 
made findings in a Convention application that the return country was unable to 
protect a victim of domestic violence.  The Family Court held that a grave risk of 
harm from ongoing domestic violence is sufficient to preclude the return of abducted 
children to their country of origin under the Hague Convention.  The Family Court 
held that the taking mother in the case, who had moved with her children to Australia 
from Greece to escape domestic violence did not have to return her children to 
Greece.   
The taking mother was an Australian citizen who moved to Greece in 1996 and 
married a Greek man in 1999.  The couple remained living in Greece and their two 
children were born there.  The mother alleged that during the marriage the father had 
become increasingly violent towards her, often in the presence of the children.  These 
acts of violence not only caused physical bruising and emotional trauma, but also 
resulted in the mother developing a serious medical condition called "positional 
vertigo" which made her dizzy, nauseous and vulnerable.  The mother and father 
separated and during the parties' separation the father spent time with the children 
weekly at a public meeting point.  Late in 2007 the father seriously abused both the 
mother and the older child.  The mother called the Greek police to try to get some 
protection for herself and her children from the father, however, the police informed 
the mother that as the father had already left the family home, there was little they 
could do besides talk to the father.  Her doctor recommended that she return to 
Australia as she required the physical and emotional support of her family.  The 
mother claimed that before leaving Greece she had informed the father of her 
intention to take the children to reside in Australia until she recovered her health.  
She claimed the father did not care.  The father denied that he had any prior 
knowledge of the mother's travel plans.  Several weeks after the mother and children 
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arrived in Australia the father lodged a return application with the Greek government 
for the children to be returned to Greece.  
The mother argued that return to Greece would place the children in an intolerable 
situation on several grounds, relating to both the domestic violence perpetrated by 
the father and Greek criminal proceedings issued by the father against the mother in 
regard to the abduction.  It was first argued that a grave risk of harm was posed to the 
children by the harmful effects of the direct physical and psychological abuse against 
the mother and older child, as observed by the younger child, and the likelihood that 
this would reoccur if the children returned to Greece.  The mother's allegations of 
extensive domestic violence were supported by affidavit evidence provided by her 
mother and sister as witnesses.  Justice Bennett noted medical evidence that the 
mother's condition was consistent with her sustaining blows to the head, and that the 
evidence provided no alternative explanation for the source of the blow.  The father's 
response to the mother's allegations was contained in a single paragraph of an 
affidavit, in which he denied exerting violence on the mother or children.  This 
evidence was not able to be tested in cross-examination. 
In assessing the evidence Justice Victoria Bennett accepted the evidence contained in 
the affidavits provided by the mother and the sister.  Her Honour was satisfied that, 
on the totality of the evidence, it was more likely than not that the father inflicted 
domestic violence on the mother and older child, in the presence of the younger 
child, in the manner alleged by the mother.  
Justice Bennett also made the significant comment that; the fact that the mother had 
not reported the domestic violence to the police earlier should not be held to weaken 
her arguments regarding the risk of harm due to violence.  Her Honour found that 
there are many reasons why victims of domestic violence may choose not to make a 
report, including ‘pressure from a dominant spouse or related persons, a perception 
of no alternative means of support, a desire not to disrupt care arrangements for the 
children, illness, fear and even shame and embarrassment’.  The mother further used 
expert medical evidence to argue that her positional vertigo condition would increase 
her vulnerability to greater injury if she was exposed to further domestic violence. 
Justice Bennett accepted that this condition would make the mother more vulnerable 
to sustaining secondary injury if she was knocked over.  Thus, a cogent aspect of the 
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mother's submissions was that her argument regarding the risk of future domestic 
violence was reinforced, as this risk could not be alleviated by reliance on the Greek 
authorities.   
The mother submitted significant expert evidence that the laws and policing 
regarding domestic violence in Greece were inadequate and unable to protect the 
mother and children and evidence from a Greek legal professor and Greek legal 
practitioner asserting that there is inadequate protection for domestic violence 
victims in Greece.  Despite there being laws purporting to protect victims of 
violence, such legislation has not been properly implemented as the culture of the 
police and their lack of resources makes them reluctant to enforce the laws.  Further, 
in reality, cases against domestic violence can take up to two years to be heard, and 
there are no refuges for abused women and children.   
Justice Bennett found that the State Central Authority left this evidence largely 
unanswered and found that while the mother bore the onus of proof regarding the 
Exception as the taking mother, once she had raised evidence supporting her 
contention, the applicant State Central Authority was required to meet her case with 
‘evidence rather than general propositions or assumption’.  Accordingly, her Honour 
held that on the available evidence the mother had established that if a return order 
was made, the Greek authorities were not equipped or likely to provide adequate 
protection for the mother and children against domestic violence.   
These unique and unusual circumstances and the evidence offered by the mother led 
Justice Bennett to distinguish the matter from previous case law such as Murray;227 
nevertheless the judge expressed agreement with the sentiment of such cases by 
remarking how ‘unpalatable’ it would ordinarily be for a court to ‘examine and 
pronounce upon the ability of a foreign court or legal system to protect its 
citizens.’228  
A final argument raised by the mother, apart from domestic violence, was that the 
father had issued criminal charges against her in relation to the child abduction and 
there was a risk that she would be incarcerated on return to Greece.  The mother 
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contended that this posed a grave risk of harm to the children as they would have to 
reside with the father who had exposed them to physical and psychological harm if 
the mother was incarcerated.  Again, the State Central Authority did not submit any 
substantial evidence regarding the likelihood of the mother's incarceration or 
processes involved, and Justice Bennett did not receive a response to her own queries 
to Greek specialist liaison judges in family law matters.  This distinguished the 
matter from previous cases raising incarceration as a component of the Grave Risk 
Exception in which the courts had been able to assess probable outcomes and 
processes of the criminal charges.  Accordingly, her Honour accepted the argument 
that there was a very serious risk of the mother being incarcerated.  
Justice Bennett reached her final decision on the evidence that the children would be 
exposed to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an 
intolerable situation if they were ordered to return to Greece.  Despite this finding, it 
was still open to Justice Bennett to exercise her discretion to return the children to 
Greece.  Neither the Hague Convention nor the Regulations give guidance on what 
matters should be considered when determining whether to exercise such discretion.  
In reaching her decision here, Justice Bennett chose to rely on the list of relevant 
factors compiled originally by Hale L.J., (referred to most recently in Australia by 
Kay J in State Central Authority and DB,229).  These include the comparative 
suitability of the forum to determine the child's future in the substantive proceedings, 
the likely outcome (in whichever forum) of the substantive proceedings, the 
consequences of the acquiescence, the situation which would await the absconding 
parent and the child if compelled to return, the anticipated emotional effect on the 
child of an immediate return, and the extent to which the purpose and underlying 
philosophy of the Hague Convention would be at risk of frustration if a return order 
were to be refused.  After comprehensively considering each of these in turn, Justice 
Bennett found that the balance of factors was in support of her not exercising the 
discretion to make a return order, and consequently the State Central Authority's 
application for return of the children was dismissed.  
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State Central Authority & Perkis230 concerned abuse and violence to the mother.  
The taking mother was 18 and the applicant father was 17.  The abducted child was 
approximately 6 months old.  The parents met while at high school in Victoria, 
commencing a relationship in 2007, first living as de factos with the mother’s family 
in Victoria and then independently.  They also lived with the mother’s father in the 
Northern Territory.  The mother was an Australian citizen and the father was born in 
South Africa.  He was also a New Zealand (“N.Z.”) citizen.  In September 2009 the 
parents travelled to N.Z. and their child was born there.  They lived with the father’s 
family.  The mother and child left N.Z. on 6 March, 2010 for a three week holiday in 
Victoria with the mother’s family.  The father consented and it was agreed the 
mother and child would return to N.Z. after the holiday.  The mother did not return 
and in March 2010 she filed an application in the Victorian Federal Magistrates 
Court seeking sole parental responsibility orders.  On the same date, the father 
received an email from the mother’s lawyers in Australia stating that the mother did 
not intend to return to N.Z. and would stay in Australia with the child and had 
applied for parenting orders.  State Central Authority of Victoria filed an application 
for the father on 20/04/10.   
The mother raised the Grave Risk Exception alleging in her affidavit that the father 
and his mother were aggressive and physically and emotionally abusive towards her 
during the time she was living with the father’s parents and after she left she received  
hundreds of harassing text messages.  She stated that he violently attacked her right 
before she left for Australia, causing her physical injury.  She stated that if she 
returned to N.Z. she would have no friends, no place to live and was not eligible for 
welfare payments.  At trial she argued that the child could suffer a grave risk of harm 
if there was deterioration in her mental health.   
The mother’s mental health was the subject of a doctor’s report.  The doctor was 
extensively cross examined and the judge found him to be well-qualified and 
impressive witness and his assessment was accepted in most respects.  He stated that 
if the mother had to return to N.Z. that she would become more depressed.  He said 
she would be substantially more vulnerable in N.Z. without the support of her family 
and friends, especially given the conflict with the father’s family.  He stated that if 
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the mother became depressed or anxious it would affect her parenting abilities which 
could affect the baby.  He stated that ‘It’s almost inevitable that if the mother was 
forced to return to New Zealand, she would decompensate and her anxiety and 
depression would redevelop, leading to problematic circumstances for the child due 
to inevitable deterioration of the quality of her parenting if depressed.’  He explained 
that “decompensate” refers to “an exacerbation of pre-existing symptoms” which 
may cause the individual to “go downhill dramatically”.  He stated that this process 
occurs “very quickly” as it “triggers the original problem”.  The doctor said the 
mother’s case had multiple stressors, including age, intellect, life experience, and 
vulnerability, a history of anxiety and depression, no work prospects, no skills.    
Justice Victoria Bennett found the mother to be truthful and polite. She found the 
father to be immature and prone to anger quickly with little impulse control.  The 
omissions in his first affidavit reflected poorly on his credibility.   
Justice Bennett held that the most compelling features of this case was the young age 
of the mother, her unchallenged pre-disposition to depression, her reasonable and 
genuine apprehension to returning to New Zealand where the father’s family have 
treated her with disregard and which is a place where she has absolutely no other ties 
or supports.  The judge found the doctor’s evidence about the significance of the 
mother’s age to be very persuasive and was satisfied that the return of the child to 
New Zealand would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise 
place him in an intolerable situation.  As a consequence of the mother having made 
out her case under the Exception, the court has discretion not to return the child to 
New Zealand.” 
Although the judge held for the mother, she still, for some reason, felt it necessary to 
discuss the extent to which the purpose and underlying philosophy of the Hague 
Convention would be frustrated if a return order were refused:  
Leaving to one side the parts of the 1980 Convention which deal with rights 
of access, the philosophy of the 1980 Convention is to protect children from 
the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention across international 
borders by depriving the abductor’s actions of any practical or juridical 
consequences.  It is not the philosophy of the 1980 Convention to capture all 
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abductions.  The concept of wrongfulness defines the children and the 
relationships which the 1980 Convention is intended to protect.  Finally, only 
if one or more of the Exceptions to mandatory return apply, does the Court 
have discretion to not return the children.  It is only in the exercise of that 
discretion that the best interest’s principles have any bearing. That is how I 
approach this case.  Dealing with the particular circumstances of this child, I 
am satisfied that to return the child to New Zealand now or in time for a 
hearing at a later date will expose him to grave risk of harm or otherwise 
place him in an intolerable situation.  I am not satisfied that there are any 
conditions which can be imposed which will ameliorate the gravity of the 
risk.  
 
The case of Harris v Harris231 involved abuse and violence to the mother.  The  
taking mother was an Australian citizen and the applicant father a Norwegian citizen.   
They married in 2006 and had a son.  They resided in Norway.  In November 2008,  
when her son was 3 years old, the mother fled back to Australia to escape domestic  
violence which she alleged she had been experiencing for over two years.  She raised  
the Grave Risk Exception and offered evidence which included her husband being  
verbally and physically abusive by denigrating her and threatening her, punching her  
in the face, injuring her eye, blackening her eye and bruising her arms, pushing her  
into walls, attempting to strangle her, breaking her arm twice, raping her, and  
threatening to kill her and their 3 year old son and her parents.  She had gone to a  
domestic violence counsellor in 2007 and she had medical records supporting her  
evidence of the physical abuse.  She could not offer evidence of police reports, as she  
gave evidence that her husband had threatened to kill her if she reported the abuse to  
the authorities. 
Justice Ryan at first instance dismissed the husband’s application, holding that Grave 
Risk had been made out.  Justice Ryan stated that she was not satisfied that court 
orders obtained in the other jurisdiction would ‘achieve their intended effect’ as the 
type of violence inflicted by the husband ‘is not amenable to the type of constraints 
which the interim orders and criminal law would impose’ and the mother would be 
isolated living in Norway with no family support and that this personal isolation 
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increased the gravity of risk of harm to the child.  Justice Ryan also found that the 
violence inflicted on the mother only ceased when she fled back to Australia.  Justice 
Ryan was concerned that the husband’s death threat (which he did not deny) was ‘a 
threat with the potential of the gravest consequences to her and the child.’   
The judge stated232 that ‘the totality of the evidence’ persuaded her that if the child 
returned to Norway with the mother there existed a grave risk of physical harm to the 
mother and a risk of commensurate severity of physical and psychological harm to 
the child.  Justice Ryan found that future violence occurring in the presence of the 
child could be psychologically damaging to him and stated that ‘while in Australia 
domestic violence has rarely been found to bring this defence into play,233  I am 
persuaded that this is one of those rare occasions where the facts support such an 
outcome.’  Justice Ryan also found that if the child and mother were to return to 
Norway they would be placed in an intolerable situation because he would be reliant 
on his mother as his primary carer who would almost certainly be isolated and 
terrified and she genuinely believes her life would be at risk from the father due to 
the seriousness of the past domestic violence.  She also held that she was not 
satisfied that it was possible ‘to construct enforceable conditions for the child’s 
return which would moderate the gravity of the risk of harm to the child to a level 
which would reasonably address his safety needs or place him in anything other than 
an intolerable situation.’  This decision was appealed by the father himself (not by 
the Central Authority) and was consequently upheld on appeal. 
What Is “Clear And Compelling” Evidence Of Grave Risk Of Exposure To Future 
Harm To The Child”?234   
 
There must be evidence that the child would risk exposure to physical or 
psychological harm.  More than allegations of domestic violence is required.235  The 
Convention does not define the gravity of risk required to successfully establish the 
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the Secretary of the Department of Human Services State Central Authority [2006] 
FamCA 466. 
234 DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
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defence.  Courts have interpreted the degree of physical or psychological harm 
required as being restricted by the words ‘or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation.’236  Circumstances which will qualify as grave risks of harm is 
where the return will place the child in imminent danger such as returning the child 
to famine, disease or a war zone.  The other is where the child will be subjected to 
serious neglect, abuse or extraordinary emotional dependence and authorities in the 
child’s habitual residence are either incapable or unwilling to adequately protect the 
child.237 Australian courts have protected the objective of prompt return by avoiding 
making determinations on the child’s best interests when interpreting the gravity of 
harm required.  This has been achieved with either an assumption that the child will 
be protected in the other jurisdiction238 and/or by undertakings/conditions given by 
the left behind parent.239   
 
However, “Courts are construing the grave risk of harm defence narrowly when 
accepting an unenforceable undertaking given by the left-behind parent or assuming 
that the authorities in the child’s habitual residence can protect the child post-return.  
This narrow interpretation demonstrates the significant value placed upon promoting 
comity between contracting states.”240   
 
The Grave Risk defence in the Regulations mirrors the provisions of Article 13(1)(b) 
of the Abduction Convention.  It is raised in most Hague cases by the taking mother 
and although ‘Article 13(1)(b) does not require returns that threaten danger to 
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children’241 the courts have made it extremely difficult to prove242 as the Convention 
requires that the risk is to the child, not to the mother.243 
 
Although, even if a judge finds, on the evidence, that the children would be exposed 
to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, or otherwise placed in an 
intolerable situation, if they were ordered to return to the other jurisdiction, the judge 
can still exercise their discretion according to Regulation 16(5) to return the children.  
To make these cases even harder, neither the Hague Convention nor the Regulations 
give guidance on what matters should be considered when determining whether to 
exercise such discretion.244 
In cases where the risk concerned a history of domestic violence, the grave risk 
defence has only been successful in extraordinary cases where there is extensive 
undisputed evidence of violence perpetrated against the mother.245  “Amidst 
mounting recognition of the increasing number of abducting primary-carer mothers, 
international parental child abduction cases characterized by domestic violence are 
anything but extraordinary.”246   
The problem for abused women/children is that the family courts hold that the 
presence of domestic violence is insufficient to establish the grave risk of harm 
defence.  Dr Danielle Bozin has stated that: 
“Failing to assess a child’s best interests during Convention return 
proceedings, coupled with an in adequate examination of their best interests 
post return, can produce problematic outcomes.  It may result in the parenting 
dispute being determined without the child’s best interests, and their 
abducting primary-carer mother’s intrinsically intertwined circumstances, 
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being sufficiently examined.  This may result in the child and their primary-
carer mother living in a precarious state post-return.” 247 
In summary, the problem, as Dr Danielle Bozin has also identified, is that the broad 
approach to interpreting the grave risk of harm defence, advocated by the majority 
judges of the High Court in DP and JLM248 has not been applied consistently by 
Australian family courts.249  This reflects the tension between the courts’ desire to 
uphold the Abduction Convention’s goals of deterrence and comity and their 
obligation under the law to protect women and children under the international 
conventions Australia has ratified. 
 
 
Conclusion: 
The decisions analysed above highlight how in most domestic violence related 
abduction cases evidence of domestic violence perpetrated against the mother and 
witnessed by the child is not generally accepted as satisfying Regulation 16(3)(b) to 
the point where no return order is made.  This is despite solid research that shows 
domestic violence against a parent by a parent ‘has a traumatic effect on those who 
witness violence, particularly children’.250  It is only in rare cases that judges will 
find evidence of abuse/violence perpetrated against the mother alone is sufficient to 
satisfy the Grave Risk of Harm Exception.  The cases also illustrate that certain facts 
that sometimes go in a mother’s favour are if she is young and will be isolated from 
family/friends upon return, if she has extensive medical/police/court records proving 
she and/or the child are victims of domestic violence, if the judge cannot construct 
sufficient conditions to protect the mother/child or if the mother can show in some 
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way that the jurisdiction she will be returning to will not be able to protect her or her 
child (which is an unfair burden to have to meet and not something the Abduction 
Convention or the Regulations require to make out any of the Exceptions).  Even 
when a taking mother offers evidence that return will result in a risk of grave risk of 
harm to her and/or the child in the form of an expert and/or a psychologist’s report, 
this does not always impress the courts enough for them to refuse to make a return 
order. 
The only consistency to be found in the case decisions is that the Grave Risk 
Exception is almost always raised by the taking mother and supported by allegations 
of past domestic violence perpetrated on her and/or the child by the applicant father, 
or evidence that the child witnessed the violence.  In response to such allegations the 
courts require clear and compelling evidence of the abuse and evidence of the 
mother’s attempts to get help.  Unfortunately, as the cases discussed show, if the 
taking mother cannot produce what the court considers to be clear and compelling 
evidence of abuse/domestic violence and proof that she took steps to report the abuse 
or protect/remove herself and the children from the abusive father, the court will not 
generally regard the allegations as being serious enough to satisfy the Grave Risk of 
Harm Exception and a return order is made with undertakings/conditions attached.251  
It can be a difficult situation if an abused woman cannot produce clear and 
compelling evidence of abuse/domestic violence perpetrated against her and/or her 
child as the court then has to balance protecting such victims while also protecting 
applicants against vexatious claims.     
When deciding Hague cases Australian judges seem to place a high value on the 
Abduction Convention’s goals of deterring forum shopping and upholding comity so 
much so that very few judges choose to interpret the Grave Risk of Harm Exception 
broadly by seriously considering all the arguments offered by the taking mother in 
relation to the grave risk of harm defence and all the allegations and/or evidence of 
domestic violence in support thereof.  It could be argued that upholding the 
Abduction Convention’s underlying philosophies takes precedence over ensuring the 
protection of abducted children (or their primary carers). 
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Outside Australia this issue has received much attention by international legal 
scholars.  Professor Rhona Schuz252 has written253 that: 
… Much of the academic criticism against the Abduction Convention and its 
implementation has been directed to the impact of the Convention on 
domestic violence victims who abduct their children in order to escape the 
violence … Whilst this problem was mentioned indirectly in the documents 
of previous HCCH’s Special Commission Meetings, and was discussed at the 
Fifth Special Commission Meeting in November 2006, it was not until the 
Sixth Special Commission Meeting in June 2011 that a detailed preliminary 
document, containing research into cases involving domestic violence, was 
published by the Permanent Bureau … Most of the discussion of the 
treatment of spousal domestic violence under the Convention has focused on 
the way in which the Article 13(1)(b) defence is interpreted and applied in 
cases where domestic violence is alleged.  This is hardly surprising, since this 
defence would seem to be the most natural way of protecting domestic 
violence victims and their children.  Yet, the available evidence suggests that 
the defence is successful in only around a quarter of cases in which there are 
allegations of domestic violence and that there is a lack of consistency in the 
way in which the defence is applied by different courts.  
Professor Schuz further states254 that: 
… Only in relatively unusual circumstances have courts refused return on the 
basis that it will involve a grave risk of physical harm.255”  She continues “… 
Psychological harm is much more frequently claimed, but courts are reluctant 
to find that such harm is ‘of a severity which is much more than inherent in 
the inevitable disruption, uncertainty and anxiety with follows an unwelcome 
return and is ‘more than transitory.’  In particular, it will be difficult to prove 
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this harm unless there is an expert diagnosis or prognosis that the child 
suffers from or will suffer from a psychiatric or psychological disorder, such 
as post-traumatic stress syndrome.  However, some courts are now prepared 
to accept that exposure to violence between his parents will cause the child 
psychological harm and a few courts are prepared to take into account harm 
which will be caused by the separation of the child from his primary carer.   
It should be noted that the Intolerable Situation Exception is rarely established 
mainly because of the courts’ improper merging of the intolerable situation and grave 
risk of harm defences.  This means that where there is no risk of physical or 
psychological harm to the child, no consideration is given to the possibility that 
return will place the child in an intolerable situation for other reasons.  Even where 
this issue is considered, it will be difficult to satisfy a court that there is an intolerable 
situation without being able to point to some physical or psychological harm.  
Another reason is the development of the practice of requiring undertakings or 
making conditions, which in the court’s view turn what might otherwise be an 
intolerable situation into a tolerable one.”256  
Currently, in most cases heard by the family courts the courts take the view that the 
court of habitual residence should deal with domestic violence allegations.  They 
place emphasis on assessing the risk in returning the child, (rather than on resolving 
issues of fact), and then implement so-called protective measures which they believe 
will reduce the risk of harm to the child.  If the mother’s allegations are proved, 
occasionally a judge will take the view that they have a duty to investigate the 
veracity of the allegations by appointing an independent expert.  Only on rare 
occasions will a court invoke a vigorous adversarial process, requiring the parties to 
present clear evidence to support or refute the allegations.257  
Dr Danielle Bozin has stated that following the High Court’s decision in DP and 
JLM,258  rejecting the Full Court of the Family Court’s preference for a narrow 
interpretation of the grave risk of harm defence, ‘greater weight should be placed 
upon whether a grave risk exists in fact.  Australian courts should assess the 
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consequences of return when the grave risk of harm defence is raised and potential 
consequences are questions of fact’.259   
 
In DP the abducting mother claimed that the child would be at grave risk if returned 
to Greece as Greece lacked appropriate medical facilities to treat the son’s autism.  In 
JLM the abducting mother claimed that the child would be at grave risk if returned to 
Mexico because she was suffering from a major depressive disorder and ordering the 
child’s return could put her at serious risk of committing suicide.  The majority 
judges determined that the fact that there would be judicial proceedings in the child’s 
habitual residence did not in itself address the assertion of a grave risk.   
 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated: 
 
What must be established is clearly identified: that there is a grave risk that 
the return of the child would expose the child to certain types of harm or 
otherwise place the child in “an intolerable situation”.  That requires some 
prediction, based on the evidence, of what may happen if the child is 
returned.  In a case where the person opposing return raises the Exception, a 
court cannot avoid making that prediction by repeating that it is not for the 
courts of the country to which or in which a child has been removed or 
retained to inquire into the best interests of the child.  The Exception requires 
courts to make the kind of inquiry and prediction that will inevitably involve 
some consideration of the interests of the [individual] child.260 
 
In DP the High Court determined the risk to the child was ‘… associated with the 
child’s condition of autism, and the suggested unavailability of appropriate and 
accessible facilities for treatment of that condition in the event the mother took him 
back to Greece from Australia’.  Many questions were raised, for example, what 
facilities are available to the child where he would be living in Greece and how 
accessible would they be?  What would be the circumstances in which the child and 
the mother would live upon return to Greece?  The High Court overturned the Full 
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Court’s decision to order the child’s return explaining that if the Central Authority 
had wished to challenge the mother’s contention that there was a lack of medical 
facilities to treat her child’s autism, then they should have done so at trial.261  The 
High Court refused to permit the Central Authority to present fresh evidence to 
answer these questions.262  The High Court also questioned the adequacy and 
enforceability of undertakings given by the father that he would not remove the child 
from the mother’s care until a Greek court heard the custody matter again and that he 
would not enforce a custody order that he had previously obtained from a Greek 
Court.  The High Court explained that ‘… we gravely doubt the efficacy of an 
undertaking in this form.  If the undertakings to be given by the father about his 
future conduct in Greece were to be enforceable, it would seem to have been 
necessary to suspend the order for return until production of evidence to the Family 
Court of the giving of undertakings by the father which would be enforceable in 
Greece at the suit of the mother’.263 
 
It should be noted that Justice Kirby, one of the dissenting minority judges in DP, 
agreed with the Full Court’s narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm defence.  
His Honour was worried about the dangers of interpreting the defences to a child’s 
return broadly.  His Honour said that comity should be promoted as the principal 
objective.  An examination of the individual child’s best interests detracts from this 
objective’s achievement.  His Honour explained his rationale for this position by 
stating:264 
 
Unless Australian Courts, including this Court, uphold the spirit and the letter 
of the Convention as it is rendered part of Australian law by the Family Law 
Regulations, a large international enterprise of great importance for the 
welfare of children generally will be frustrated in the case of this country … 
To the extent that Australian Courts, including this Court, do not fulfil the 
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expectations expressed in the rigorous language of the Convention and the 
Family Law Regulations, but effectively reserve custody (a residence) 
decisions to themselves, we should not be surprised if other countries, noting 
what we do, decline to extend to our Courts the kind of reciprocity and 
mutual respect which the Convention scheme puts in place.  And that, most 
definitely, would not, in aggregate, be in the best interests of children 
generally and of Australian children in particular.265 
 
When the Grave Risk Exception is raised by the taking mother, her actions and 
inaction are scrutinized by the courts in many cases.266  What does sometimes seem 
to sway the courts are police reports and medical and psychological reports showing 
that the taking mother and or children have suffered from physical and psychological 
abuse and trauma and therefore would likely to continue to suffer if they are 
returned.267  It has been stated that although “the Convention contains provisions that 
allow judges to refrain from returning a child if doing so puts him or her at ‘grave 
risk’ of ‘physical or psychological harm,’ judges are not sufficiently steeped in the 
law to know that they have discretion to accept this as an applicable defence.”268    
 
The case law reveals how in many domestic violence related abduction cases the 
courts try to minimize the use of the Grave Risk Exception by putting in place 
protective measures that are supposed to eliminate or substantially reduce the grave 
risk of harm or avoid the intolerable situation.  I submit that because these measures 
are often unenforceable this results in domestic violence victims and their children 
having to return and subsequent serious hardships.  To minimize such hardships I 
suggesting that the courts adopt a broader interpretation of the Grave Risk Exception 
when dealing with domestic violence related abduction cases by accepting that 
evidence of domestic violence perpetrated against the taking mother equates to a 
Grave Risk of Harm to the abducted child.  And if a return order must be made in a 
domestic violence case, then I suggest that the courts make it their practice to always 
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attach strict pre-conditions to be complied with by the applicant father - before the 
return order will take effect.  This would be allowable pursuant to the authority given 
by Regulation 15(1)(c).   
Despite the 2001 High Court decision of DP, Australian family courts continue to 
interpret the Grave Risk of Harm Exception narrowly and this practice is resulting in 
serious hardships for abused women and their children.  To minimize such hardships 
the Exception has to be interpreted more broadly by the courts. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HOW THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATION 
16(3)(b) EXCEPTION AFFECTS ABUSED WOMEN AND CHILDREN.   
This chapter is an analysis of literature from international scholars from the past 
several years which discusses how generally in most Western jurisdictions, even 
when solid evidence of domestic violence is produced, a return order is usually still 
made with so-called protective measures such as undertakings or conditional orders 
attached.  It will be argued that these types of safeguards are ineffective protection 
for abused women and children, and the only safeguards possibly capable of 
protecting abused women and children are strict pre-conditions imposed by the court 
which must be satisfied by the applicant father before the child is removed from the 
jurisdiction.  It will be shown that this issue exists in Australia, as our family courts 
follow the same procedure.  A few cases will be examined which illustrate this point 
and discuss the consequences of this pointless procedure.  The limited discussion 
which has taken place in Australia on the issue of safeguards attached to return 
orders has mostly been via the ALRC, which made recommendations for reform of 
this practice, recommendations which have yet to be adopted by the government or 
the courts.     
Why Mothers Are Abducting Their Own Children: 
 
Professor Rhona Schuz states that ‘there are legal and sociological explanations for 
the fact that most abductions are now carried out by primary carers and not by non-
custodial parents, as envisaged by the drafters of the Convention’.269  For example, 
the granting of joint legal custody and the ne exeat orders,270 has become 
increasingly common in many jurisdictions.  Also, unilateral relocations by custodial 
parents were often lawful in 1980, but are usually considered unlawful abductions 
today.  In addition, changes in social norms such as the entry of more women into the 
labour market, have given mothers the confidence to take the initiative to break out 
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of unhappy marriages (though not enough to satisfy the Grave Risk of Harm 
Exception), and relocate with their children to another country, in order to improve 
the quality of their own and their children’s lives.  Furthermore, international travel 
has become physically easier and more affordable over the years.271   
 
Researchers in the field of social science have shed a lot of light on the sociological 
and psychological aspects of the separation of a child from their primary carer.272  
The combination of empirical surveys which show that most abductions to which the 
Abduction Convention applies are carried out by primary carers, together with 
scientific evidence as to the irreversible harm that disruption to the primary 
attachment bond causes to young children when separated from their primary 
carer.273  This then should raise questions as to the way in which the mandatory 
return mechanism should be applied to primary carer abductions of young 
children.274   
 
What International Scholars Say About Return Orders Attaching Unenforceable 
Safeguards: 
Professor Carol Bruch275 has stated that returning a child is expected to ameliorate 
danger, but instead exposes the abductor to danger and nothing in the Convention 
suggests this trade-off.  Professor Bruch also opines that Australian and English 
courts have nonetheless returned children in the care of mothers who were under 
death threats, assuming that these women and their children would find refuge in 
battered women’s shelters, pending resolution of their custody disputes.  
Furthermore, some courts are even willing to return children to be placed in foster 
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care, believing that this can protect them from dangers that would result if they were 
returned to the petitioning parent’s care.  These kinds of orders victimize the child 
while also imposing a grave risk of psychological harm or placing the child in an 
intolerable situation.276 
Professor Schuz describes undertakings as ‘sophisticated forms of judicial 
conscience appeasement’277 as ‘there is a good deal of evidence to support the claim 
that undertakings may not achieve their purpose in adequately safeguarding the child 
from harm’.278   
 
The abductor is effectively dependent on the left-behind parent’s willingness 
to keep his word or on the possibility of obtaining appropriate protection 
quickly from the courts which will often not be possible.  Frequently, the fact 
that such immediate protection is not available was the reason for the 
abduction in the first place or for the undertakings.  The problem is 
particularly bad in domestic violence cases both because of the likelihood that 
the sort of people that abuse their spouses will not balk at violating their 
undertakings (e.g., the Hadzic case) and because of the real risks involved in 
renewed violence.  However, the problem of unenforceability has not been 
taken seriously by the courts.  Some feel comity requires them to assume that 
courts and other authorities in the requesting State will take ‘the same serious 
view of a failure to honour undertakings given to a court (of any jurisdiction).  
Alternatively, it is assumed that considerations of comity will motivate the 
courts in the requesting State to give effect to the undertakings.279  
 
Professor Carol Bruch has stated that: 
 
… so-called “undertakings,” first applied in Convention cases by the English 
courts to permit return orders as a matter of discretion despite proven grave 
risks to children of a return, should be prohibited.  Taking these promises 
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from petitioning parents at face value permits judges to avoid an honest 
appraisal of the dangers into which they are sending children and, de facto, 
their caregivers.  In reality, undertakings are breached so often as to make 
them ephemeral.  Proposals that would make them binding on the former 
habitual residence are similarly destined to failure.  Instead, defences should 
be honoured when proven, and the original Convention rule, which placed the 
inconvenience of travel for custody litigation on non-custodial parents, 
should be recognized as a common sense protection for children and – also – 
for their caregivers.280   
A prime example of how undertakings are useless can be found in a 2003 British 
report published by Reunite International.  Violence and non-molestation orders 
made in six U.K. cases along with undertakings that were registered in a court in a 
U.K. court were broken in 67% of cases, therefore not actively protecting the 
children that were returned.281    
Undertakings vs. Mirror Orders: 
 
Dr Rhona Schuz states282 that where undertakings relate to the behaviour of the left-
behind parent after the return, the only way to ensure enforceability is to provide for 
the making of a court order in the requesting state prior to return.  Sometimes the 
court of the requested State requires the applicant to obtain an order from the court of 
the requesting State, known as a mirror order, which would contain parallel 
undertakings to those given to the court in the requested State.  The advantage of 
mirror orders is that undertakings made by the applicant father can be enforceable 
both in the requesting and requested States.283  These types of orders solve the 
problem of the limited duration of undertakings given to the court of the requested 
State.  Since the undertakings are included in a court order of the requesting State, 
they can remain in force until that court cancels them.  However, evidence suggests 
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that mirror orders are not commonly made.284  It is not clear whether the sparse use 
of this apparently effective method of making protective measures enforceable is due 
to a lack of awareness of this possibility by the judiciary/lawyers, or whether there 
are other reasons.   
Two problems with mirror orders were mentioned by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 
Danaipour v McLarey.285  First, it is claimed that the practice of conditioning return 
upon the making of an order by the court in the requesting state ‘would smack of 
coercion of the foreign court’.286  Second, the court takes the view that expecting the 
foreign court simply to copy and enforce the order of the court of the requested State 
‘offends notions of international comity’.287  Neither of these reasons is convincing 
though.  The court in the requested State has a duty to protect the child and in some 
circumstances the only way in which it can be sure that the child’s safety can be 
protected on return is by dictating the conditions of return.  If the foreign court does 
not like the conditions, then the child should not be returned by the requested State.  
To show good faith the court of the requested State should limit the conditions to 
only those necessary to protect the child upon return.  Other reasons for the limited 
use made of mirror orders are that some legal systems do not have the necessary 
procedures for giving such orders, or for the making of particular undertakings.  For 
example, in the Danaipour case the Swedish court did not enter an identical order to 
that given by the U.S. court, holding that ‘the majority of the conditions imposed by 
the Federal Court for a return of the children under the Hague Convention cannot for 
formal reasons be confirmed’.  Another issue with mirror orders is the delay involved 
in making them.  It is submitted that these issues with mirror orders could be solved 
by relatively simple procedural reform by the Member States.   
Australia’s Issue With Return Orders Attaching Unenforceable Safeguards: 
In JLM v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services288 the High 
Court stated that the order of the Full Court of the Family Court returning the child to 
Mexico: 
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… Was premised upon there being judicial proceedings in the country of 
return that would determine with whom the child would reside … The order 
provided for the father to give certain undertakings to the ‘Australian Central 
Authority.’  It is not self-evident how, or by whom, an undertaking to that 
body is enforceable.289  
Although some Australian courts have been critical of the effectiveness of 
undertakings because there is no mechanism to ensure that such an undertaking is 
complied with,290 the current practice generally is to attach undertakings and 
conditions to return orders in the mistaken belief that it will somehow protect abused 
mothers and children upon their return.291  Unfortunately, such undertakings and 
orders are unenforceable in other jurisdictions due to the fact that there is no 
designated power under the Abduction Convention for them to be automatically 
enforced in Australia or in the returning state.   
Further, Item 87 of Schedule 3 of the Family Law Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) 
provides that the Australian Central Authority is not bound to make decisions, 
pending court proceedings, in accordance with any undertakings that may have been 
given in another jurisdiction.  This approach fails to embrace or promote an 
atmosphere of cooperation with respect to this issue.292 
The ALRC Recommendations: 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) has been critical of Australian 
courts using undertakings/conditions to attempt to alieve concerns about domestic 
violence when making return orders.  Their 2010 Domestic violence Report293 noted 
concerns about the practical use and effect of conditions and undertakings ‘as there is 
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no provision in the Hague Convention for automatic enforcement of conditions and 
undertakings made in the returning jurisdiction’.294 
In 2011, the ALRC reiterated their view that the application of the Abduction 
Convention may have unjust consequences when it penalises victims of domestic 
violence who have fled a country with their children for safety reasons.295  The 
ALRC observed that ‘it is not in the child’s best interests to enforce the return of the 
child and mother to the country of habitual residence to determine custody when this 
would expose the child’s mother, and perhaps the child, to serious danger … 
Furthermore, to expose the mother to the trauma, difficulty and cost of returning to 
pursue custody litigation is not consistent with the purpose of the Convention when 
she is a survivor of her husband’s violence and took a reasonable course of action to 
protect herself’.296   
The Australian Law Reform Commission Report On Equality Before The Law 
provides:297 
The principal purpose of the Convention is to deter child abductors by 
preventing any advantage flowing from the removal of a child to another 
country.  This approach works well in the majority of cases where the 
abductor is in fact seeking to thwart the other party by taking the law into his 
or her hands and thereby gain an advantage.  But it can have unjust 
consequences on a person who has a just cause for leaving if it penalises 
those women who have been subjected to violence and who flee with their 
children for their own safety.  It is not in the child's best interests to enforce 
the return of the child and mother to the country of habitual residence to 
determine custody when this would expose the child's mother and perhaps the 
child to serious danger.  Violence against the mother has significant effects 
                                                        
294 Professor Rosalind Croucher, President, ALRC, Submission To The Senate 
Standing Committee On Legal And Constitutional Affairs – Inquiry Into 
International Child Abduction To And From Australia (12/8/2011). 
295 ALRC, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs – Inquiry into International Child Abduction to and From 
Australia (12/08/2011). 
296 ALRC, Equality Before the Law: Justice for Women (Part 1), Report 69 (1994). 
297 ALRC 69, Part IV Violence Against Women, Violence And Family Law (9.39 to 
9.46). 
 Page 109 
 
on the child.  This should be directly reflected in the Family Law Regulations 
so that the child's return should not be ordered if to do so is likely to endanger 
the safety of the parent in whose care the child is.  Furthermore, to expose the 
mother to the trauma, difficulty and cost of returning to pursue custody 
litigation is not consistent with the purpose of the Convention when she is a 
survivor of her husband's violence and took a reasonable course of action to 
protect herself. The Hague Convention gives a court a discretion whether to 
return the child in these circumstances.  Given the strict interpretation the 
court has taken of the Family Law Regulations, they should be amended. The 
issue could also be raised by the Commonwealth as part of its reporting 
functions under the Convention. 
The ALRC recommended in recommendation 9.5:298   
Regulation 16 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Family Law 
Regulations should be amended to provide that in deciding whether there is a 
grave risk that the child's return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or an intolerable situation regard may be had to the 
harmful effects on the child of past violence or of violence likely to occur in 
the future towards the abductor by the other parent if the child is returned.  
The Commonwealth Contracting Authority should be requested to raise the 
problem of women fleeing with their children from violent spouses with the 
monitoring body of the Convention with a view to amending the Convention 
to make it clear that in deciding whether a child should be returned under 
subregulation (3) the Court must take into account the likelihood that the 
child will be exposed to violence or the effects of violence by one parent 
against the other.  The Family Law Regulations should provide that the child 
should not be returned if there is a reasonable risk that to do so will endanger 
the safety of the parent who has the care of the child.  Funds should be 
provided by the Commonwealth to the Commonwealth's contracting authority 
to ensure that in appropriate cases either parent can take action for custody to 
be determined in the Family Court. 
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Those recommendations have never been acted upon by the government, although  
the problem was raised at the Third and Fourth Special Commissions at the behest of 
the Australian delegation.  
 
In 1999, an analysis of 1080 returns under the Hague Convention revealed that 70% 
of abductors were women and the most common reason given by these women for 
the abductions was that they were fleeing from domestic violence.299  The 
Convention was drafted with one main mission in mind – to deal with non-custodial 
fathers kidnapping children across jurisdictions and the mothers having no legal 
recourse to locate and return the child.  The High Court has confirmed this:300  
When preparatory work on the Convention began, it was commonly thought 
that ‘parental abductions were perpetrated by fathers dissatisfied with an 
access award they had or were about to receive in a divorce settlement.’  
Time has shown, however, that many removals and retentions are by mothers 
and concern young children for whom the mother is the principal carer.301 
Because the Abduction Convention was not meant to be applied to domestic violence 
related abduction cases, attaching unenforceable undertakings to return orders does 
not make that law applicable to such cases.  Undertakings aim to structure the 
provision of enforceable protection for the child to be returned and upon return until 
and only the receiving jurisdiction takes over responsibility for the child.302  The 
concept of “undertakings” is based neither in the Convention nor in the 
implementing legislation of any nation.303  Rather, it is a judicial construct, 
developed in the context of British family law.304  The courts attempt to alleviate 
concern for future safety of the abused woman and/or child by giving parties the 
opportunity to give undertakings to each other, and the court can also attach 
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conditions to return orders which supposedly provide protection for abused 
women/children when they return.305   
The change in the profile of the typical parental abductor and the high incidence of 
cases involving domestic violence, together with current knowledge as to the harmful 
effects on children of being exposed to domestic violence, make it essential to ensure 
that the return of children does not in fact cause them harm, rather than protect them 
from harm as intended by the drafters of the Convention.  Initiatives have been taken 
by courts in some countries and by the HCCH to find new ways to protect returning 
children and/or their primary carers.  In particular, in common law countries, wide 
use is made of attaching undertakings and/or pre-conditions to return orders.  
However, as discussed above, these measures are by no means always effective.   
In 2007 the Full Court in McDonald & Director-General, Department of Community 
Services (NSW)306 commented that it is not enough to ensure that there will be 
judicial proceedings in the country of return, but also that there will be suitable 
interim arrangements for the child and care must be taken to ensure that the 
conditions are voluntarily met or can be readily enforced.  In most cases though the 
undertakings/conditions are not voluntarily met and they are unenforceable in other 
jurisdictions so the abused women and/or child suffer, as illustrated by the Cassandra 
Hasanovic case.307 
In summary, undertakings should be done away with as they are unenforceable and 
can be easily ignored once the child is returned.  Return orders made with strict pre-
conditions attached by Australian family courts would give the abused mother better  
protection, as the return order would not take effect until the applicant father satisfied 
all the pre-conditions.  Mirror Orders, although a better alternative than undertakings, 
are generally only reliable if the family law system of the foreign country can be 
relied upon to enforce the mirror order, so they are not completely 
secure.  Unfortunately, the case law suggests that neither type of order is commonly 
made by Australian courts.  
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Hardships Flowing From The Narrow Interpretation of Regulation 16(3)(b): 
Children Exposed to Parental Violence:   
 
As discussed above, witnessing parental violence can have severe detrimental effect 
on children and even go on to affect them in adulthood.  In fact, the witnessing 
and/or exposure to domestic violence  
“has been increasingly recognized  as a form of child abuse, both in Australia 
and internationally … and it can involve a range of incidents, ranging from 
the child ‘only’ hearing the violence, to the child being forced to participate 
in the violence or being used as part of a violent incident. … the documented 
impacts that this exposure can have in children include psychological and 
behavioural impacts, health and socioeconomic impacts and is linked to the 
intergenerational transmission of violence and revictimisation.”308   
Second, applying the Grave Risk of Harm Exception narrowly respects the 
Abduction Convention’s policies of deterrence and comity over the Australia’s 
obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child to protect children from 
harm.309   
The Abduction Convention was drafted long before policy makers really understood 
the devastating impact that exposure to domestic violence has on children.”310  
Unfortunately, to date, there is no evidence that Australian judges have seriously 
embraced the research showing that domestic violence perpetrated against a mother 
can also be seriously harmful to their children.  The result is that return orders are 
made more often than not, so abused women are forced to return with their children, 
only to suffer more abuse, sometimes even death, at the hands of their ex-partner.311   
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In her paper, Shani King explores the ‘imbalance that favours the policy of 
preventing child abduction at the expense of exposing children to domestic 
violence’.312   
Furthermore, Miranda Kaye discusses how the Explanatory Report encourages 
compliance with the Convention and how this overriding concern not to undermine 
the Convention has meant that a decision to return a child will generally be 
considered a ‘good’ decision per se.  She also says that the Convention is treated by 
judges as being apolitical by and non-gendered, and that they feel protected as their 
job is just to interpret the Convention.  They can evade responsibility for decisions 
by wrapping the cloak of legal neutrality around themselves.  The myth is that the 
law is responsible for negative outcomes.313  British Judge Purchas LJ stated in a 
case where domestic violence was alleged that “cases under the treaty very 
frequently appear to expose the mother and the children to considerable hardship. 
That is unavoidable.  The circumstances command the sympathy of the court, but the 
court’s hands are tied by the treaty itself.”314 
In LK v Director-General, Department of Community Services315 the High Court 
recognised that an underlying assumption of the Hague Convention and the 
Australian Family Law Regulations is that it is generally better for a child to be 
returned promptly to familiar surroundings rather than suffer the disruption of an 
international move.  However, the High Court also stated in that case that that 
assumption will not be right in every case.  For example in the case of Secretary, 
Department of Family and Community Services and Prim316 two children 8 and 13 
were ordered by Justice Loughnan of the Sydney Family Court to be returned to 
California despite the taking mother (who was suffering from Huntington’s disease) 
raising the grave risk defence and offering evidence of domestic violence. 
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In the case of Director-General, Department of Communities, Child Safety and 
Disability Services & Rovo317 two children aged 11 and 8 were ordered by Justice 
Kent of the Brisbane Family Court to be returned to New Zealand despite the taking 
mother raising grave risk and offering evidence of abuse perpetrated by the petitioner 
husband towards her and his criminal record for supplying methamphetamines.  
However, the court found “there [was] no evidence of the mother seeking to invoke 
either the domestic violence laws or the family law of New Zealand to deal with 
what she says is the father’s behaviour”318 and stated that “Whilst counsel for the 
mother sought to place emphasis upon the father’s criminal history and in particular 
his drug conviction … I am not persuaded that this of itself means that the children 
would be at grave risk within the meaning of the subregulation.  If a return order is 
made the children’s mother and primary carer will return with them to New 
Zealand.”319 
During the case analysis I did not come across specific reasoning given by the 
Family Court or Full Court of the Family Court as to why they chose to interpret the 
Grave Risk of Harm Exception narrowly.  That approach, though, conforms with the 
Abduction Convention’s policies.  It could also be argued that the High Court ruling 
fourteen years ago that the Exception should be given its natural meaning was 
somewhat qualified by the High Court stating that “clear and compelling” evidence 
of  a Grave Risk of Harm was required to make out the test.  The strict enforcement 
of the “clear and compelling” evidence test allows the family courts to use discretion 
to narrowly interpret the Grave Risk of Harm Exception. 
Abused Mothers: 
Narrowly applying the Grave Risk of Harm Exception puts the Abduction 
Convention’s policies of deterrence and comity above Australia’s obligations under 
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW)320 to protect women from harm.  One of the rights listed 
in CEDAW is the right to protection against gender-based violence.   
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“Gender-based violence is a serious form of discrimination.  While CEDAW 
does not contain an explicit reference to violence against women, the 
CEDAW Committee has issued a General Recommendation which states that 
violence directed against a women because she is woman or violence that 
affects women disproportionately is recognised and addressed as 
discrimination under the convention. … Parties to CEDAW therefore have an 
obligation under CEDAW to take positive steps to eliminate all forms of 
violence against women. The CEDAW Committee asks countries to provide 
information in their regular reports about legislation and other measures it 
uses to protect women from violence, as well as the support services available 
to women.”321   
It is now well known that domestic violence can be a precipitating factor for a 
mother in removing her children to another country.322  Unfortunately, when a taking 
mother arrives in Australia with her children it soon becomes apparent to her that she 
is not entering a warm and protective cocoon, as neither the Abduction Convention 
nor the Australian Family Law Regulations provide real protection for their children 
or any direct protection for them.323    
These issues have likely arisen because the Abduction Convention was not drafted to 
deal with this type of situation.  Indeed, Adair Dyer, former Deputy Secretary 
General of the Hague Conference, recognized even before the time of drafting that 
the “archetypal taking person was the father who had not been awarded custody of 
the child and had thus fled with the child.”324   
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Abused mothers and their children should be protected by the Abduction Convention 
as the Explanatory Report to the Abduction Convention states that the drafters 
inserted Exceptions to the general rule of prompt return and that the Exceptions 
derive from considerations of the best interests of the child.325  It has been stated by 
the leading academic in this area, Professor Merle Weiner, that “this subset of cases 
raises unique issues for policy makers.”326  However, despite the emergence of a new 
kind of abductor over the past fifteen years, that of the primary carer abused mother, 
the Grave Risk Exception is still being narrowly interpreted and applied to a large 
extent in domestic violence related abduction cases and resulting in serious hardships 
for abused women and/or children. 
There Is No Direct Protection For Abused Mothers: 
“Sometimes the batterer is so dangerous that only geographical distance can 
make a difference.”327 
When the Convention was drafted almost three decades ago and it was not even 
considered by the drafters that there could be future cases that involved mothers 
having to flee their homes with their children to escape domestic violence. 
Consequently, there is no provision for direct protection of abused mothers in the 
Convention328 and these mothers then find themselves in a precarious personal and 
legal position when they flee from domestic violence to Australia, something they 
did not anticipate.  Abused mothers such as Cassandra Hasanovic who face the court 
and have their children ordered back know they are returning to further abuse and/or 
death.  When an abused woman is afraid for her safety or that of her child she does 
not think about the future consequences of breaching a court order not to remove the 
child from the jurisdiction.  In cases of severe abuse/domestic violence it could be 
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assumed that victims like Cassandra Hasanovic just want to get away from their 
abuser.  She will find out later that most judges take the breaching of court orders 
extremely seriously.329   
In 2003, California lawyer Roxanne Hoegger proposed that a whole new defence 
should be carved out which meets the needs of the domestic abuse victim.330  She 
asserted that a “domestic violence” defence would allow the country requested of the 
application to assess whether there is credible evidence of domestic violence.331  If 
sufficient proof was found, the court would then adjudicate the custody matter.332  
An adoption of an explicit defence has its benefits; it would draw attention to the 
traumatic effects which domestic violence can have on the child who is witnessing it 
and drive home the message that domestic violence is wholly unacceptable.  
However, it has been stated that a gender-centred exception for the abducting 
custodial mother would create a double standard in Hague Convention cases.  
Moreover, revising the Abduction Convention to accommodate a new defence would 
not be procedurally easy.  It would entail a time-consuming process and provoke 
disagreement among States on numerous issues that countries treat differently.333  
The authoring of a new defence may also spark a contentious debate into the 
possibility of other defences.  Adding more and more defences would dilute the 
efficacy of the Convention.  Most importantly, an explicit domestic violence defence 
may require the courts requested of the application to conduct a detailed enquiry into 
the allegations of domestic violence.  This could not be encouraged as it would 
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331 Ibid 206. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Merle H Weiner, ‘International Child Abduction and the Escape From Violence’ 
(2003) 69 Fordham Law Review 593. 
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frustrate the primary aim of the Convention: to return the child promptly to the State 
of his or her residence. 
Under the Abduction Convention if a mother takes her child to protect herself or the 
child from their habitual residence without the father’s consent, she faces serious 
legal proceedings in Australia instituted by the federal authorities, and possible 
criminal prosecution and imprisonment in the other jurisdiction.334  In the USA, for 
example, there is no statute of limitations for parental kidnapping.335  An abductor 
mother can be sent to federal prison for three years or even longer.336   
Despite the physical and legal consequences which abused women face when they 
leave, there will always be cases where an abused mother has no choice but to flee 
with her children to find protection from her abuser.  In some cases there are, what 
have been called objective, justifiable reasons for a child’s removal, for example if 
an abusive husband has managed to obtain custody orders in his favour from the 
family court in his jurisdiction.  However, even if a petitioner holds a custody right 
and was exercising custody at the time of the taking the Convention does not offer a 
blanket guarantee that the child will be returned and specific defences exist which are 
particularly relevant to domestic violence.  The main defence raised is that there is a 
Grave Risk337 that the return would expose the child to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.338   
Some mothers cannot return with their child even if they want to because they fear 
facing criminal prosecution instigated by their husband339 (despite any written 
undertakings he made to the contrary), and/or by the authorities, and a prison 
                                                        
334 See the Papastavrou case where a Greek husband had issued criminal charges 
against the abused mother for child abduction and there was a high risk she would be 
incarcerated upon her return to Greece if the Australian judge made a return order for 
the children; see also the Garning case where the mother could not return with her 
four daughters to Italy because she would have been arrested and prosecuted by the 
authorities. 
335 U.S. Code: Title 18, Chapter 55, § 1204 (International Parental Kidnapping - 
Statute of Limitations). 
336 U.S. Code: Title 42, Chapter 121, § 11601 (International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act; International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act 1993 (USA)). 
337 Art 13(b). 
338 Carol Bruch, ‘Protecting Children Who Are Abducted By A Parent’ (Summer 
2012), Symposium (A Publication of Shimer College, Chicago IL) 2. 
339 Department of Family and Community Services & Luzzatto [2013] FamCA 1016 
(19 December, 2013). 
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sentence in that jurisdiction, as was demonstrated in the Garning case.  A recent 
example of how serious the Australian and American governments view parental 
child abduction is the recent case of Dorothy Lee Barnett.  Barnett, an American 
citizen, was arrested on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland in 2013 for violating a 
court order and fleeing the USA with her baby daughter 20 years earlier.  Barnett 
was arrested by Australian Federal Police at her home in November 2014 and 
extradited to the USA to face charges of parental kidnapping and falsifying passport 
documents.  She was sentenced to 21 months in prison followed by two years’ 
supervised parole. 
It has been stated that given that a large proportion of mothers abduct their children 
to protect themselves and/or their children from violence, decision-makers in 
Convention cases need a good understanding of domestic violence related 
abductions.340   
Some also face losing their child via court order (if the husband has received orders 
in her absence from the family court), and some face further retribution, even death, 
at the hands of their violent husband.341     
Even if an abused woman does manage to escape, all the petitioner father has to do is 
meet some general criteria and his Hague Application will be accepted by the 
Australian Federal Central Authority.  If he is an American citizen, for example, and 
has managed to get ex parte custody orders in his favour from his jurisdiction, he 
will get the full support of the state and federal legal authorities in that country and 
also the full support of the federal authorities in Australia to locate, serve and 
prosecute the abductor mother, and obtain an order for the immediate return of the 
child.  Further, since it is the goal of the federal authorities to return the child within 
six weeks of the filing of the application, lawyers do not have sufficient time to 
collect evidence that domestic violence occurred in the other jurisdiction (e.g., 
medical records and witness statements).   
                                                        
340 M Kaye, ‘The Hague Convention and the Flight from Domestic Violence: How 
Women and Children are being Returned by Coach and Four’ (1999) 13 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 191. 
341 Department of Community Services & Hadzic [2007] FamCA 1703 (30 November 
2007). 
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There is a high correlation between incidents of child abduction and marriages 
plagued with domestic violence.342  However, the Australian courts have been 
extremely reluctant to have the law evolve to properly deal with domestic violence 
abduction cases.  Rather, the Australian authorities continue to aggressively pursue 
and prosecute abused mothers who have escaped domestic violence situations with 
their children, no differently from taking mothers in other Hague cases.  They 
vigilantly adhere to enforcing an international convention whose drafters did not 
have the foresight to contemplate how to properly deal with future domestic violence 
related abductions.  The solution to this serious issue is not a complex one.  Instead 
of placing the Abduction Convention’s goals of deterrence and comity above the 
safety of an abused mother and/or her child, the courts should adopt the practice of 
interpreting the Grave Risk Exception more broadly by accepting the argument that 
abuse perpetrated against the mother can pose a grave risk of harm to her child.  The 
tragic and avoidable case of Cassandra Hasanovic should have been the catalyst for 
the Australian judiciary to finally recognize that a narrow interpretation of the Grave 
Risk Exception is wrong in such cases.  
Gender Discrimination: 
The case law discussed shows that strict application of the Grave Risk Exception in 
domestic violence related parental abduction cases is resulting in gender 
discrimination against abused women because in most cases where women are the 
taking mother, they lose.  Circumstances surrounding removals are also gendered343 
and the courts should be cognisant of this when making a decision to make a return 
order. 
One reason for this is the gender representation in the legal system.  In most cases, 
taking mothers usually have to face male judges who generally enforce the 
Abduction Convention strictly, not ruling in their favour.  Interesting, research of the 
Australian case decisions showed that female judges were less conservative in 
applying the law.344  
                                                        
342 Krista M Bowie, International Application And Interpretation Of The Convention 
On Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction (March 2001).  Available at: 
http://www.familycourt. gov.au/papers/html/bowie.html.  
343 M Kaye, ‘The Hague Convention and the Flight from Domestic Violence: How 
Women and Children are being Returned by Coach and Four’ (1999) 13 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 191, 200-202. 
344 See the decision in Harris v Harris [2010] FamCAFC 221 (5/11/10) of Justice 
Judith Ryan (Sydney Family Court); and decisions in State Central Authority & 
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Also, there are more male lawyers and judges prosecuting these cases.  The case law 
shows that the narrow application of the Grave Risk Exception to domestic violence 
related abduction cases does not give an ungendered result.       
In her 1999 paper,345 Miranda Kaye explores how “violence against women and 
children influences and impacts upon child removals and how courts have interpreted 
the Abduction Convention in circumstances of violence.  She suggests that “an 
overriding concern by courts and researchers not to undermine the Convention has 
led to a lack of recognition of the fact that the circumstances surrounding abductions 
are inevitably gendered.  She states that certain themes run through these cases which 
are unrealistic given what is known about violence and its impact upon child 
removals.  For example the mother being depicted as hostile and manipulative; an 
unrealistic faith in the ability of the legal system to protect abused women and 
children; an underestimation or dismissal of the harm caused to children by 
experiencing domestic violence; and the irony that now the presence of violence in 
relationships is recognized as so common and ‘special’ consideration to the victims 
of violence would undermine the Convention.  She even goes so far as to say that 
“through these themes the courts are in danger of colluding with the perpetrator of 
violence.”   
In domestic violence related abduction cases the taking mothers should be treated the 
same as the applicant fathers, i.e., with the same access to free legal representation 
and unbiased lawyers and courts, but also treated differently based on their status as 
abuse survivors who are fighting to be free from their abuser.  Another problem is 
the lack of agency that abused women have.  One's agency is one's independent 
capability or ability to act on one's will.  Women often face problems which are 
compounded by economic, legal and justice systems which are firmly and 
unabashedly androcentric, i.e., they are systems designed by men, laws written by 
men, about men, to deal with how men experience the world - including violence.346  
Also, gender inequality occurs when there is structural inequality.  Structural 
                                                                                                                                                             
Perkis [2010] FamCA 649 and State Central Authority & Papastavrou [2008] 
FamCA 1120 of Justice Victoria Bennett (Victoria Family Court).  
345 Ibid. 
346 Soraya Chemaly, ‘50 Facts About Domestic Violence’, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/50-actual-facts-about-
dom_b_2193904.html 
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inequality is the bias that is built into the structure of organisations, institutions, 
governments or, social networks.  Abused mothers are attributed an unequal status in 
relation to other categories of people, i.e., abusive applicant fathers.  
Miranda Kaye states that ‘the championing of neutrality in the guise of fear by 
judges and commentators not to undermine the Convention ignores the fact that 
circumstances surrounding abductions are inevitably gendered.  The seemingly 
objective concern about ‘driving a coach and four’347 through the provisions is 
masking the fact that many of the Hague Convention cases about which the courts 
are concerned or ‘sad’ are those where women are escaping violence.  This context 
of violence and its impact on women and children is not being dealt with adequately 
by courts interpreting the Convention’.  Unless a more realistic approach to violence 
is taken in Convention cases when interpreting “grave risk” defences, the courts 
could be seen as a further tool of the abuser for exercising power and control over 
women and children.  Language and themes in the Convention (and our Family Law 
Regulations) which minimise, trivialise or normalise violence against women and 
children are in danger of colluding with the violent partner.348 
There are several reasons why the Abduction Convention in its current form is not a 
friendly law to abused women who escape domestic violence with their children. 
Hardships or More Violence Upon Return: 
Upon return, taking mothers and their children may have to face housing and 
financial issues, or isolation from family/friends left behind in the requested State.  
They may also have to face their abuser just as twenty four year old Cassandra 
Hasanovic did.  She was killed by her estranged husband shortly after returning to 
the U.K. with her children.  Despite being able to produce a substantial amount of 
documented evidence detailing years of abuse at the hands of her violent husband in 
the form of police reports and restraining orders from U.K. courts, Justice Le Poer 
Trench (Sydney Family Court) ordered her to return her children to the U.K. and 
attached useless conditions to the return order which did not protect her or her 
children.   
                                                        
347 Per Butler-Sloss LJ, Re C (A Minor) (Abduction) [1989] 1 FLR 403 at 410. 
348 M Kaye, ‘The Hague Convention and the Flight from Domestic Violence: How 
Women and Children are being Returned by Coach and Four’ (1999) 13 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 191, 205. 
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Conclusion: 
The Convention’s drafters did not intend for the Abduction Convention to apply to 
domestic violence related child abduction cases.  It is clear that ‘The Hague 
Convention framework makes far less sense as a remedy for abductions by primary 
caretakers, often women, who take their children with them when they flee from 
domestic violence’.349  It is time the Australian family courts recognised this.   
  
                                                        
349 Merle H Weiner, ‘International Child Abduction And The Escape From Domestic 
Violence’ (2000) Volume 69, Issue 2, Fordham Law Review 599. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SOLUTIONS 
This chapter discusses some possible solutions which have been raised in relation to 
this issue. 
The following reforms have been recommended by international scholars and 
academics: 
1) To clarify the Article 13(1)(b) defence in the Abduction Convention, both to 
confirm that children’s exposure to adult domestic violence can meet the 
standard of “grave risk” of physical and/or psychological harm to a child, and 
to make clear that an “intolerable situation” exists for the child if the taking 
mother wife would face a grave risk of physical or psychological harm from 
the petitioner husband upon the child’s return.  The courts should not ignore 
thirty years of scientific evidence that exposure to domestic violence by one 
parent against another can cause significant physical and/or psychological 
harm to children.  Many courts also ignore the fact that it is “intolerable” for a 
child if his/her parent must return to a place in order to be with the child, where 
that parent faces a grave risk of physical/psychological harm from the other 
parent.  It is also an “intolerable situation” to return the child to a battered 
woman’s shelter, another place of hiding, into foster care or institutional care, 
or into the temporary care of the alleged abuser. 
 
2) To make it clear that judges should not use their “discretion” to order return 
when an Article 13(1)(b) or Article 20 defence has been made out.  Without 
this clarification, judges often believe they must return a child, rather than 
allowing them to stay where they are safe – despite recognizing that they face 
likely danger if returned.  Many courts do not protect children because they 
choose to trust law-on-the-books in the other country over the family’s actual 
experience, and choose to rely on unenforceable “undertakings” made by the 
alleged abuser.  Significant evidence indicates that protective laws in many 
countries are often poorly implemented and abusers routinely violate 
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undertakings.350  The Federal Family Law Regulations should make it clear 
that judges lack “discretion” or authority to return a child once an Article 
13(1)(b) or article 20 defence is made out, and that unenforceable undertakings 
are purposeless.  Human safety and fundamental human rights should not be 
balanced against the desire to trust other nations. 
 
3) To replace the “clear and compelling evidence” standard with the civil burden 
of proof, “preponderance of the evidence” (i.e., more than 50%) to establish a 
defence under Article 13(1)(b) or Article 20.  This is because the especially 
high burden of proof in Hague cases is inappropriate for the adjudication of 
human safety.  Such a standard puts the risk of error on children rather than on 
the alleged abuser and the Abduction Convention does not require this shifting 
of the risk of error to children. 
 
4) To make abusive parents bear the fleeing parent’s costs of successfully 
defending the Hague lawsuit and ensure parents fleeing for safety are not 
punished financially for taking protective action in good faith.  The question of 
who pays legal fees is important because it implicates fairness and impacts 
whether the fleeing parent will get legal assistance in the court proceeding.  
The law should award attorney’s fees to the fleeing parent if that parent wins 
the case based on a defence related to the parent’s and/or child’s safety.  
Otherwise, it is very difficult for protective parents to obtain representation to 
defend against a return in a Hague case, putting children at greater risk.  Even 
if the fleeing parent loses the defence (as it is hard to prove domestic 
violence/child abuse when it occurs in private, the evidence is in another 
country and the time line for hearing is short), the protective parent should not 
have to pay the other parent’s attorney’s fees if the protective parent had a 
good faith belief that removing the child was necessary for the parent’s and/or 
child’s safety. 
 
5) That Federal law requires that all judges who adjudicate Hague cases, liaison 
judges and staff at the Central Authority receive training from a curriculum 
approved by a domestic violence organisation on the unique impacts of 
                                                        
350 Department of Community Services & Hadzic [2007] FamCA 1703 (30 November 
2007. 
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domestic violence exposure on children, the links between adult domestic 
violence and child abuse and how/when adult domestic violence could be 
considered a “grave risk” to the child or subject the child to an intolerable 
situation. 
The aforementioned recommendations would have the effect of making proceedings 
under the Hague Convention more fact-based, and therefore more likely to determine 
accurately if either parent is abusive and if so, what are the best interests of the child.  
There is no place for bias in these cases towards either parent.  However, finding and 
analysing the facts is the best way to avoid inadvertently harming the children at the 
centre of these cases.351 
Dr Ruth Lamont cautions that finding a legal solution which satisfies and protects all 
the parties’ rights – those of the left-behind father, the fleeing mother and, most 
importantly, the child – will prove to be a challenge.352   
In April 2012, the HCCH353 recommended that “The Special Commission 
recommends that further work be undertaken to promote consistency in the 
interpretation and application of Article 13(1)(b) including, but not limited to, 
allegations of domestic and domestic violence.354  Legal scholar Kirsten Fleming has 
stated that even before the Sixth Meeting of the Special Commission in 2011, which 
was the most recent meeting, it had been reported that some “States had expressed 
the need for further guidance to promote the consistency in the application of Article 
13(1)(b) where issues of domestic violence are raised.”355  Furthermore, she stated 
that:356 “It was emphasised that Hague return proceedings must nevertheless still be 
                                                        
351 Raymond Calamaro, Hogan Lovells US LLP (on behalf of Professors Merle H 
Weiner, Joan Meier and Taryn Lindhorst), Policy Paper on Law Reform, “Federal 
Law Implementing Abduction Convention Puts Children in Harm’s Way” (2014). 
352 Ruth Lamont, ‘International Child Abduction and Domestic Violence in the 
European Union’, 37 in Stalford H, Currie S, Velluti S (eds.), ‘Gender and Migration 
in 21stCentury Europe’ (Ashgate, 2009). 
353 The Hague Conference On Private International Law. 
354 Recommendation 81. 
355 Kirsten Fleming, ‘Does The United Kingdom’s Current Interpretation Of Article 
13(1)(b) In The 1980 Hague Convention On International Child Abduction Protect 
Victims Of Domestic Violence?’ (April 2014) The Student Journal of Law Issue 6. 
http://www.sjol.co.uk/issue-6/does-the-united-kingdom-s-current-interpretation-of-
article-13-1-b-in-the-1980-hague-convention-on-international-child-abduction-
protect-victims-of-domestic-violence. 
356 Ibid. 
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conducted expeditiously and proper management of domestic violence should not 
compromise this aim.  While it is a positive development that the HCCH has 
explicitly acknowledged the issue of domestic violence in child abduction cases, 
further steps need to be taken to come to a suitable solution.   
Could A Protocol To The Abduction Convention Protect Abused Women And 
Children? 
The HCCH could implement an additional Protocol on protective measures.  The aim 
of the Protocol should be to provide a uniform approach in situations where the child 
and mother are being put back in a situation where they are in close proximity with 
an abusive father.  Because of the strong correlation between child abduction and 
domestic violence, the Protocol should explicitly acknowledge the need for judicial 
and administrative authorities to adopt protective measures in a domestic violence 
context.  In light of the inter-dependent relationship between mother and child and 
the detrimental effects of exposing the child to domestic violence, the Protocol 
should provide for protective measures to secure the safe return of mother and child.   
For the protocol to effectively secure a safe return, it should properly define what 
constitutes “protective measures” and provide a non-exhaustive list, including the use 
of undertakings.  Clarification from the HCCH as to the operation of undertakings 
would be necessary to provide guidance to jurisdictions outside of the common law 
world.  The protective orders made by virtue of the Protocol should be easily 
recognised and enforceable in all contracting States, which would require a high 
level of cooperation between judges and Central Authorities of the different States.  
Judges would require training and the role of the Central Authorities in implementing 
the protective measures must be emphasised by the Protocol.  The potential value of 
a Protocol for the taking of protective measures to secure a safe return of the child 
(and where necessary, the accompanying parent) has been recognised, although it has 
not been regarded as an “immediate priority”.357  However, as cases involving 
                                                        
357 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting of the Special 
Commission (2006) 1.8.3  
http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2
&ved=0ahUKEwj53cCa8aPJAhUGiKYKHYTFAvAQFgghMAE&url=http%3A%2
F%2Fwww.hcch.net%2Fupload%2Fconcl28sc5_e.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEc6O3bbAhq
TgeKSGlS305jxw5IPg 
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victims of domestic violence are on the increase, the focus on facilitating a safe 
return of the child and mother should undoubtedly be an immediate priority.  
This Protocol would complement Australia’s interpretation of Article 13(1)(b) by 
alleviating the dangers exposed to the child returning to a situation of domestic 
violence.  The imposition of a positive obligation on the courts to implement 
enforceable protective measures will mean that the abused taking mother does not 
have the difficult task of proving that the State of origin cannot protect the victim and 
child.  Australia’s dedication to a strict interpretation of Article 13(1)(b) would not 
need to change as the aim of the Protocol would not be to liberalise the interpretation 
of Article 13(1)(b), but to tighten up the protective mechanisms when a return order 
is granted.  Thus, the aims of the Convention will not be undermined.    
The Conclusions of the HCCH’s Fourth Special Commission Meeting to review the 
operation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention (22 - 28 March 2001) expressly 
recommended that Contracting States ‘should consider the provisions of procedures 
for obtaining, in the jurisdiction to which the child is to be returned, any necessary 
provisional protective measures prior to the return of the child’.358  Unfortunately, 
this recommendation does not seem to have had any real impact and the Fifth Special 
Commission Conclusions from the Fifth Special Commission Meeting (October - 
November 2006) raised the possibility of providing a clear legal framework for the 
taking of protective measures to secure the safe return of the child (and where 
necessary the accompanying parent) in a Protocol359 to the Convention.360  The U.K. 
Supreme Court has even urged the HCCH to consider whether procedures might be 
put in place which will enable protective measures to be enforceable in the 
requesting State.361  
The implementation of an additional Protocol to the Abduction Convention to 
provide for protective measures to secure a safe return of the child (and where 
necessary, the accompanying parent) was in fact raised a few years ago, however, no 
                                                        
358 The Fourth Special Commission Conclusions (n 181), rec 5(1). 
359 A “Protocol” is an “amendment”. 
360 The Fifth Special Commission Conclusions (n 112), rec 1.8.3. 
361 Re E [2011] EWCA Civ 361.   
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consensus could be reached by the Member states at that time or since.362  As there 
seems to be no likelihood of a Protocol happening in the near future, it is important 
to find solutions which can be implemented by Australian courts without such an 
instrument.363  
 
Other Suggestions: 
There have been many suggestions for law reform and reform to procedure made by 
legal scholars and lawyers who research and write and work in this area as to how 
legislators/courts should deal with domestic violence related abduction cases: 
1) to adopt an explicit “domestic violence defence.”364 
2) to stay the Hague application to allow female domestic violence victims and 
their children to continue living in Australia while the parties mediate or 
litigate for parenting rights in the courts of the child’s habitual residence.  
Abused women would not then be compelled to litigate custody of their child 
in an unsafe venue.365 
3) to implement a program such as international mediation (e.g., via Skype366 or 
FaceTime367) as a concept to encourage solutions through cooperation 
between the parties involved, their lawyers and the Central Authorities.368 
                                                        
362 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention, A Critical Analysis, 
Volume 13 in the series Studies in Private International Law, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), 441.  
363 Ibid 441. 
364 Merle H Weiner, ‘International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence’ (2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 593, 600; Roxanne Hoegger, ‘What if She 
Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague Convention and the 
Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Women’s Law 
Journal 183. 
365 Merle H Weiner, ‘International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence’, (2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 593, 600, 634. 
366 Wikipedia defines “Skype” as a telecommunications application software product 
that specializes in providing video chat and voice calls from computers, tablets and 
mobile devices via the Internet to other devices or telephones/smartphones.  Users 
can also send instant messages, exchange files and images, send video messages and 
create conference calls.  
367 Wikipedia defines “FaceTime” as a video-telephony and from September 2013 
also voice over IP (VoIP) – software application and related protocols, developed by 
Apple Inc. for supported mobile devices running iOS and Macintosh computers 
running Mac OS X 10.6.6 onwards. 
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4) to abolish the “exceptional circumstances” test for separate legal 
representation of the abducted child and/or their interests and automatically 
appoint a legal representative for a child when their parents are parties to a 
Hague proceeding, as is done by the courts in Switzerland.369 
5) Redefine the term “abduction”:  Some have suggested restoring the position 
intended by the drafters by redefining the term “abduction” so that it only 
includes removal by a non-primary carer .370  However, this proposal may be 
inappropriate for two main reasons.371  First, removals by primary carers still 
violate the child’s right to contact with the other parent unless the child’s 
relationship with the left-behind parent was not significant or was damaging 
to the child.  Second, that kind of proposal is swimming against the tide of 
social and legal change in many countries in which fathers are playing greater 
roles in the upbringing of their children.   
6) to introduce Judicial Liaison:372  Liaison between the judge hearing an 
application for the return of a child under the Abduction Convention and a 
judge in the requesting State both of whom have been trained to deal with 
domestic violence cases, can assist in overcoming obstacles to return, has 
become increasingly accepted over the last decade.  The Permanent Bureau 
has published a document containing guidance and general principles in 
relation to judicial communications, the use of which was approved at the 
Sixth Special Commission.  This document lists seven examples of matters 
which may be subject to communication.  Five of these are relevant to the 
need to protect the returning child from harm. 
                                                                                                                                                             
368 Krista M. Bowie, International Application And Interpretation Of The Convention 
On Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction (March 2001), 26.  Available at: 
http://www.familycourt. gov.au/papers/html/bowie.html. 
369 Merle H Weiner, ‘Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following 
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases’ (2008) American University Law 
Review, 58:335, 376. 
370 Carol Bruch, ‘The Promises And Perils Of A Protocol To The 1980 Convention 
On The Civil Aspects Of International Child Abduction’ (2011) 1 Festschrift Fur 
Ingeborg Schwenzer 237, 239-41. 
371 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention, A Critical Analysis, 
Volume 13 in the series Studies in Private International Law, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), 440. 
372 Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention, A Critical Analysis, 
Volume 13 in the series Studies in Private International Law, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), 296. 
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1. Are protective measures available for the child or other parent in the 
State where the child would be returned? 
2. Can the foreign court accept and enforce undertakings offered by the 
parties in the initiating jurisdiction? 
3. Is the foreign court willing to entertain a mirror order (same order in 
both jurisdictions) if the parties are in agreement? 
4. Were orders made by the foreign court? 
5. Were findings about domestic violence made by the foreign court?      
Judicial communication could be helpful in providing the information necessary to 
ensure that protective measures are effective.  However, care needs to be taken that it 
does not replace effective and enforceable provisional measures. 
 
Conclusion: 
Under Australian law court-imposed conditions must be purposely related to the 
Abduction Convention’s objects of facilitating return of the child.  However, a 
finding of “grave risk” by the Australian court ordering return is not 
necessary.373  For example, in the case of State Central Authority and Fouadi,374 the 
judge attached conditions to the return order that the applicant father deposit enough 
money into the mother’s bank account for airfares, travel and accommodation, that 
he agree to the children living with the mother with him having supervised visitation, 
that he obtain from the Los Angeles Family Court evidence that the court has noted 
his undertaking to not approach or harass the mother or her family, that he have any 
orders he received from the Los Angeles Family Court in his favour vacated and 
obtain orders giving both parents joint custody of the children.   
The courts must seriously consider the hardships that women and children in these 
cases will face when being ordered to return.  For example, what is the mother’s 
legal status in the other jurisdiction?  Will she be allowed back into the other 
                                                        
373 International Child Custody, A Common Law Judicial Conference (September 
18-21, 2000) Washington DC: Issues Surrounding Safe Return of the Child (and the 
Custodial Parent) by The Delegation From the Commonwealth of Australia (Family 
Court Australia), 19.  
374 [2010] FamCA 12 (22 January 2010). 
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jurisdiction?  If not, how will this affect the child?375  Will the mother be arrested in 
the other jurisdiction upon return?  Are mother and child returning to an 
abusive/violent situation?  Does the mother have somewhere safe to live with the 
child?  Do they have personal support from family or friends upon return?  What is 
the mother’s psychological frame of mind?  Is she so afraid of return that she may 
harm herself or her child?  What is her financial situation?  Can she work to support 
herself and the child?  Will she get government support upon her return?  Will she 
and her child have access to affordable medical care?  Can she afford to retain legal 
counsel to represent her in the other jurisdiction?  Currently, the family courts refrain 
from addressing these very important questions which directly affect the lives of 
abused mothers and their children. 
The Australian family courts are strictly enforcing the Abduction Convention at the 
expense of ensuring abducted children and their abused mothers are protected from 
future harm.  It is submitted that despite the intelligent suggestions discussed above, 
the most viable solution to this issue is for the courts to embrace a broader 
interpretation of Regulation 16(3)(b), so that evidence of abuse/violence perpetrated 
against the taking mother by the applicant father, or evidence that a child has been 
exposed to serious parental violence, satisfies Regulation 16(3)(b) and no return 
order is made.  If a return order must be made in a domestic violence related 
abduction case it is strongly suggested that only strict enforceable pre-conditions 
which the courts can make pursuant to Regulation 15(1)(c) are attached which must 
be satisfied before the child is removed from Australia. 
                                                        
375 Director General of Family and Community Services and Davis (1990) 14 
FamLR 381.  The taking mother argued there was a grave risk to the children if 
returned without her being given immigration clearance by other country. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter sums up the main arguments made in this thesis. 
The Abduction Convention’s Explanatory Report of April 1981376 states that the 
Exceptions are to be interpreted ‘in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to 
become a dead letter’ and that ‘it cannot be inferred … that the Exceptions are to 
receive a wide interpretation’.  However, in 2001 the Australian High Court held that 
the term “grave risk of harm” is not to be interpreted narrowly, although evidence of 
grave risk of harm [to the child] should be clear and compelling.377   
The main issue which this thesis has sought to illuminate is how Australian courts 
have been reluctant to embrace the High Court’s 2001 decision.  That is, they have 
not made it their practice to interpret the Grave Risk of Harm Exception more 
broadly by accepting that clear and compelling evidence of abuse/violence 
perpetrated against the primary carer taking mother by the applicant father, or 
evidence that the abducted child has been exposed to serious parental violence 
satisfies Regulation 16(3)(b).  The family courts have consistently interpreted 
Regulation 16(3)(b) narrowly when they have to evaluate what constitutes clear & 
compelling evidence of a grave risk of harm to a child or what constitutes an 
intolerable situation.  Unfortunately, this approach has created major problems for 
abused women and children.  
Sadly, domestic violence is on the increase in all countries, including Australia,378 
and it affects women and children in all socio-economic groups.379  Despite this 
                                                        
376 See [34] and [116]. 
377 In DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401. 
378 The 2012 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Personal Safety Australia survey 
found that one in six women in Australia (or 16.9%) suffered some form of physical 
or sexual violence from a current or former partner since the age of 15. About one in 
four women had experienced some form of emotional abuse in the same 
circumstances.  *This does not take into account underreporting of domestic 
violence. (http://theconversation.com/out-of-the-shadows-the-rise-of-domestic-
violence-in-australia-29280); http://www.womensagenda.com.au/talking-about/top-
stories/two-women-are-now-killed-by-domestic-violence-every-week-the-time-for-
discussion-is-over-it-s-time-to-act/201502185319 
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trend, the Australian family courts still choose to enforce strictly the Abduction 
Convention even in domestic violence related abduction cases.  This serious issue 
has been addressed in other jurisdictions such as Switzerland and the United States 
where lawmakers and courts have taken steps to deal more sensibly and 
compassionately with domestic violence related child abductions.380  The same 
reform could be undertaken in Australia with little effort.381   
The Abduction Convention was not drafted to punish women or children who try to 
escape an abusive life.  Its underlying goal was child protection, albeit without any 
consideration about how to deal properly with future cases involving domestic 
violence related abductions.  It is not clear why Australian courts steadfastly remain 
reluctant to embrace a broader approach to interpreting Article 13(1)(b).  However, 
in cases where abused mothers have fled to Australia with their children the 
Australian courts should be handling such cases in a different manner to that of 
abduction cases where there is no evidence of domestic violence.     
It is submitted that Australia’s legal system is out of step with the European High 
Court and the United States Federal Courts, as Australia seems dedicated to 
honouring the Abduction Convention at all costs, even if that means enforcing this 
international law against abused women and children who have fled violence.   
It could even be argued that Australian courts are harder on taking mothers in Hague 
Cases than they are on abductor fathers.  For example, in Garning382 the taking 
mother fought hard against the return of her four daughters to Italy to what Justice 
Forrest described as their ‘overly authoritative father’.  The four children were 
forcibly returned to Italy despite the mother retaining experienced family lawyers to 
defend the case and taking the case as far as possible through the legal system.  
                                                                                                                                                             
379 Sophie McBain, ‘When Wealthy Women Experience Domestic Violence’ 
(26/7/13).  Available at:  http://www.newstatesman.com/business/2013/07/when-
wealthy-women-experiences-domestic-violence. 
380 Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (2010), European Court of Human Rights; 
Merle H Weiner, ‘Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following 
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, (2008) 58 Am.U.L.Rev. 335. 
381 Professors Merle H Weiner, Joan Meier and Taryn Lindhorst, USA Policy Paper: 
‘Federal Law Implementing Abduction Convention Puts Children in Harm’s Way’ 
(2014).  
382 [2011] FamCA 485. 
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However, the taking father in Kerrigan & Raiffe383 (decided by Justice Cassidy, 
Brisbane Federal Circuit Court), received a much different result.  The taking father 
kidnapped his daughter to India in 2012 because he was angry about his divorce from 
his Australian wife.  India is not signatory to the Convention.  The father managed to 
obtain custody orders in India which allowed the child to live there with him 
permanently and the Australian mother filed an application for the girl’s return.  On 
16 August, 2013 the father was ordered by Justice Cassidy to return the child to 
Australia but he flagrantly breached those orders and then had the audacity to return 
to Brisbane thereafter - without the child.  He was subsequently found in contempt of 
court and jailed ‘indefinitely’ by Justice Cassidy.  However, to the mother’s dismay, 
he was released after serving only three months and departed Brisbane for India 
where he could continue to live with the kidnapped child.  Despite Justice Cassidy 
stating that ‘the child was now likely to remain overseas, with the mother and 
daughter unlikely to have any opportunity for a relationship’, she decided to release 
the abductor father after only a few months in prison.  Comparing these two cases, it 
could be argued that Australian courts are more inclined to use the full force of the 
law against mothers accused of kidnapping their child back to Australia, but are not 
as serious about punishing fathers who kidnap children from Australia.    
The structure of the Abduction Convention and the judiciary’s desire to enforce 
strictly the return principle have resulted in inadequate protections for domestic 
violence victims and their children.  Accordingly, Australian courts must ensure that 
protective measures do indeed provide effective and enforceable protection for 
children and where this cannot be guaranteed, they have to refuse return.     
 
Well respected United States’ Jurist, Roscoe Pound384 opined that “The law must be 
stable, but it must not stand still.”  However, although primary carer abductions have 
increased substantially over the past ten years, neither the Australian lawmakers nor 
the judiciary have attempted to amend our laws, even though other jurisdictions have 
done so.  Changes to our legal system are long overdue.  Australia has to now 
recognize that the face of international parental child abduction has changed from 
                                                        
383 (No. 2) [2013] FCCA 2240 (18 December, 2013). 
384 Nathan Roscoe Pound (October 27, 1870 to June 30, 1964) was a distinguished 
American legal scholar and educator.  He was Dean of Harvard Law School from 
1916 to 1936.  The American Journal of Legal Studies has identified Pound as one of 
the most cited legal scholars of the 20th century. 
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being that of the non-custodial father to the abused primary carer mother, and to 
make appropriate modifications to our laws to better handle such cases.   
For our courts to continually apply Regulation 16(3)(b) narrowly in domestic 
violence cases is manifestly unjust.  It is submitted that a legal and moral duty is 
owed by Australian legislators to recognize that the Family Law (Child Abduction 
Conventions) Regulations 1986 (Cth) must now be amended to more fairly deal with 
domestic violence related abduction cases as has been recommended by the 
ALRC.385  However, it does not seem that legislative amendment is on the horizon, 
therefore it is up to our judiciary to embrace a broader interpretation of Regulation 
16(3)(b) when it is raised in cases when there is clear evidence that a taking mother 
has fled domestic violence perpetrated by the applicant father against her, or the 
child has been exposed to serious parental violence.  This evidence should constitute 
a grave risk of future harm to the abducted child or create an intolerable situation so 
that the child’s return is not ordered.   
Only after urgent changes are made to our legal system can we begin moving 
forward in the direction of protection instead of prosecution. 
  
                                                        
385 Family Violence – A National Legal Response (ALRC Report 114). 
https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications 
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APPENDIX A 
QUEENSLAND COMMUNITY AND LEGAL RESOURCES 
AVAILABLE TO AUSTRALIAN CITIZENS 
Financial Support: 
 
Emergency grants of financial assistance may be available from Centrelink.  
Australian citizens can contact Centrelink on +61 3 6222 3455 (from outside 
Australia) or 132 468 from within Australia.   
Legal Representation: 
There a huge disparity between Australia’s Federal Government funding made 
available for the legal representation of the applicant parent filing the Hague 
Application and the taking mother who is usually made to find a way to defend 
herself.  The Family Law Regulations provide that the applicant is not required to 
bear any personal legal costs as the Australian federal government automatically 
meets the costs of the State Central Authorities in giving effect to Australia’s 
obligations under the Convention, including the cost of interpreters.386  This is not 
the case for taking mother who have four avenues for representation (i) apply for 
Legal Aid funding (and likely be denied); (ii) pay for her own legal representation, 
(iii) find pro bono representation; or (iv) appear in pro per.  Legal Aid387 and the 
Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (which only represents Indigenous 
Australians) are the main organizations that can fund a taking mother’s defence. 
Legal Aid, which has office throughout Queensland, has the primary financial ability 
to fund a defence.  However, the applications for funding to defend Hague cases are 
severely scrutinized.  A taking mother making an application must pass a “means” 
(income/assets) test.  Applicants who rely on full Centrelink payments for their 
income are deemed to be eligible under the income test.  All other applicants are 
required to provide their gross weekly income and the number of people who rely on 
                                                        
386 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (entered 
into force 1 December 1983), art 26. 
387 www.legalaid.qld.gov.au 
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that income for consideration in the income test.  Applicants must also pass an 
almost insurmountable “merits” test in order to get funding for representation.    
To satisfy the merits test, the applicant must meet each of the following three tests:  
a. the Reasonable Prospects of Success test  
b. the Prudent Self-Funding Litigant test, and  
c. the Appropriateness of Spending Limited Public Legal Grants of 
 
The Reasonable Prospects of Success test is met only if, on the information provided 
to Legal Aid Queensland, it appears to Legal Aid Queensland that, on the legal and 
factual merits, the proposed action, application, defence or response for which a 
grant of legal assistance is sought is more likely than not to succeed.  
 
The Prudent Self-Funding Litigant test is met only if Legal Aid Queensland 
considers that a prudent self-funding litigant would risk his or her own financial 
resources in funding the proposed action, application, defence or response for which 
a grant of legal assistance is sought. 
 
The Appropriateness of Spending Limited Public Legal Grants of Legal Assistance 
Funds test is met only if Legal Aid Queensland considers that the costs involved in 
providing the assistance are warranted by the likely benefit to the applicant or, in 
appropriate circumstances, the community. 
In a nutshell, the Reasonable Prospects of Success test is met only if it appears on the 
legal and factual merits, the proposed action, application, defence or response for 
which a grant of legal assistance is sought is more likely than not to succeed.388  
Consequently, the decision to fund a defence is based on the amount of evidence a 
taking mother can produce to prove the defence(s) they want to argue in their 
defence.  This is where most taking mothers fail as they flee without sufficient 
evidence in their possession and the short timeframe in these cases prevents them 
from obtaining such evidence from the other jurisdiction. 
                                                        
388 Legal Aid Queensland - Grants Policy Manual (2006), 
http://www.legalaid.qld.gov.au/ABOUT/POLICIES-AND-
PROCEDURES/GRANTS-POLICY-MANUAL/Pages/The-merits-test.aspx 
 Page 139 
 
ATSILS also has the capacity to fund these types of cases, if they choose to.  
However, from personal experience, Queensland ATSILS has very limited 
experience dealing with Hague cases.  Although they do have a family law section 
and they are able to retain an experienced family law Barrister for advice and/or 
representation at trial (or even find one to act pro bono).  The Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Women’s Legal & Advocacy Service (Milton, Brisbane) provides 
legal and other assistance by way of information, referrals and legal advice for 
Indigenous women.389   
Working Against Violence Support Service (WAVSS +61 7 3808 5566) can provide 
information about obtaining a Domestic Violence order upon your return to 
Australia. 
A taking mother may need to contact several different services before they find 
somebody who is willing and able to help provide free/affordable legal advice and/or 
representation for a Hague case. 
It should be noted that it is a very different situation where a child is abducted from 
Australia.  The applicant is afforded support by the Australian Government.  An 
application for financial assistance for the return of the child may be made to the 
Attorney-General’s office under the Federal Overseas Custody (Child Removal) 
Scheme.  The scheme provides financial assistance to parents for expenses for legal 
representation overseas and for reasonable costs associated with securing the return 
of the child, for example travel and accommodation costs for the parent in Australia 
to travel overseas and accompany the child back to Australia.  Funding is even 
available for Australian parents to employ a private investigator to locate the child 
overseas.  Applications under that Scheme can be made to the Financial Assistance 
Section, Legal Assistance Branch, Attorney-General’s Department.390  The 
Commonwealth of Australia is not responsible under the Convention for any costs 
incurred by a left behind parent, for airfares for the return of the child from Australia 
to the country of habitual residence.  An undertaking may be required from overseas 
parent to pay for the travel and related costs of returning the child.  However, an 
                                                        
389 www.atsiwlas.com.au 
390 Comments by Jane Selwood from the Central Authority, Attorney General’s 
Department, Canberra (6/5/09). 
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applicant can request that the responsible Central Authority obtain a Court order 
directing that the abducting parent pay the necessary expenses incurred by or on 
behalf of the applicant, including travelling expenses and costs incurred to locate a 
child.391 
 
Below is a list of the major Emergency Relief Services, Community Services and 
Hostels currently operating in the Brisbane area.392  The Brisbane Community 
Directory also provides up-to-date information on Crisis & Emergency 
Accommodation in the Brisbane on-line.393 
Emergency Accommodation/Relief Services: 
139 Club, 505 Brunswick St., Fortitude Valley, 32541144, provides use of amenities 
(showers, toiletries, washing machine, beds), cheap meals, food parcels, help with 
rent, utilities and prescriptions. 
Salvation Army, 398 St Paul’s Tce Brisbane, 32528608, provides food vouchers, 
parcels, clothing, etc., (+61 1300 36 36 22). 
St. Vincent De Paul Family Support Centre, 44 Taylor Street Woolloongabba, 
30101096, provides food vouchers, parcels, clothing, rent and limited bills (+61 7 
3010 1000)  
Wesley Mission, 316 St Paul’s Terrace, Fortitude Valley, 32161579, provides food 
parcels, prescription help,  
Trinity Centre Welfare, 874 Ann St., Fortitude Valley, 38521635, provides food 
parcels, help with rent, medication, utilities. 
Free / Low Cost Hostels: 
Women’s House Domestic Violence Support, Woolloongabba, 3391 0005, takes 
females and children for short term secure and confidential accommodation. 
Othila’s Young Women Housing & Support Service, Stones Corner, 3847 9633, 
takes only females and children for a maximum of 3 months.  
                                                        
391 Comments made by Lee Mather, Legal Aid Western Australia. 
392 See Appendix B. 
393http://www.mycommunitydirectory.com.au/Queensland/Brisbane/Accommodation
_Services/Crisis___Emergency_Accommodation/ 
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Southside Community Care, Inc., Mount Gravatt, 3343 1441, takes families and 
offers short term crisis accommodation for families who are homeless or at risk of 
being homeless. 
Brisbane Homeless Service Centre Micah Projects Inc., South Brisbane, 3036 4444, 
offers after hours services, financial assistance, showers, meals, advice and support. 
Community Services: 
DV Connect provides crisis intervention, support, information, advocacy, telephone 
counselling, referrals and state wide coordination of emergency refuge and shelter 
placements across Queensland (1800 811 811 or www.dvconnect.org) 
Brisbane Domestic Violence Service (www.bdvs.org.au) 
Working Against Violence Support Service, Woodridge, Qld (www.wavss.org) 
Domestic Violence Prevention Centre, Gold Coast, Qld 
(www.domesticviolence.com.au) 
Family Relationships Online, http://www.familyrelationships.gov.au 
The Migrant Women’s Advice Service, Nambour, Qld. 
(www.migrantwomensadvice.com) 
Logan United Counselling Centre (www.luc.org.au) 
Youth and Family Service, Logan, Qld (yfs.org.au) 
Australia’s CEO Challenge based in Brisbane city promotes the prevention and 
alleviation of domestic and domestic violence. (www.ceochallengeaustralia.org) 
Legal Representation: 
Legal Aid (Qld) www.legalaid.qld.gov.au 
The Access to Justice website, www.accesstojustice.gov.au 
The Women’s Legal Service (www.immi.gov.au). 
Women’s Infolink on +61 1800 177 577. 
The Family Law Network Australia (is a free information resource and referral 
service for family law matters) www.familylawmattersaustralia.com.au. 
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The South West Brisbane Community Legal Centre, Inc., Inala, Qld provides free 
legal advice and assistance in many areas of law including domestic violence, family 
law and child protection (www.communitylegal.org.au).    
The Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (*only represents Indigenous 
Australians).  Level 5, 183 North Quay, Brisbane QLD 4000, (07) 3025 3888 or toll 
free 1800 012 255, www.atsils.org.au. 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Women’s Legal & Advocacy Service 
(Milton, Brisbane) provides legal and other assistance by way of information,  
referrals and legal advice for Indigenous women.  Freecall: 1800 442 450, Phone: 07 
3720 9089, reception@atsiwlas.com.au, http://www.atsiwlas.com.au 
QAILS (Qld Association of Independent Legal Services, Inc.) is the state based peak 
body representing funded and unfunded Community Legal Centres operating 
throughout Qld (www.qails.org.au). 
Young & Associates Family Lawyers (Browns Plains, Qld, 07 3503 6883)  
Offer free initial telephone consultations for domestic violence victims and are a 
Legal Aid Preferred Supplier.  They can assist clients with the compilation and 
submission of Legal Aid forms and can represent a client in court to obtain a 
protection order (www.yafl.com.au).   
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